The Libyan National Conference (LNC) is a "process" (مسار تشاوري) of a series of conferences held across
the country in 2018. The LNC was announced as part of the September
Road-Map that was declared
by the UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General to Libya number 6, Dr. Ghassan Salamé, on the 20th of September 2017 — shortly after the GNA was imposed in 2016.
The LNC
is also called the National Conference (المؤتمر الوطني) or
the Unifying Conference (المؤتمر الجامع), while the process is known as the Libyan National Conference Process (LNCP). The UN seem confident about their latest adventure as they were about the GNA, which although the UN claimed it will create a "national accord", it has in fact created more discord and even painful wars; leaving the Libyans to ask:
Why abandon the HoR soon after it was elected only to impose the PC (and its illegal GNA)?
Why abandon the PC and the GNA soon after they were imposed? Why organise a process to create yet another transitional government, the GNU (the Government of National Unity), which in turn will organise elections for, yet, a sixth transitional government: NTC, GNC, HoR, GNA, GNU, and the sixth is the government to be elected on the 24th of December 2021 under the supervision of the GNU, which is referred to as "the 4th transitional period" by the head of the HNEC, Mr. Imad Sayeh.
The consultation phase of the LNC extended from April to July 2018, comprising 77 conferences held in 43 locations across Libya (see LNCP tab for a full list). The UN has appointed another foreign organisation
to run the event, namely the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (HD) (منظمة الحوار الإنساني). The appointed HD was claimed to have worked with local organisers, such as municipalities, universities, civil society organizations, and military groups, of course.
The framework for the consultation meetings was "a set of questions in the form of an agenda allegedly designed to generate discussion", they said. The questions were rather absurd, because they address basic needs that are required for any country to exist, like "the need for sovereignty", "unity", "security", and "public services" — all the issues that should have been thought out by the UN as part of an exit strategy before its bombing campaign pulverised law and order in Libya.
Is there a country in the world that does not want sovereignty, unity or public services? These are not simple questions to be discussed by a handful of people in conferences attended by a handful of people; they are fundamental pillars of any sovereign state that should be stated by law, enshrined by the constitution, and above all respected by the UN.
Obvious logic tells us that, if a few tiles fall off the roof, you do not wait for the rain to pour in and destroy everything in the house before you replace them. But to take down the entire roof of your "home", let your children shiver under the merciless rain for ten years, then get them to talk about how to put a new roof over their heads is criminally insane. Certainly the UN or any of its Western allies will "not try that at home".
So Who is this HD?
The website of the UN-appointed HD (https://www.hdcentre.org/activities/libya/) starts its Libya
introduction literally with a "pack of lies". Here is how:
"On 15 February 2011, major demonstrations erupted throughout
Libya seeking the removal of Muammar Al-Qaddafi." [2]
Turning "one" to "throughout Libya" is
wrong and a lie — probably instigated to beat the drums of war and regime change.
Secondly, this small protest did not call for the removal of Gaddafi; full stop. It was calling
for the release of Abu Salim prisoners whom Gaddafi imprisoned in 1996 because they
(the prisoners) were attacking European embassies in Benghazi in response to the offensive "Danish
cartoons" then printed in Europe. This means that Gaddafi was making sure of the safety of his European guests.
Then the UN-appointed HD continues with more lies:
"They began peacefully
but on 17 February, forces loyal to Qaddafi fired on demonstrators,
killing hundreds and provoking resignations from some officials in
Qaddafi’s own cabinet, several prominent Libyan diplomats and members
of the security forces in the eastern region of the country."[2]
Thirdly, the UN-appointed HD claim that the ensued protests of the 17th of February
began peacefully is also a lie, since although the women protest of the 15th of February was indeed peaceful, we have many international
organisations reporting the 17th of February protest (by men) as an "armed conflict" in
which protestors were shooting at government soldiers and burning government
buildings, with black smoke rising to the sky for all to see. It is hopeless trying to replace one tyranny with another just because one has more power than the other.
Then the UN-appointed HD continues:
"Following
a brutal campaign, which exerted a high toll on both sides, revolutionary
forces finally overcame the last bastions of Qaddafi support in Sirte
on 20 October. Qaddafi was found and killed while fleeing the city."[2]
And to imply revolutionary forces eventually
toppled and killed Gaddafi is also not true, because there was no mention
of the simple fact that foreign military powers representing nearly 50 countries
were bombing Libya day and night for nearly 7 months, completely destroying
Libya's entire infrastructure; and there was no mention of the fact that Gaddafi's personal convoy was
bombed by European military jets while leaving Sirte, after which he was brutally killed. Now why should the Libyans trust such an organisation to run the LNC when we are urged to be honest and transparent?
Critics of the LNC are puzzled by the lack of information about the LNC. There is no definition of the conference nor of its terms of reference, and there is no complete idea about the conference. The published report was dated to November 2018 — around four months after the LNC was concluded.
Another problem with the LNC, critics say, is that it is going to include only a small group of representatives who may not represent all the Libyans including all the ethnic and political groups.
They were right, as the total number of all participants in all the 77 conferences from the whole of Libya turned out to be 5258 Libyans (plus around 1700 who took part via online venues). Such low number is hardly representative of the entire country. For example, under 200 people attended from the whole of Tripoli (a city of around 2 million people). How on earth 200 people out of 2 million could debate the sovereignty destroyed by the UN?
Anyone asking any questions regarding the role of militias in failing all the previous governments? Well; according to the chairman of the HoR's Dialogue Committee, Mr Nassia, the LNC would only be effective and fruitful if held under the authority of a unified government [7]. There is no point in holding the conference now, he said, because there is no one to guarantee the outcome of the conference.
The UN launches The Libyan National Conference Process
انطلقت اليوم في زوارة فعاليات الملتقى الوطني الليبي
5 April 2018
The Libyan National Conference Process [LNCP] (المسار التشاوري
للملتقى الوطني الليبي)
The LNCP, also known as the Libyan National Gathering [LNG], or the Libyan
National Forum (LNF), was launched in Zuwarah and Benghazi on Thursday
the 5th of April 2018 in coordination with the Humanitarian Dialogue
Centre and under the auspices of the UNSMiL.
Spiraling towards the abyss, the UN says the LNCP aims to work "horizontally",
in contrast to the Skhirat saga which started "vertically": الملتقى يعمل منذ البداية بشكل أفقي على عكس مسار حوار الصخيرات
الأممي الذي بدأ بشكل عمودي
"Libyans! what Libyans? There are no Libyans".
The September Road-Map to Include The 1st of September Loyalists
Many Libyans, some of whom were labelled "Greens" or "Gaddafi's
loyalists", were butchered, reportedly skinned alive in Mesratha, and even "pulverised" during the UN bombing campaign. Libyan journalists too were bombed and killed by the UN-authorised forces. When NATO's chief was asked about such war crimes, he justified the killing of journalists by stating that the journalists were "spreading propaganda", despite
the fact that international law prohibits the murder of journalists during
conflict.
Of course, in reality it was the other way round; many of the UN-athorised military operations in 2011 were based on media propaganda to weaken Gaddafi's support and effect defeat, like dropping leaflets from the sky telling the Libyans to surrender because the government was defeated when it was not.
All that is history now, but the point is that such foreign policies resulted in sowing the seeds of hatred, and consequently divided the Libyans against each other. The international community then set back and watched as Libya was ravaged by the horrors of the UN-imposed war; looted by the world's terror groups; and plunged in total chaos and darkness, with the UN-protected Libyan civilians blasting each other across the country. No one said anything about it; just "bomb and go" — the international definition of protection.
To add insult to injury, the self-appointed NTC imposed its "isolation law", officially persecuting Gaddafi's loyalists, and even banned freedom of speech in that any Libyan reported criticising the so-called "revolution" or the "flag" of the ousted fascist monarchy will be arrested and punished by law. As a gesture of embracing the newly imposed democracy, the installed leaders also banned demonstrations and peaceful protests.
Now, after the damage had been done, the shameless UN is reversing the wheel of misfortune, by talking about national reconciliation while telling us
to include "Libyans" in the "Libyan dialogue" that is designed by foreign entities, hosted in foreign countries, and with foreign agendas the Libyans seemingly still oblivious to.
The Libyans do not need the UN to remind them of national reconciliation only when it is too late, because the Libyans were the first to call for national reconciliation on 2012, as called
for by Dr. Magarief; after which he too was persecuted, nearly killed, then forced to leave. Dr. Magarief also urged the Libyans "not
to be pawns on others' chessboard".
In fact the Libyans, back then, never wanted violence or hostilities as much as they wanted to resolve their differences by themselves peacefully, without any foreign bombs or boots on the ground, without any foreign vultures of war beating the drums of hostility and hatred; and yet the UN agreed to that only to hide their "implicit" objectives in their crafted resolutions and deceive the Libyans into division and devastating war when the Libyans were "lured" to accept a simple "no fly zone in the air". Were Gaddafi alive today, he would say: "Libyans! what Libyans? There are no Libyans".
12 May 2018
Gaddafi's loyalists met in Benghazi on the 12th of May 2018 in preparation
for the National Congress [3, 4]. The motto of the meeting was: "for rescuing the nation
from terror, chaos and foreign intervention"
من أجل
إنقاذ الوطن من الإرهاب والفوضى والتدخل الأجنبي
14 May 2018
It was reported by the media that Gaddafi's loyalists met with members of the classified terror group LIFG
and the Libyan Muslim Brotherhood in the Senegalese capital Dakar [5, 6].
لقاء السنغال قيادات المقاتلة والاخوان مع بعض رموز النظام
السابق (15-5-2018)
لجنة الحوار السياسي التابعة لمجلس النواب
واللجنة التابعة للمجلس الاستشاري للدولة
The Libyan Political Dialogue Committee (LPDC) is made of two dialogue committees: one representing the HoR, and the other the HCS. The HoR committee comprises 24 members, and the
HCS include only 14 members. Their job is to form, yet, another
committee to amend the LPA agreement:
لجنة صياغة تعديل الاتفاق السياسي
The LPDC held their first meeting in the capital Tunis on the 26th of September
2017 — about 7 months before the LNC was launched by the UN. They formed two committees to begin amending the LPA. Each committee
will comprise 6 members from each dialogue committee [5].
HoR's LPA-Amending Committee (لجنة صياغة التابعة
لمجلس النواب)
عبدالسلام نصية : رئيس لجنة الحوار السياسي لمجلس النواب
Abdulsalam Nassia,
head of the HoR Dialogue Committee
HCS' LPA-Amending Committee (لجنة صياغة التابعة
للمجلس الاستشاري للدولة)
Musa Faraj, head of the HCS Dialogue Committee
موسى فرج : رئيس لجنة الحوار السياسي للمجلس الاستشاري للدولة
First Round
الجولة الاولى
It was reported that the points discussed during the first round include:
Reducing the PC to three members: one member from Cyrenaica,
one from Fezzan, and one from Tripolitania [4].
Separating the GNA government from the PC. That is the PC President
cannot be the Prime Minster of the GNA as well. The Prime Minister will have two deputies.
Supplementary Article 8 (the Libyan army & Haftar's role).
Enlarging the HCS to include 200 members (in order to achieve political
and geographical balance). Apparently some members call for the inclusion
of Bloc 94 to the HCS in order to achieve equilibrium, they say (مجلس الدولة
غير متوازن ويتطلب انضمام كتلة 94).
Granting the CDA three more months to amend the widely-rejected draft
they proposed on the 29th of July 2017.
They have also discussed whether the HoR issues a referendum law and
put the proposed constitution for referendum, or return to the amended
1951 constitution of the ousted monarchy that ruled Libya before the installation
of Gaddafi [6].
9-11/10/2017
The HoR Annuls Article 8 of The Additional
Provisions & Amends Article 8
Between the 9th and the 11th of October 2017 the HoR discussed the proposals
put forward by the LPA-Amending Committee after their first round of
discussions in Tunis.
The first decision made by the HoR was to cancel Article 8 of
the additional provisions of the LPA :
تم في جلسة اليوم وبإجماع السادة أعضاء المجلس الغاء المادة الثامنة من الاحكام
الإضافية من الاتفاق السياسي [7].
The
HoR has also amended Article 8 of the LPA in that senior military and security
positions will be appointed by the PC with a unanimous agreement by all
the PC members, and then approved by the HoR:
تعديل نص المادة الثامنة من الاتفاق السياسي بحيث تنص على أن القرارات الخاصة
بالمناصب العليا العسكرية والأمنية تتخذ فيها القرارات بإجماع المجلس وبعد
مصادقة مجلس النواب على هذه القرارات [7].
The HoR has also discussed a number of proposals including:
the proposals
regarding the executive and legislative authorities:
مناقشة تعديلات الاتفاق المتعلقة بآلية و اختصاصات السلطة التنفيذية
والسلطة التشريعية [8].
four proposals regarding the mechanism for choosing the nominees for the Presidency Council
(PC) [9]:
ألية اختيار المترشحين للمجلس الرئاسي
تصريح رئيس لجنة الحوارالمنبثقة عن مجلس النواب د. عبدالسلام نصية عقب جلسة اليوم (11/10/2017)
Summary of the HoR's discussion after the first round of talks.
The HCS's Dialogue Committee Does Not Agree With
The HoR's Decisions
The head of HCS's dialogue committee, Musa Faraj,
was reported by the Libya Observer to have "played down" the
HoR's decision regarding Article 8 as a "personal opinion". The Libya Observer said that "Faraj
told Alnabaa TV that the Libyan political agreement can only be amended by
the mutual agreement of both the House of Representatives and the High Council
of State"[10].
Second Round
الجولة الثانيه
15 October 2017
Selection Mechanism of PC Members Via Lists (آلية
اختيار المجلس الرئاسي عن طريق نظام القوائم)
It was reported [11] that the LPA-Amending Committee has agreed on
selecting PC members via the system of lists. Mr. Salamé proposed the HoR and the HCS to nominate members from
the three regions of Libya, and that the list to choose from should not
include more than six nominees [12]; thereby showing once again the UN's
continuous meddling in what supposed to be a Libyan-Libyan dialogue.
تعليق جلسات لجنة الصياغة الموحدة
16 October 2017
Disagreement Breaks Out: HCS Obstructs Dialogue
& HoR Team Pulls Out
The HoR's LPA-Amending Committee pulled out of talks on the second day of
the second round of discussion [13].
Some HoR members say the HCS is wasting
time to fail the dialogue, and that some members from both parties are attempting
to keep certain politicians in office, while others say new names are needed for both the
PC and the unity government.
However, there are several reasons for the sudden failure
of the negotiations including the following:
إصرار مجلس الدولة على عدم حسم القضايا الخلافية والرجوع إلى نقاط قد حُسمت
من قبل
The HoR's committee says the HCS's committee keeps going back to the points
agreed on the first round of talks, and thus the HoR's committee demanded
from the HCS's committee to write down all the points agreed on the first
round before they could continue with the second round of talks [13, 14].
The HoR's committee also demanded from the HCS to write down all their
disagreements in relation to the points to be amended [16]. For example,
what they think of Articles 8 of the LPA and the Provisions.
In reply to
this, the HCS said it was the HoR that rejected the LPA in the first place,
and not the HCS, and therefore the HoR must write down all the points they think require amending. One would childishly say this tit-for-tat politics will lead to nowhere but further discord.
أعضاء مجلس الدولة مصرين على ان يكون لهم دور تشريعي مع مجلس النواب
The HCS wants to share the HoR's legislative authority, while the HoR rejects
this demand stating that the HCS was born from the LPA and cannot share the
HoR's legislative authority.
اقترح مجلس الدولة أنه في حال لم يمنح مجلس النواب الثقة للحكومة مرتين يحال
الأمر الى المجلس الرئاسي الجديد ليعطي الثقة بالحكومة
The HCS wants the HCS to approve the proposed government if the HoR rejects
the proposed government twice, as it had done already with the two governments proposed by the PC. The HoR rejected this proposition stating
that according to Article 5 of the LPA, likewise all over the world, it is the HoR
who can approve or reject the government.
The HCS says this demand guarantees that the government does not remain suspended
for ever as is the case now — which is a reference to the HoR rejecting the
two governments proposed by the UN-imposed PC in the past year. [Three years later, it turned out that the UN managed to impose its LPDF list of 75 members with a legislative authority; the reason for which, of course, is to approve the would-be proposed government if the HoR rejects it too.]
The HCS does not wish to include the 94 Bloc in the HCS (that is all those
who were elected during the 7/7 elections of 2012). The HCS said the 94 Bloc was dissolved and that 33 of them are currently in
the HCS (أن كتلة 94 حُلت والآن يوجد 33 عضوًا منها في مجلس الدولة) [15].
نقطة الخلاف اليوم آلية اختيار أعضاء المجلس الرئاسي وآلية اختيار رئيس الوزراء
The HoR wants the Libyan people to nominate lists of three names for
the PC and then let the HoR vote over the lists [16]. But according to
the same discussion (Sijal, 16) Mr Maezeb, one of the deputies for
the HCS president, the disagreement stems from the fact that the HoR wants
to select the PC President and one of his Deputies while leaving the HCS
with the option to select the second Deputy. He also said that the LPA
originally included that the PC president will be appointed by consensus
(بالتوافق) and each deputy will be appointed by each party (one by the
HoR and one by the GNC), giving a total of three members. But then Mr Agila
Saleh rejected the 3-member PC which eventually led to the doomed 9-member
PC we have now. This seems fair: each selects a deputy and then agree on
the president. But for the HoR to select two of the three (including the
president) is something the HCS rightly rejects.
طلب المجلس الأعلى للدولة بضرورة تدوير رئاسة المجلس الرئاسي الجديد بين أعضائه
الثلاثة، بحيث يترأس أحد الأعضاء المجلس الرئاسي لمدة ثلاثة أشهر
One HoR member, namely Fatima Alsweiai (عضو لجنة الحوار الممثلة لمجلس النواب
فاطمة الصويعي), said the HCS wants the position of PC President to rotate
between the PC members where each member takes the position for three months
[17]. However, according to Mr. Maezeb [16] this proposal was a personal one put
forward by one HCS member and was not presented by the HCS itself [minute
58 of the video].
وفد مجلس النواب يشترط المصادقة على تعيينات المناصب العسكرية
The HoR wants a second say to approve the military and security
positions that will be chosen by the PC. The HCS says the HoR would be
within the new PC and therefore there is no need for it to have a second
say on the matter [16]. Mr. Maezeb stated that the PC member who will be
chosen by the HoR can veto any decision taken by the PC if he/she disagrees
with it and therefore there is no point in a second approval.
In reply to
this, Hor member Mr Salheen Abdennabi (الصالحين عبدالنبي) said the following:
when you check Article 16 Clause 4, Article 8 Clause A, Article 10,
and Article 62 you will find that all these articles were constructed against
the military leadership [16]; while on the other hand he adds that Article 8 of
the same LPA requires the approval of the HoR to appoint the head of the
Intelligence Services; declaring emergency requires the approval of the HoR;
striking international agreements requires the approval of the HoR; and therefore
even the military positions should be approved by the HoR. He says he does
not understand why this particular point should be exempt from the HoR's
approval and thus he adds "there is a plot" [at minute
1: 12:06 of the video].
If the matter is left for the PC
to approve whatever decision they come up with, then there is no guarantee
that the president of the PC would not make any decisions on his own. For
example the current PC's president reportedly made so many decisions without consultation
with his colleague members (some of whom had suspended their membership and even
resigned in protest: Alkouni, for example) despite the fact that the LPA stipulates all decisions must be made
with unanimous agreement between all the PC members.
Leaving the
matter to the PC would thus repeat the same mistake. Therefore, there must
be an authority to hold the PC accountable to the agreement.
سجال : جولة تونس 2 . . . طرفان لا فريق والبرلمان الى التعليق"
Sijal: two parties with no team . . . the parliament towards suspension
The HoR's demands.
18 October 2017
UN Continues To Interfere In The Libyan-Libyan
Dialogue
The UN continues to interfere in what supposed to be a Libyan dialogue.
It was reported that Ghassan Salamé had proposed a united format for the
points of disagreement intended to be amended by the united LPA-Amending
Committee. Of course, the idea gets "proposed" first, then gradually becomes "imposed".
قال عضو لجنة الحوار عن مجلس النواب زياد دغيم إن رئيسي لجنتي الحوار عن مجلسي النواب والدولة وخلال اجتماعهما اليوم مع المبعوث الأممي إلى ليبيا غسان سلامة ناقشوا صيغا توافقية لتعديلات الاتفاق السياسي، قام باقتراحها سلامة خلال الاجتماع.
19 October 2017
LPA-Amending Committees Resume Talks استئناف اجتماعات
لجنة الصياغة المشتركة
The LPA-Amending Committees resumed their talks today [19], after the HoR's
committee ended their suspension yesterday, the 18th of October, after the
UN's envoy confirmed that they received a written summary of the so-called
"disagreement points" from the HCS [20].
The "disagreement points" are also known as "the disagreement issues", القضايا
الخلافية, or "the tit-for tat list".
The LPA-Amending Committee has decided to create three sub-committees
to oversee amending the LPA. There was a slight difference
between the sub-committees reported by Libya's Channel and those reported by
Alwast. The first committee differs completely between the two sources: one
source says it will amend the constitution, and the other source says it will
deal with the boycotting members and those who resigned.
Here are the 3 sub-committees reported by Libya's Channel [21]:
Constitution: the first committee will amend the constitution draft:
تنظر الأولى في موضوع الدستور
Government: the first committee will amend the executive government:
تتولى الثانية النظر في موضوع السلطة
التنفيذية
Military: the third committee will amend Article(s) 8 of
the LPA:
تتولى اللجنة الثالثة مناقشة التعديلات على المادة الثامنة من الاتفاق السياسي
وملحقاتها، وكيفية التعامل مع المؤسسة العسكرية وقادتها
And here are the 3 subcommittees reported by Alwasat [22]:
the first committee will look into the boycotting members and those resigned:
تنظر الأولى في «وضع أعضاء المجلسين المقاطعين والمقالين»
the second committee will look into the executive government, the PC and
the government:
تتولى الثانية النظر في موضوع «السلطة التنفيذية، المجلس الرئاسي والحكومة»
the third committee will look into amending Article 8 and the mechanism
to deal with the military institution and its leadership:
الثالثة مناقشة التعديلات على المادة الثامنة من الاتفاق السياسي وملحقاتها
«وكيفية التعامل مع المؤسسة العسكرية وقادتها»
21 November 2017
UN Proposes Yet Another Rejected Initiative
UN's proposal for amending the LPA in relation to the executive government
was rejected by the HCS [23].
6 December 2017
HoR Demands The UN's Feedback
The HoR has demanded from the UN to clarify its position regarding the HoR's
approval of the UN-proposed LPA amendment — البرلمان يطالب البعثة الأممية بتحديد
موقفها من موافقته على مقترح الاتفاق السياسي [24]
25 January 2018.
The Dialogue Committees Meet Again With UN Envoy
After months of deadlock the two dialogue committees met again with the UN
to discuses the mechanism for selecting the "new presidency
council".
They have also talked about the formation of a "united executive
committee" [25]. *Wahaloummajer.
Third Round (الجولة الثالثة)
08 October 2018
New Presidency Council (اتفاق لجنتي مجلسي النواب والدولة على آلية تشكيل مجلس رئاسي جديد )
After nearly nine more months of deadlock, the two dialogue committees have finally met once again and decided to form a new Presidency Council [26].
The next step, Fhima reported to have said, is to begin the process of selecting the names. However, HSC member Mr. Idris Bofayed told Libyashannel that the HoR was not professional in its latest proposal because it presented its initiative in an informal, white paper that does not carry any official logo and that only one member (namely Mr. Nassia) was sent to negotiate its latest proposal, as opposed to sending the whole Dialogue Committee as stipulated by the LPA [27].
نصية : مجلس الدولة سيصوت على آلية اختيار الرئاسي الجديد
السعيدي : الإنقسام في البرلمان ومجلس الدولة يعطل تعديل المجلس الرئاسي
قزيط : تشكيل كتلة داخل مجلس الدولة تحت اسم كتلة الوفاق
31 October 2018
HoR and HCS Agree To Reform The UN-Imposed PC
رئيس لجنة الحوار يعلن التوافق مع مجلس الدولة حول إعادة تشكيل السلطة التنفيذية
The HoR and the HCS have agreed to reform the PC. The agreement includes the following points [28]:
The new PC will include one president and two deputies (3 in total).
One prime minister from outside the PC, whose job is to form a government that will operate from all corners of Libya.
The mission of the new PC is to unite the country's institutions and prepare for the new parliamentary and presidential elections for another transitional government.
The call for abandoning personal ambitions and tribal affiliations, and instead unite for the unity of the country.
The call for the media and civil authorities to support the new government in its mission to unit the various institutions and achieve its goal.
The call for all the military institutions to continue their dialogue towards uniting the military institutions all over the country.
The last point is somewhat confusing because the third point (which calls for the new PC to unite all institutions) [29] should take care of military institutions too. Like the previous Article 8, the last point could pose trouble in the future.
Also the document published by the HoR (in its website [28]) carries no official logo, just the signatures of the two people involved in the alleged agreement. In fact the document is titled: "Joint Press Release", which means it has no legal value. It would have been more professional if the agreement is struck officially by all the members of the two dialogue committees (and not just two people), and the results are decreed by both the HoR and the HCS officially. This also signals possible trouble ahead.
The GNA and the HoR had agreed today to hold parliamentarian
and presidential elections on the 10th of December 2018. The meeting was attended by four Libyan dignitaries:
the president of the UN-imposed
GNA
the president of the elected HoR
LNA's chief Khalifa Haftar
and the
president of the self-appointed and illegal HCS, Mr. Khalid Almeshri
The French
president said the attendees represent
all the Libyan people, when in fact the native Berbers and Tebu are, as usual,
excluded from the negotiations that are usually held by foreign dignitaries
in foreign countries. The points agreed on by the selected Libyan
leaders are outlined in the following joint declaration, as translated from Arabic by Temehu.com:
Joint Declaration By Fayez Alsarraj, Agila Saleh,
Khalid Almeshri And Khalifa Haftar
Recognise
the importance of establishing constitutional foundations for the elections
and support the UN's envoy to Libya in his consultations with the Libyan
authorities on a proposal for the adoption of the constitution and setting
a time-limit.
To agree on holding parliamentary and presidential elections as stated
by the UN's envoy to Libya in consultation with the GNA, the HoR, the HCS
and the HNEC. The parties have agreed to lay the constitutional foundations
for the elections and adopt
the necessary electoral laws by the 16th of September 2018, as well as
hold parliamentary and presidential elections on the 10th of December 2018.
To formally accept the election requirements
presented by the UN's envoy to Libya in his briefing to the United Nations Security Council on the 21st of May
including the organisation of a new round of voter registration on the electoral
rolls for an additional period to be decided by the UN. Libyan
leaders must accept the election results and ensure the availability
of the necessary financial resources and the security arrangements. Anyone
who violates or disrupts the electoral process will be punished.
[Temehu.com's note : how is it possible to ensure "security arrangements" when the country is infested with hundreds of militias, brigades and terror groups, and with no authority exercising total power over Libya's territories and borders? This is exactly why all the previous governments and conferences had failed, and this is why the Libyans have been crying-out-loud for the international community to help with dismantling all militia and terror groups before holding any elections. Yet to this day, the international community still refuses to fix the intentional or otherwise unintentional mistake they made in 2011 — namely creating, funding and training militia groups including those with "Qaida flicker".]
To agree to work constructively with the UN to ensure
the availability of the technical, legislative, political and security requirements for
the organisation of national elections including the adoption of the required electoral laws by the HoR and their implementation
in accordance with the timetable and the mechanism for consultation with the
HCS agreed-on in the Libyan Political Agreement.
The Libyan security forces shall ensure the safety of the electoral process
and the right of all Libyans to express their will and to determine the future
of their country peacefully and democratically with the support of the UN, regional organisations and the international community and in
coordination with them. No delay or obstruction of the electoral process will be tolerated and every party responsible for such obstruction or delay will be punished.
The obligation to improve the general conditions for the organisation
of national elections by all possible means including the transfer of the
headquarters of the HoR, as stipulated in the Constitutional
Declaration, and the gradual abolition of parallel governments and institutions, as well as urging the HoR and the HCS to unite the
Central Bank of Libya and other institutions.
The obligation to abide by the UN's procedures to build and unite military
and security institutions subject to accountability, as well as to encourage the current Cairo dialogue, and
to work constructively towards the unification of Libyan military and security
institutions.
To agree to participate in a comprehensive political conference
to follow up on the implementation of this Declaration under the auspices
of the UN with ensuring to adhere to the timetable and conditions dictated by the UN's envoy to Libya in with the Libyan institutions.
If Libyan leaders promise to implement these obligations then the international community will stand together to support all the Libyans who strives towards holding national and peaceful elections and look forward towards building a prosperous future for Libya via improving the Libyan economic system. If not, then . . .
Western Brigades Oppose The Paris Agreement
Around 13 brigades from western Libya have declared their opposition
to the Paris meeting [1, 2]
The Western brigades statement regarding the Paris meeting.
Head of Illegal HCS Admits Being Member of The Muslim Brotherhood
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oghIRR58Rh8
Head of the self-appointed HCS says Paris Meeting is not important and not a final
stop because there are a number of issues that were postponed. When he was
asked to give an example, he replied all the institutions in the east (meaning
Cyrenaica) must be dissolved immediately. He even refused to classify the terrorists
in Cyrenaica as terrorists whom he called "revolutionaries".
Almeshri Gives 3 reasons Why The PA Will Not Succeed
23 June 2018
The head of the illegal HCS, Mr Almeshri, gave three reasons for what he believes
to be the eminent failure of the PA. These are as follows [5]:
The wars in Cyrenaica and Fezzan (without saying anything, of course,
about the wars in Tripolitania).
The delay in returning the displaced to Benghazi and Derna.
And the recent revelations of Khalifa Haftar.
Calling For Elections Without Stable
Institutions Will Destroy What Is Left of Libya
22 June 2018
Most Libyans agree that holding elections now will further destroy Libya,
without a shred of doubt, and yet the UN and the Western leaders seem certain
to impose more tragedies on Libya in the name of protection that manifests
as further destruction, and, sadly, nothing more but more destruction.
According to Foreign Policy, "Calling for elections in the absence
of stable institutions while competing for diplomatic and economic influence
won’t rebuild the country — it will destroy it " [4].
Foreign Policy asks: "Why, then, do Western leaders repeatedly make
the same mistake? Optimists would assume it is due to a Western desire to
spread democracy . . . But when it comes to Western diplomacy in Libya, the
answer is far more cynical. The United States, United Kingdom, and Russia
— great-power rivals that have long competed for influence in the greater
Middle East — don’t usually feel the need to dominate in Libya. France, Italy,
and the array of middle powers involved in Libya all have their own geostrategic
reasons to punch above their weight by dominating the so-called Libya file.
For the French since 2017, micromanaging the drive toward elections with
high-level summits appears to be their gambit for dominance in a country
outside their traditional sphere of influence." [4]
The answer, dear Foreign Policy, is that they are not mistakes; and although the "Libyan Job" might have been "the worst mistake" for some "folks", to consider such mistake "unintentional" can only arouse suspicion as to how a "mistake" can ever be "intentional".
"Calling for elections in the absence of stable institutions while competing for diplomatic and economic influence won’t rebuild the country — it will destroy it. " [25]
15 July 2017
The president of the UN-imposed PC had proposed a road-map [1] which includes
presidential and parliamentary elections to be held in March 2018.
Reactions To Sarraj's Election Project
HoR :
According to the president of the HoR, the PC is not a legitimate body
to legislate anything regarding Libya, and that the only legislative authority
in Libya is the HoR. He also stated that Sarraj's call for presidential elections
is not constitutional and even contradicts the LPA agreement [2].
HNEC :
According to the head of the HNEC, the time allowed by Mr Sarraj for holding
the presidential elections is not enough to complete all the missing election
laws and preparations required to organise the elections.
HCS :
The illegal and unconstitutional HCS also condemned the election proposal
saying that the elections should not take place before approving the final
constitution [4]. The HCS itself, as documented under the GNA page,
was created by former members of the defunct GNC in total violation of Article
(64) of the Libyan Political Agreement (LPA) — the agreement orchestrated
by the UN in Morocco in total violation of the Libyan elections that resulted
in the election of the HoR. The HCS was also formed in total violation of the CD. When former prime minister Mahmoud Jibril called
for the UN's envoy to urgently address the violations committed by the GNC
members who illegally amended the CD and self-elected a president for the HCS in violation
of the political agreement [5] the UN pretended deaf.
No elections before dismantling militias :
Most Libyans believe that no elections would be successful without
removing the militias from power and disarming the Libyans. The international community
including the UN not only had failed to understand the Libyan dilemma but
also they contributed to the disaster they created in the first place. To
begin with, there are no "parties" in Libya that are struggling
for power and that such parties must sit around the table and negotiate a
peaceful solution to the imposed tragedy. All there-is is an elected government
struggling to run the country that was hijacked by armed militias in a military
coup in 2014 while the international community was watching and even backing the coup with legitimacy. Evacuating their
diplomatic staff from the country they claimed they liberated
was an act of "shame", many Libyans say. To add
insult to injury, the international community then went on and imposed
a government from Tripoli that was protected by the militias that orchestrated
the coup in 2014 — the government that reportedly included war criminals
and listed terrorists.
Therefore the solution to Libya, like the LPA itself claims to state, and like the Libyans have been repeating for ten years now, must
begin with dismantling all militias in Libya and disarming the Libyans before
any talks of elections or negotiations could take place. The NTC, the GNC
and the HoR had all failed to effect any order due to militia extravaganza.
The fact that the international community continues to support various militia-based
governments and regional councils (like Mesratha and Zintan) and also meet with some of these militia groups while ignoring
the elected government of Libya does not help bring stability to the country. And even though the following notes have been stated repeatedly before, it is important to reiterate them here, again, just in case the UN decides to address the roots of the problem instead of creating more.
It was the UN that organised the LPA agreement which calls for dismantling all militia groups in Libya — a clause which was welcomed by Libyans as a sigh of relief that at last the UN is seeing the light and making the right decision (for a change). Unfortunately, the first thing the imposed PC (and/or GNA) did was to create more militia groups (thereby violating the LPA that brought them into this world); the Western powers continued to deal with such militia groups; while the UN never enforced its LPA — just ink on paper, the Libyans said, once more. Why bother including such a clause in the LPA if no one is going to implement it?
It was the Western countries who are reported to be striking deals with outlaw militias
in Sabratha, Mesratha and Tripoli to stop the influx of immigrants allegedly flooding Europe's
shores through Libya.
It was the Western countries (as well as Qatar and Turkey) who created and sponsored some of the most powerful of these militia groups in the first place.
It was the Western countries that armed these militias and "coordinated"
their assault on the Libyan government (as the British Foreign Minister William Hague had confirmed at the time). The "iron fist" was so strong to destroy the old, but flimsy and weak to rebuild the new.
It was the UN-installed NTC that granted licences for
these militias to kill and operate in prematurely-liberated Libya.
It was the UN and the Western countries that allowed outlaw militias to reinstate
the defunct GNC to power in a military coup that terrorised the civilians
in Tripoli in 2014 in total violation of the UN resolution to protect civilians
by all necessary measures.
It was the UN that imposed the GNA
on the Libyan people despite the existence of an elected government (the HoR); while at the same time legally preventing the Libyan Army from equipping itself to fight terror and the myriad of militias
imposed during the UN-bombing campaign.
It was the Western countries that bombed Libya to smithereens with authorisation from the UN and without
exist strategy to ensure the civilians are indeed protected, only to turn round and say it was a "mistake" — except that they never look back to fix their never-ending mistakes.
It was the UN and the Western countries that keep coming with more initiatives to organise yet more talks in London, in Paris, in Palermo, in Geneva, in Cairo, in Berlin, in Tunis, and in *Halommajer, instead of organising such events inside Libya to rise morals and help bring stability to the country they destroyed in the name of "protection" and now "mistakes", and instead of supervising the elections for a single and final government that can in reality bring stability to the chaos they created in the name of order. Etc.
عزة المقهور تطرح خارطة طريق لاجراء انتخابات برلمانية ورئاسية في ديسمبر المقبل
The February Committee (FC) proposed a "Road Map" to hold elections in December according to the conditions stipulated by the FC. The proposal also called for the UN to form a small committee to prepare a "law project" for the parliamentarian and presidential elections (
مشروع قانون انتخابات رئاسية وبرلمانية ) [3].
25 July 2017
Paris Meeting
Haftar Meets Sarraj in Paris
On the 25th of July 2017 the GNA president Mr. Sarraj and the commander
of the Libyan National Army Mr. Haftar met in the French capital Paris and
agreed on a ten-point road-map. According to point 9 of this road-map, the
two had agreed to organise presidential and legislative elections as soon
as possible from the date of this agreement and under the supervision of
the United Nations [6]:
نتعهد رسميًا بالعمل على تنظيم انتخابات رئاسية وتشريعية في أقرب
وقت ممكن، اعتبارًا من تاريخ صدور هذا البيان بالتنسيق مع المؤسسات المعنية
وبدعم وإشراف الأمم المتحدة
It must be noted that this is the first time the GNA's website
refers to Haftar by his official title, the general commander of the "Libyan National Army" (وقائد
الجيش الوطني الليبي المشير خليفة حفتر) [6], instead of the title usually used by Aljazeera: "warlord".
Sarraj says conditions are fine to hold elections in Libya; despite the lack of order and law, and in spite of the large number of militia and criminal groups still controlling Tripoli and even most of Libya (in practice); terrorising the Libyans in broad day light, car jacking for fun, kidnapping children for ransom, and violating honour for pleasure.
السراج ومقترح تجاوز البرلمان إلى الإنتخابات
Sarraj to bypass the parliament on the way to the presidential elections!
According to Mr. Sarraj early elections would allow the people of Libya
to say their word [9]. The UN had also included the 2018 presidential elections in its 20th of
September Road Map.
28 November 2017
UN Decides 2018 Elections Will Go Ahead Regardless
!
The UN once again has decided to impose its authority by continuing to
meddle in Libya's affairs. This time the UN has decided that the 2018 elections
will go ahead regardless of whether the Libyans have reached an agreement
or not over the UN-proposed road-map.
2 December 2017
UN Specifies Election Conditions
The UN specifies the conditions according to which the 2018
elections will be held in Libya. The UN also decided that voter registration
can start this month.
Among the conditions stipulated
are:
Technical condition: registering as many as possible voters for the upcoming
elections to ensure adequate participation.
Legislative condition: the existence of legislative preparation according
to winch the elections would be completed.
Political condition: all parties should agree to accepting the results
of the forthcoming third elections in advance.
Presidential Elections
March 2018
Presidential Election Project (مقترح بشأن تصميم
نظام انتخاب رئيساً للدولة)
The HNEC has proposed a project for electing a president
for the State of Libya [21,22,23]. The HNEC announced the news as follows:
في إطار مساعي
المفوضية لرفع من مستوى الوعي بالعملية الانتخابية وتفاصيلها الفنية لدى
المهتمين والنخب السياسية، وإلماماً بالأنظمة الانتخابية وما تتضمنه من
معطيات فنية؛ التي تُعد الأساس لأية تشريعات وقوانين انتخابية، فإن المفوضية
تقترح مشروع نظام انتخاب رئيساً للدولة، يأخذ في اعتباره معطيات البيئة
السياسية الليبية، وذلك لإضفاء المزيد من النقاشات والآراء حول المتطلبات
الفنية من العملية الانتخابية.
The president of the HoR reveals that the presidential elections may
take place in September! He says most Libyans are calling for the elections
as a way out of the disaster but provides no evidence.
لقاء حصري مع رئيس مجلس النواب المستشار عقيلة صالح
September 2018 Elections
6 December 2017
HNEC Begin Voter Registration ( السائح : عملية
تسجيل الناخبين ستستمر شهرين قابلة للتمديد)
The HNEC has formally announced the beginning of voter registration on the
6th of December 2017. Libyans have 60 days to register. Libyans
living abroad can begin registration on the 1st of February 2018, the HNEC
said; they have 30 days to complete registration. The HNEC said there are
4.2 million Libyans over the age of 18.
31 December 2017
HNEC Declares Number of Registered Voters
Only two days later the HNEC said the number of registered voters has reached
1,782,512, including those registered in the previous
elections of 2012 and 2014. However, like all previous elections, the HNEC
has failed to publish a list of such names. A few days later the number
reached more than 2 million voters; and continues to rise!
Foreign Nationals Were Given National IDs
January 2018
The sudden interest in voter registration, according to NTC former Prime Minister, Mr. Mahmoud Jibril,
is unexplained. In reference to the widespread practice of giving (or selling)
national IDs and Libyan passports to foreign nationals (including terrorists),
Mr. Jibril reminds us that national IDs and passports are
not enough to confirm the "Libyaness" of voters because such IDs
and passports must be checked against the birth and death lists kept in municipalities
across Libya [10, 11]. If no "birth certificate" can be confirmed
then the documents are fake. Watch the following
video (at 1:13:23) for further analysis.
Mr. Jibril said tens of thousands of foreign nationals were said to have been
issued Libyan national IDs.
This practice is in fact being reported since 2012, and yet none of the
imposed or elected governments was able (for unknown reason)
to put a stop to it. Is there a conspiracy
to create the number of voters required to win any determined agenda?
Mr. Jibril also talks about important and dangerous issues threatening Libya's future. From his revelations and from other reports one can deduce the following points:
The immigrants issue is not a random problem of refugees trying to get to Europe, but an organised criminal operation, which, as previously noted here, involves certain governments.
Libya, with its massive territories, rich resources, and its tiny population is thus an ideal target for UN's hidden agendas (Agenda 21 and Agenda 2030), as well as an easy target because Libya since the UN bombing campaign of 2011 is not an independent nor sovereign; it is still under the control of the UN and its embargos.
By stopping immigrants reaching Europe the immigrants actually end up stuck in Libya and thus forcing the Libyan government to provide safe camps for these illegal immigrants (and terrorists hiding as immigrants); and with a bit of media propaganda about migrants being tortured, sold & bought, and abused in Libya, the transitional Libyan government of Tripoli is lured to provide a safe heaven for such immigrants including hospitals and schools; to ultimately become Libyans.
Thus there are Libyan reports about the Grand Plan to divide Libya and settle "illegal
immigrants" in Libya [26]. Probably as a disclaimer, in 2018 the EU admitted that its Sophia Operation has led to more immigrants
being stranded in Libya.
The GNA and the UN have no right to impose international agreements on Libya during a transitional period. Libya needs a constitution to decide what should and should not be allowed, and then an elected government to implement the law according to the constitution. Therefore the UN and many of the Western countries are immorally taking advantage of the country they eagerly helped destroy in the name of protection.
Dear Libyans, the key is to keep Libyans busy fighting each other until it is too late for Libyan children to realise what hit them, because by then it becomes nothing more than forgotten history.
Open your eyes, and say " No to arms; no to the UN", before it is too late. Instead work towards future Libya.
The numbers continue to rise.
The numbers as of 21/1/2018: 2,115,295.
The numbers as of 15/02/2018.
Registration closed on the 15/02/2018.
1 February 2018
Voting Abroad: www.voteabroad.ly
The HNEC has opened a new website for Libyan voters abroad on the 1st of
February 2018. The system was called: "the system of Libyan out-of-country
voter registration", which can be accessed at: www.voteabroad.ly
In order to register online you must have an email and a telephone number
in the country of residence. With these two credentials the applicant can
create an account and begin the process of registration. The requirements
for voting are as follows:
To be Libyan and to be legally eligible.
To be 18 years old by the day of application.
To hold a National Number with a name that exists in the National Number
System (NNS).
Of course, we must remember that although there are over one million Libyan
refugees in Tunisia and Egypt during the 2014 elections, only 938
voters from Egypt and 393 voters from Tunisia were confirmed by the HNEC;
which means that the majority of Libyans abroad were deprived from taking part
in this democratic chaos!
The number of voters registered abroad as of 19/02/2018 is 3300 voters.
Registration will be closed on the 28th of February 2018.
This was later extended
to 12th of March 2018
Final number of registered voters abroad, as of the 12th of March 2018
is 6267 voters [13].
It was reported that the HNEC said the number of registered
voters is very low because it is common for people abroad not to vote,
and because of transport difficulties which prevent many people from registering.
The voteabroad.ly website should (in principle)
allow Libyans to register online without needing transport. All you need to surf the superhighway is fiber-optic or even dial-up would do.
Apparently official figures
say there are around 60,000 Libyans living abroad.This figure seems to include only
those Libyans who are paid for by the government(s) to study abroad and those
who are working for the various governments of Libya, because the reported
number of Libyans living in exile is around 1 million people (mostly in Egypt and Tunisia).
Number of voters by country (based on the figures published by the HNEC in its
website [13]).
Update
The deadline for voting abroad has been extended
to the end of March (31/03/2018). On the 31st of March 2018 the HNEC
closed voting abroad and said the total number of registered voters is 6630
voters [14, 15].
In a campaign run by the HNEC the number of registered voters continues
to rise on a daily basis. Take for
example the HoR elections: only 14% of Libyans voted for the controversial
HoR. There are no lists published anywhere in the HNEC's website to document such numbers. This latest announcement says there are more than one
million women voters as of the 12th of February 2018.
HNEC Headquarters Bombed
2 May 2018
The HNEC's Headquarters in Ghoat Asshaal attacked by suicide bombers. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QPtVXdcaZ1k
The HNEC's headquarters was attacked by two suicide bombers on Wednesday the
2nd of May 2018. It was reported that at
least 15 people were killed and 19 were injured. The HoR's government in Bayda
blames the Muslim Brotherhood for the terror attack [16]. Other sources say
the Brotherhood are calling for a referendum on the long-awaited constitution
before holding any elections [17]. Clutching to sinking ship.
Plunging the country into a third election feast without
agreeing on the constitution will almost certainly lead to further mayhem in
Libya. The Libyans need to know that the UN and its western allies are wrong to urge for a third elections without agreeing on the constitution and without cleansing Libya from the imposed myriad of militias.
An elected government, as has been proven repeatedly for the past ten years, cannot operate while Tripoli is run by rouge militia groups, terror organisations and greedy puppets supported by regional powers. This is common sense that requires no political expertise to foresee. Whatever or whoever it was, the bombing killed the 2018 elections project.
6 July 2018
Mahmoud Jibril Warns of Election Failure Due To
Fake IDs
According to Mahmoud Jibril, former NTC Prime Minister, there is widespread fraud concerning the so-called
"National Number" (الرقم الوطني), pointing out that this may endanger the
outcome of the forthcoming elections where the loosing political parties may
doubt the results on the basis of fake voters [17].
It is reported previously
that the authorities in Tripoli
are implicated in the illegal trade in human beings and that many immigrants
were given fake Libyan IDs. The same practice was observed in the military
where many militias (from both the Muslim Brotherhood-controled Tripoli and the
Hor-controlled Benghazi) are enlisting immigrants and mercenaries in their
fight against each other and against the invisible terrorists.
As we have reported in this website all previous elections, the elections hailed
success by the colonial masters, were not transparent and therefore the forthcoming
elections are not expected to be any different.
In fact most Libyans are now
sick of hearing the word "elections" that means nothing more than more misery and
destruction.
8 July 2018
Number of Libyans Jumped to 7.7 Million People (تلاعب بمنظومة السجل المدني
والرقم الوطني)
Just 2 days after Mahmoud Jibril warned of the National Number disaster, Libya's Channel
reported [18] that according to Mr. Bouker, the former head of the Civil Registry
Authority (مصلحة الأحوال المدنية), tampering with the civil register
and the national number had resulted in increasing the number of Libyans to
nearly 7.7 million people, thereby endangering the national security of the
country (مشيرا إلى خطورة ذلك
على المستوى الديمغرافي للدولة الليبية، وعلى الأمن القومي للبلاد). That
is a jump of one million people in just over two years. Early reactions to
these violations are reported here: youtube.com/watch?v=paisTgwymBs.
Mr. Bouker said he has a copy of the original database that can reveal the
fake one million identities that were added in the past two years, and that
restoring the original database would not take more than 24 hours [18].
11 October 2018
LNA's Spokesman Calls For Elections Without Constitution
المسماري : سنذهب إلى الانتخابات إذا رفض الشعب الدستور
The spokesman of the armed forces in Cyrenaica says they will go for the elections even if the people of Libya rejected the draft constitution
proposed by the CDA.
According to the persecuted Libyan natives the proposed draft is a fascist constitution that should be rejected outright. Constitutional rights cannot be voted for, but rightly enshrined by the constitution as a matter of right.
It seems that two years of work were wasted. No elections for 2018; nothing happened in 2019; and nothing happened in 2020. Fast forward to 2021. Now the LPDF agreed to hold elections on the 24th of December 2021 (see 2021 Elections tab for full info).
To find out more about PM Dbeibah and "corruption", download the Libya's Flawed Unity Government report, by Dr. Wolfram Lacher, a Senior Associate in the Africa and Middle East Research Division at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs.
Based on the UN Security-Council 2510 (2020), which endorsed the conclusions of the international Conference on Libya in Berlin, the United Nations Support Mission in Libya organised and run the first round of the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum (LPDF) from 7 to 15 November 2020 in the Tunisian capital Tunis.
The forum reconvened on the 2nd of December in Tunis, then in January 2021, also in Tunis, before they finally met in Geneva, Switzerland, from 1 to 5 February 2021, and voted for the Interim Unified Executive Authority (IUEA). The IUEA comprises the restructured Presidency Council (PC), and the Government of National Unity (GNU).
The Acting Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Libya number 7, Stephanie Williams, facilitated the talks with the support of a team from the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (HD). The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) provided the organizational and operational support.
The LPDF controversially included 75 participants in violation of the initially agreed number (see below for details). The forum started on the 9th of November 2020.
LPDF Agenda:
Final elections and the constitution
Reunification of Libya's institutions
Restructuring the Presidency Council (president and two vice-presidents), one from each region.
Appointing a separate, interim prime minister for the GNU.
At the conclusion the participants in the LPDF agreed on:
A roadmap to national elections [for yet another transitional government], to be held on 24 December 2021.
The need to reform the executive authority in line with the conclusions of the Berlin Conference.
An outline of the structure and prerogatives for the Presidency Council and a separate Head of Government.
Eligibility criteria for these posts.
Another meeting on November 23 to agree on the selection criteria for the reformed Presidency Council and the interim Prime Minister.
The HoR condemned the UN's attack on Libyan sovereignty by imposing a new legislative authority
Around 112 HoR members were outraged by the UN's decision to impose a legislative authority in Libya, stating that such authority can only be elected by the Libyan people [1]. This is a reference to the fact that the LPDF, which, as we shall see, its 75 members were imposed by the UN (just like they imposed the PC (GNA) in 2015-16), has the right to approve the proposed GNU that will be formed within the next 21 days if the HoR does not approve it.
"وفي حال لم تمنح الثقة، وفقا لوليامز، "يعود الأمر لأعضاء الـ75 لمنحها الثقة
This new measure, according to the HoR, constitutes a violation by the UN against Libya's sovereignty because only elected authorities can legislate. See the Violation tab for more.
UN Violations Continue: the UN imposes a 75-Member committee on the forum
The HoR said that originally the UN supposed to mediate a Libyan Political Dialogue comprising 13 HoR members, 13 HCS members, and 14 independents, but "we were surprised", they said, to see the UN had imposed a long list of 75 members. The change of numbers, of course, plays an important role when it comes to s-electing the final members of the interim government!
The HoR published its 13-member list (see below) for the political dialogue via Decree 18 of 2020 (قرار-مجلس-النواب-رقم-18-لسنة-2020). The following is a copy of the decree, showing the 13 selected members:
13+13 Committee: الاجتماع التنسيقي بين أعضاء مجلسي النواب والدولة «13+13»:
After the initial agreement between the HoR and the HCS regarding continuing the Libyan dialogue, and in preparation for the LPDF forum in Tunis, the 13+13 committee met in Bouzniga, Morocco (بمدينة بوزنيقة المغربية), on the 4th and 5th of November 2020. The participants agreed on a new roadmap to end disputes and unite the legislative authorities and institutions of Libya ( التوافق على خريطة طريق لإنهاء الانقسام وتوحيد المؤسسة التشريعية ).
They have also discussed Article 15 of the LPA signed in Morocco in 2015. The committees also met Tangier Morocco on the 30th of November 2020.
The HoR members also agreed to meet in Ghadames, Libya, to unite the divided HoR; around 100 members arrived in Dar Ghadames Hotel, Ghadames, on the 3rd of December 2020. However, 9 members decided to leave Ghadames after their demands to define the agenda of the meeting before the meeting takes place were not met (الأعضاء التسعة اشترطوا تحديد جدول أعمال ملتقى غدامس قبل انعقاد جلساته).
HoR's Letter to the UN Regarding Selecting HoR Boycotting Member for Geneva's dialogue
The HoR had objected to the UN selecting a member who had boycotted the HoR to represent them in the political dialogue, stating such act will send the wrong message [2]. The HoR reminded the UN that the active members of the HoR are the only official members of the HoR, and any boycotting member has no legal right to represent the HoR.
LPDF Members Chosen by the UN
The following is the LPDF list of 75 members selected by the UN against the will of the Libyan Government (the HoR). The Hor presented its list of 13 members to the UN (as documented above), but they were surprised to see the UN publish a list of 75 Members. The UN list clearly has the UN logo on the left, and a map of Libya broken into three regions on the right:
The UN (via its Libyan office: UNSMiL) alleged that it had selected the 75 members from across Libya to represent all segments of the Libyan society. Tell that to the persecuted Berbers and Tebu! The UN has no right to select any member from any segment anywhere in the world, let alone all the 75. It is down to the LIBYANS to do that.
Nonetheless, many Libyan analysts, politicians and even militia leaders said the list selected by the UN does not represent the Libyan population and instead it includes many ‘‘pro-Qaddafi’’ personalities, many ‘‘Islamists’’, and others from the Muslim-Brotherhood-led, defunct GNC.
Still worse, the UN did not publish its imposed list of 75 candidates until the eve of the start of the so-called "virtual LPDF", and thus not allowing the Libyan people and authorities to reflect on the list. This, according to some Libyans, is a "dirty tactic" to trick the Libyans into submitting to the UN's hidden agenda; otherwise why not reveal the list at least three weeks before the start of the conference so that the Libyan authorities have a say in the matter?
According to afrique2050.net [3] the list is broken down according to political affiliation and ideology as follows:
Selection Mechanism
On the 3rd and 4th of December 2020 the LPDF held sessions to vote on the proposed selection mechanisms for the interim unified authority. Proposal number 2 was the winner, with 39 votes (out of 71 votes in total); followed by proposal number 3 (24 votes), then proposal number 10 (8 votes).
Cyrenaica's LPDF members called for the United Nations to officially endorse the results of the LPDF agreement[4].
دعا أعضاء ملتقى الحوار السياسي الليبي عن إقليم برقة في بيان أصدروه بعد اجتماعهم في بنغازي المبعوث الخاص للأمين العام للأمم المتحدة يان كوبيتش إلى حث مجلس الأمن الدولي على اعتماد مخرجات ملتقى الحوار السياسي الليبي
5+5 Joint Military Commission (5+5JMC)
After a series of talks in Sirte the JMC agreed on a number of steps, the most important of which include:
To reopen the coastal road and remove foreign fighters.
Opening of flights throughout the country.
Full resumption of oil production.
Arrangements for the withdrawal of foreign forces.
Permanent ceasefire steps agreed at Ghadames meeting. The ceasefire agreement was signed in Geneva on the 23rd October 2020.
All foreign mercenaries and forces must leave Libya "immediately" (16/03/2021)
اللجنة العسكرية المشتركة 5+5 تشدد على إخراج المرتزقة والمقاتلين الاجانب فورا
LPDF talks resumed in Geneva, Switzerland, on the 5th of February 2021 to vote on the proposed lists for the new interim, unified government. A minimum of 60% of valid votes is required; otherwise a second round will take place to vote on the two lists with the highest number of votes secured in the first round. The minimum requirement for the second round is 50% + 1. All in all there are four lists to vote on: List 1, List 2, List 3, and List 4.
After the second round of voting, List 3 won by 39 votes (out of a total of 72 votes). The total number of participant was 73. The total number of LPDF members is 75. The new Interim Unified Executive Authority (IUEA) consists of two authorities:
Presidency Council (PC) (مجلس رئاسي), which is referred to as "the restructured PC", in reference to the existing PC. The restructured PC consists of three members:
PC President: Mhemmed Lemnefi
PC Vice-President: Mosa Alkouni
PC Vice-President: Abdulla Allafi
National Unity Government (حكومة وحدة وطنية):
Prime Minister designate: Abdulhamid Dbeibah
The Interim Unified Executive Authority (IUEA) is sometimes referred to as: UEA, without the "I" of "Interim, which is part of its original name in Arabic, namely: السلطة التنفيذية الموحدة الموقتة
Mhemmed Lemnefi (Almenfi)
PC President
Born in 1976
Tobruk
Member of Tripoli's self-appointed & illegal HCS
Former member of GNC
Abdulla Allafi
PC Vice-President
Born in Zawiya, 1968
HoR Member for Zawiya
Mosa Alkouni
PC Vice-President
Former member of NTC
Former member of GNC
Former member of the UN-imposed PC
Ubari, Fezzan
Abdulhamid Dbeibah
GNU Interim Prime Minister
Businessman & Politician
Founder & Leader of "Libya Almoustaqbal"
Najwa Whiba
PC Spokeswoman
Mhemmed Hammouda
GNU Spokesman
5 February 2021
First Round Results
None of the candidates of the four lists have succeeded in securing the required 60% threshold during the first round.
List number 4 won 25 votes. List 4 includes Mr. Agila Saleh (as the head the Presidency Council) and Fathi Bashagha (as the interim Prime Minister).
List number 3 won 20 votes.
List number 2 won 15 votes.
List number 1 won 13 votes.
List 4 :
Agila Saleh (President of the Presidency Council)
Osama Juwaili (Presidency Council member)
Abdulmajeed Alnasr (Presidency Council member)
Fathi Bashagha (interim Prime Minister)
List 3 :
Mhemmed Lemnefi (President of the Presidency Council)
Mosa Alkouni (Presidency Council member)
Abdulla Allafi (Presidency Council member)
Abdulhamid Dbeibah (interim Prime Minister)
List 2 :
Alsharif Alwafi (President of the Presidency Council)
Abdulrahman Albalazi (Presidency Council member)
Omar Aboushrida (Presidency Council member)
Mhemmed Almontaser (interim Prime Minister)
List 1 :
Mhemmed Albargathi (President of the Presidency Council)
Ali Alhojob (Presidency Council member)
Idris Alqaed (Presidency Council member)
Mhemmed Ghweil (interim Prime Minister)
Lists 4 and 3 will be voted on the second round.
Second Round Results
List number 1 (which is list number 3 of the previous round) won by 39 votes. This list is headed by Mr. Mhemmed Almenfi as the president of the Presidency Council, and Mr. Abdulhamid Dbeibah as the interim Prime Minister.
List 1 :
Mhemmed Lemnefi (President of the Presidency Council)
Mosa Alkouni (Presidency Council member)
Abdulla Allafi (Presidency Council member)
Abdulhamid Dbeibah (interim Prime Minister)
Constitution Should Be Ready Before Electing Yet Another Interim Government
Many Libyans (including HoR members [1]) fear that going ahead with s-electing another transitional government (the GNU) without deciding on the constitution is yet another mistake that could well lead to yet another disaster. See the 2021 Elections tab for more information.
PC Takes Constitutional Oath
15 March 2021
The second Presidency Council (PC) took the constitutional oath today before the Supreme Court in Tripoli. The PC members then left Tripoli for Tobruk to attend the "Constitutional Oath Session" at the HoR headquarters (أدى رئيس وأعضاء المجلس الرئاسي اليوم الاثنين اليمين القانونية أمام المحكمة العليا في طرابلس) [2].
The Structured PC Takes Constitutional Oath
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OS-VRp1fKd4
GNU interim Prime Minister, Mr. Abdulhamid Dbeibah, delivers his welcome speech.
Government in 21 days
The interim Prime Minister of the GNU, Mr. Dbeibah, pledged to form his government in 21 days. The government will then be presented to the HoR for approval.
If the HoR does not approve the proposed government, then the decision will return to the 75-committee of the LPDF to approve the government (وفي حال لم تمنح الثقة يعود الأمر لأعضاء الـ75 لمنحها الثقة).
This new measure, according to 112 HoR members, constitutes a violation by the UN against Libya's sovereignty because only elected authorities can legislate. Yet, for some unknown reason, the HoR had implicitly agreed to this by accepting the LPDF agreement — exactly in the same way they initially rejected the LPA agreement in 2015.
Sirte Headquarters For The GNU
Libya's Channel reported [1] that the HoR's president, Mr. Saleh, said that the HoR had agreed for the new GNU to operate from Sirte as its headquarters, because the current condition in Tripoli does not allow the new government to operate from there. This is bizarre development because Tripoli seems to be fine for the current GNA. Hostilities have ended between the two governments after the signing of ceasefire on the 23rd of October 2020 (اتفاق وقف إطلاق النار بتاريخ 23 اكتوبر 2020).
This move recalls the days when the HoR said Tripoli was not safe for it to operate in Tripoli when the HoR was elected, and as a result they fled to Tobruk where they have been since. Ironically, the disagreement at the time between the GNC and the HoR was a trivial one regarding the handover ceremony; and therefore the HoR itself is largely to blame for abandoning Tripoli for the defunct government when it should have stood its ground and fought for what the Libyans voted them for. Interestingly, the UN had confirmed (via its Libya office) that the demilitarised zone in central Libya that was agreed by the 5+5 Joint Military Commission would include Sirte and also Jufra!
25 February 2021
Dbeibah Proposes A Projection For His Cabinet Without Names
رئيس حكومة الوحدة الوطنية يقدم تشكيلته الوزارية دون وزراء ودون أسماء، مع الاكتفاء بطرح شكلها والتصور الكامل لها
Mr. Abdulhamid Dbeibah appeared nervous, stressed and under pressure. He said he took 28 days to propose his projection, when in fact from the 5th to the 25th of February is only 20 days (see minute 17 of the above video). The last day for the designate PM to reveal his cabinet was the 26th of February 2021. Instead the PM proposed a projection for the structure of the cabinet he has in mind without any names.
When one journalist, Mr. Ashref Alazzabi, asked the PM when he intends to name his cabinet, given the fact that he has one day left to do so [2], the PM did not specifically answer the question but instead began talking about his "projection" and how his government will be composed from all the categories and from "all the towns of Libya without exception" (at minute 18 of the above video).
Where is the cabinet?
Reportedly [3] the cabinet will be revealed on the confidence vote day: سيتم الكشف عنها في يوم جلسة منح الثقة
According to the following video (regarding the bribe allegations) the HoR will hold a session on Sirte on the 8th of March 2021 to deliver their vote of confidence on the government that will be revealed to them on that particular day.
Revealing his cabinet on the day of voting, some say, does not allow enough time for the HoR members to study the list; while another source says Mr. Dbeibah ignored the efforts of the HoR members who met in Sabratha to discuss the preparations for the vote of confidence.
Mr. Dbeibah Implicated In Bribe Allegations
"Corrupt Political Dialogue"
تقرير الخبراء التابعين لمنظمة الأمم المتحدة والذي رفع لمجلس الأمن بخصوص شراء أصوات ثلاثة مشاركين على الأقل بملتقى الحوار السياسي الذي انعقد في العاصمة تونس شهر نوفمبر 2020
The bribe allegations state that the designate Prime Minister, Mr. Dbeibah, offered money ranging from $150,000 to $200,000 to three LPDF members to vote for him during the November 2020 talks in Tunis. The allegations will be investigated by the UN around mid March 2021.
Of course, the real question is that, why did not the UN decide on the allegations in November 2020? And why bring it up now just to hinder the vote of confidence?
Hence, one source said the vote of confidence should be postponed until then, until after the results of the investigation, because what if the vote of confidence is granted now and then in mid March it turns out that the three suspected LPDF members are guilty as charged of bribery and therefore Mr. Dbeibah too?
On the other hand, another source says the UN's delay in declaring the results, which they could have declared way back in November 2020, until after the day of vote of confidence will complicate matters and create more confusion at times when we need clarity and unity, and thus may damage the GNU's credibility if found guilty.
This recalls how the UN and its military allies helped setup the NTC way back in 2011, then as soon as the UN bombing campaign destroyed Libya's entire infrastructure, they began attacking the NTC by calling it "helpless" and "weak" and urging it to brings matters under control in a lawless, dilapidated state, infested with terror and chaos and without an army. The result was obvious: the NTC did miserably fail; in fact it was pressurised to fail from the start.
What is also strange about the whole affair, is that the allegations report, first published by French Press (AFP), was said to be based on a "leaked document" that somehow found its way out of the UN's vaults of secrecy.
youtube.com/watch?v=w_Sd5N9Ozkk
Mr. Dbeibah responded to the allegations by saying that they were attempts by the media to hinder the formation of his government of national unity. He also stated that the selection process during the LPDF talks in Tunis was "transparent".
UN's Report Confirms Bribes Were Made But Not Accepted:
The UN's Panel of Experts Report confirms that bribe offers were made during the UN-supervised LPDF talks in Tunis. Various Libyan reports noted the violations at the time, but the UN stayed silent and went ahead with the talks. After the GNU was s-elected in Geneva, and after it was approved by the HoR in Sirte, the UN announced that at least three LPDF members were offered bribes to vote for the post of "prime minister", later won by Mr. Debeibah, but they (the 3 members) categorically rejected the offers.
Maybe the UN knows who made the offers, and also who he is working for! Is this person still a member of the LPDF?
Designate prime minister of the Libyan Government of National Unity (GNU), Mr. Dbeibah, was reported to have presented his GNU cabinet to the HoR today, the 4th of March 2021. Unfortunately we do not know if the cabinet includes a list of names or not. Mr. Zghid (a HoR member) said people do not need to see the structure of the government, but what they need is the list of names. Therefore the following list is not official. Reportedly the following list was leaked, and found its way to social media sites. It was also shown by Libya's Channel in its 8 O'clock news [5].
Unofficial list of the proposed GNU Cabinet
The leaked GNU cabinet list includes 2 deputy prime ministers, 27 ministers, and 6 state ministers. Mr. Dbeibah was reported to have said that the proposed GNU cabinet includes the same number of current ministries, and that it represents all Libyans.
The minister of defence (number 17 in the above list) is not named, with the word "vacant" written in place of the name. This is very peculiar because the "army" has always been a problem during all the previous dialogues and agreements. Since the prime minister had failed to announce his cabinet, we are left to speculate as to why. Is the above list fake? Or is the vacant slot was intentionally left for the HoR to fill in? All we know is that announcing the government on the day of vote (namely the 8th of March 2021) could, speculatively, allow the HoR to propose or fill in the vacant post(s). If so, who did leak the list and why?
حكومة دبيبة.. بين الكفاءة والمحاصصة وثقة البرلمان
Questions regarding Dbeibah's government https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jkTXt-IJh3k
The discussion regarding the leaked GNU cabinet list includes three HoR members: Mr. Zghid, Mr. Dghari, and Mr. Alaswad. There are a number of problems with the proposed cabinet including:
Mr. Zghid says the list of ministries proposed is way too large for a transitional period of 9 months.
One HoR member says Mr. Dbeibah can be excused for the long list because he was under pressure to please everyone.
Mr. Dghari, on the other hand, says it was the HoR's president, Mr. Ageela Saleh, and the HoR members of the LPDF who "forced" Dbeibah to come up with such a long list, adding that it was Mr. Saleh who stipulated that the cabinet should include 11 ministers from Tripolitania, 9 from Cyrenaica, and 7 from Fezzan. All those contradicting views come from MP's who are members of the same parliament: the HoR.
Some of the proposed ministers have open cases in the high court.
Some of the ministers lack the required expertise.
Some of the ministers are known to support the Muslim Brotherhood, while others are known to support terror groups. One source, in the above video, said the GNU is said to represents all Libyans and therefore it is natural for it to include the Muslim Brotherhood.
Foreign diplomats are pressurising the HoR to approve the proposed government, which according to Mr. Zghid, they have no right to tell the Libyan Parliament what to do. These include: the American ambassador, the Italian foreign minister, the French foreign minister, and the Egyptian foreign minister among others.
Governments, legally speaking, do not start work until they are approved by the parliament, yet, according Mr. Zghid, Mr. Dbeibah is already working as if he is a Prime Minister.
Why is the defence ministry listed as vacant?
Why create 3 ministries just for Education?
Why separate the Youth Ministry from the Sport Ministry?
The above video shows brief information and photo about each minister in the list, followed by a discussion.
Is The GNU Anti-woman?
According to libyanexpress.com [9]:
"During his first press conference, Prime Minister Debaiba came under fire for a string of sexist remarks and possibly backtracking on promises made during the UN lead peace process to grant women 30% of the ministerial posts in Libya. Debiba stated that there were no women put forward in the thousands of CVs he’d received for the ministerial positions therefore he may not be able to meet the 30% quota agreed upon prior in the LPDF.
After the comment, the PM backtracked by rehashing outdated remarks such as “women ae our mother, sister, daughter, etc” leading to even further criticism by feminists groups nationally and internationally, calling for an apology and demanding that a woman be recognized not only as someone’s relative or spouse but as an independent equal human being of her own right."
Names of the 42 HoR members as reported by LANA [6].
42 HoR members have called for postponing the grant of confidence session a day before the session thought to take place in Sirte [7]. The reason, they said, is that they need to include the agreed results of the LPDF into the Libyan Constitutional Declaration (CD) in the same session of granting the confidence — all as "one bundle" (حزمة واحدة). Without this, they say, the granting of confidence session will be a constitutional violation, and also it would mean there will be no elections on the 24th of December 2021. According to LANA [6]:
دعا عدد من أعضاء مجلس النواب، الأحد، إلى تأجيل جلسة المجلس في سرت لكونها محصورة في مناقشة منح الثقة للحكومة المقترحة دون الإشارة إلى تضمين مخرجات تونس حزمة واحدة للإعلان الدستوري، خاصة أن عدم التضمين للمخرجات يعني عدم إجراء الانتخابات في 24 ديسمبر 2021م
The question is, why wait until the last day before the session to come up with such a legal reason? The HoR had nearly 30 days since the 5th of February to prepare all the necessary legalities required to approve the government of national unity.
Whatever reasons they might have, if they decline to approve the government in the allocated time, the LPDF would grant confidence to the GNU even though the LPDF agreement is yet to be endorsed by the CD; which in the opinion of some would complicate matters even worse.
Another development along these lines is that, according to LANA, journalists have been prevented from entering Gardabiyyah airport in Sirte to cover the arrival of HoR members in Sirte [8]:
الصحافيون المكلفون بتغطية جلسة مجلس النواب يعبرون عن استيائهم من منعهم من الدخول لمطار القرضابية لتغطية وصول النواب ، وكذلك لمقر الإقامة.
Important Point!?
According to the GNA's former Minister of Education, Dr. Othman Abduljalil, there is no constitutional or legal base that confirms the 24th of December elections, and that the HoR did not endorse the LPDF agreement when it approved the GNU in Sirte; adding that if there were "honest intentions" then the HoR could have also amended the CD to endorse the LPDF agreement so that we have a legal confirmation of the 24th of December 2021 elections. Dr. Abduljalil, Mr. Ahmed Sherkesi and others, in this video, fear that there is a conspiracy to not hold elections in December 2021 for the reasons outlined in the discussion. In conclusion, it is hard if not impossible to know what is going on simply because transparency is always invisible and the Libyan saga has now become so complicated and confusing for anyone to make any sense of it all.
How Many Votes Are Required To Grant Confidence?
The number of votes required to grant confidence, according to Mr. Zghid (in the above video), is 98 votes. He hopes that around 120 members (out of 200 HoR members) would attend the session in Sirte on Monday the 8th of March 2021.
One HoR member said it might take the whole week before the HoR can decide to accept or reject the proposed government. It was previously reported that the HoR have 21 days to do so.
What If The HoR Rejects The Proposed Government?
If the HoR rejects all the proposed GNU cabinets, as they did with the GNA, then the proposed government will be approved by the UN-imposed LPDF. This however will create more problems than unite the country — something the UN is good at. For example:
The LPDF members were imposed by the UN in violation of the Libyan Constitutional Declaration.
The UN or any other organisation has no right to impose a legislative authority that is not elected by the Libyan people.
Ignoring the above two objections for a moment, and according to the following video by 218TV, there is no "legal frame" defined by the LPDF agreement to deal with granting confidence, nor "regulations" in regard to approving the GNU government.
Vote Of Confidence
08 March 2021
According to Libya's Channel, one hundred and thirty two (132) HoR members have attended today's historical "Grant of Confidence Session" (جلسة منح الثقة).
The session was suspended to the following day (09/03/2021) (تعليق جلسة منح الثقة إلى يوم غد) [10].
09 March 2021
According to the HoR's spokesman, the prime minister presented his government and also he answered some questions, and that the HoR will meet tomorrow (10/03/2021) to vote over the proposed government [11].
However, according to the HoR's president (in the above video), the government presented by Mr. Dbeibah is incomplete, and therefore he instructed the prime minister to form a "complete government" and come back on the following day (10/03/2021).
Apparently the cabinet has two ministries listed as vacant, and not just one (as noted in the leaked document):
Vacant Ministries:
Ministry of Defence
Foreign Ministry.
The session was suspend to the following day (10/03/2021) (تعليق جلسة منح الثقة إلى صباح غد الأربعاء) [12].
10 March 2021
The HoR has granted its vote of confidence to the GNU government by a majority of 132 votes. According to LANA, 2 HoR members have abstained [13]: ( بأغلبية 132 نائبا وامتناع عضوين وتغيب 36 عضوا عن الجلسة ); although other sources say only one member abstained.. The HoR's president also said the approved government was approved only until the 24th of December 2021.
The news are confirmed by the website of the HoR [14]:
تم التصويت على منح الثقة للحكومة بأغلبية 132 صوتاً وبذلك نالت حكومة الوحدة الوطنية الثقة على ان تؤدي التشكيلة الوزارية ورئيس الحكومة اليمين الدستورية في جلسة الإثنين القادم بمقر مجلس النواب الدستوري في مدينة بنغازي وبذلك علقت الجلسة.
It was reported [15] that the HoR made adjustments to the proposed list; while according to this source [17] the PM responded to the demands of the HoR members.
Constitutional Oath:
The HoR's president also announced in the same session that the approved government of national unity will be sworn in next Monday in Benghazi. However, two days later, the HoR's president said the "Constitutional Oath" session will be held in Tobruk, and not in Benghazi. Some sources said the move was due to security fears, but the HoR's spokesman said it was due to logistic and organisational reasons [18].
However, Mr. Faraj Zidan, a law expert and political analysts, told 2018TV News that Benghazi is the legal and official headquarters of the HoR, and that the reason the HoR operates from Tobruk is due to security reasons resulting from the war on terror then plighting Benghazi; and that since that is all behind us now, then there is no reason why the HoR does not operate from its legal headquarters in Benghazi [19].
Minister of Defence:
In the above video, the HoR's president started reading the approved list of ministers, but when he reached the minister of defence he said (to himself) "there is no minister of defence" (at minute 2:32 of the video).
According to the above video, 218TV Live, Dr. Masoud Salami says it was a clever move by the PM to keep the defence post for himself in order to avoid wars, and that the PM promised no more wars in Libya.
LANA, on the other hand, said the Defence Minister will be named with the Presidency Council (يسمى مع المجلس الرئاسي) [13], and also the Foreign Minister. But according to the official GNU approved list of ministers, published by the HoR itself (see next), the Defence Minster is named as "the president of the GNU" (who is Mr. Dbeibah) with the word "temporary" between brackets.
The answer to this dilemma is apparently Mr. Dbeibah has no "full right" to appoint a defence minister. According to the above video by Libya's Channel [17], Mr. Dbeibah has only 25% of the right to do so, with the other 75% rests with the Presidency Council, as indicated by LANA [13]. However, the final word went to the spokesman of the GNU who told Aljazeera that the minister of defence is currently held by the Prime minister Mr. Dbeibah, just as shown by the following list of the approved GNU published by the HoR.
HoR-Approved Libyan Government of National Unity (GNU)
HoR-Approved GNU According to LANA [13]
Does the HoR need to endorse the LPDF Agreement before the vote of confidence?
As noted above (see 07 March 2021), 42 HoR members called for postponing the grant of confidence session because, they said, they need to include the LPDF results into the Libyan Constitutional Declaration (CD) in the same session of granting the confidence — all as "one bundle" (حزمة واحدة). No one said anything about this on the following day, and the GNU was granted confidence.
Then another source [15] reiterated the same objection after the GNU was approved, adding that voting before endorsing the LPDF results into the CD could pose a problem in the future [15].
However according to the following source, the HoR does not have to do that, because the UN had already done that via its 2510 Decree of 2020, which endorses the results of the Berlin Conference, and since the Geneva dialogue is one of the Berlin results then it is automatically endorsed as part of the Political Agreement, and therefore, the source says, there is no need to include the results into the CD.
GNU Takes Constitutional Oath: حكومة الوحدة الوطنية تؤدي اليمين القانونية أمام مجلس النواب
15 March 2021
The government of national unity has today took the constitutional oath to serve the State of Libya, be honest, be loyal to the 17th of February revolution, respect the Constitutional Declaration, consider the Libyans' needs, and preserve Libya's independence, security and UNITY.
أدى رئيس حكومة الوحدة الوطنية المهندس عبدالحميد الدبيبة ونائباه ووزراء الحكومة اليمين القانونية أمام مجلس النواب بطبرق [20].
The session was attended by:
عبدالحميد الدبيبة
حسين القطراني
رمضان بوجناح
وزراء الحكومة
رئيس مجلس القضاء الاعلى
رئيس المجلس الرئاسي محمد المنفي ونائباه
رئيس مجلس الدولة خالد المشري
عدد من سفراء البعثات السياسية
GNU Takes Constitutional Oath
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ze-mg-hC1Uk
The logo confirms that the name of the government is the "Government of National Unity" (GNU). Two days after announcing the winning logo, the GNU cancelled the winning logo because it was not original as stipulated by the competition rules, and instead the winning logo went to the second winner. This shows that the GNU are prone to making decisions based on wrong facts. It was the Libyans in social media who alerted the GNU about the logo discrepancy.
Logo One
The canceled winning logo
The first winning logo announced by the GNU on the 25th of February was later cancelled. Apparently Libyans protested that the winning logo number one was taken from "shutter stock", and that it was already used by another company.
A logo template that can be bought online by anyone to use as a logo for their company.
Logo One Symbolism
The cancelled logo is actually an elegant and symbolic stylisation of the name "Libya" in Arabic (first box from left), as well as an abstract representation of an eagle in flight (second box from left); with the Libyan flag right in the centre, embraced by two hands, signifying "power" and "unity": the government of national unity of (allegedly) free Libya.
Tifinagh
The use of Tifinagh ('Berber script') in political logos and banners is always suspicious when it is not accompanied by deeds to reflect recognition in practice. The GNU's use of Tifinagh is a good sign that the current transitional leaders are not like the HoR and its military leader.
The GNC also used such advertising in the background only when their spokesman talks to the press, but they never included Tifinagh in their official logo or documents.
We also know how the NTC deceptively used Tifinagh in its banner when they were rallying support early on during the UN bombing campaign only for Mr. Abduljalil to turn round and call the Berbers "foreign agenda" when they began demanding basic human rights after the "premature liberation" of Libya.
Readers interested in the official persecution and non-recognition of the Berbers by the leaders need to go no further than the unjust constitution.
Logo Two
The second winning logo that replaced the canceled logo.
Designed by Adli Alakkari (عدلي العكاري)
The reason for canceling the first winning logo can be argued to also apply to the second winning logo. One Libyan user in Facebook pulled the following logo from the internet that is used by a Turkish entity. The resemblance is not limited to the crescent and the star in the middle, but more importantly to the entwined lines around the circle that represent unity.
The winning logo also appeared in social media sites with slight variation, for example, the logo includes the name in English, like the following one:
The following logo also appears on the wall behind the GNU's spokesman while delivering press statements, and also during official receptions of foreign delegates.
Logo Two Symbolism
Website
The GNU was reported to have said that all social media pages are fake and do not represent the official GNU; and that they will publish details regarding their official website when it becomes available.
It was reported that there are hundreds of millions of fake accounts and pages in Facebook alone, and therefore it is strongly recommended to not use social media to confirm anything at all.
Careful users should always refer to official websites for information. The GNU was reported by one Libyan source to may take over the current websites of the GNA once the new cabinet is announced and approved.
Still there is no official announcement regarding the GNU's website. However, there is a new URL that appeared at the bottom of the GNU's first Statement (1) of 2021 on the 13th of March 2021, namely: www.gnu.gov.ly
The new URL is not active yet, and currently leads to an empty page.
Update: 29/03/2021
Around the 29th of March 2021, the GNU's new URL, gnu.gov.ly, redirected to the website of the Prime Ministers Office, which was previously used by the GNA: pm.gov.ly, as shown by the following screen-shot upon visiting gnu.gov.ly :
gnu.gov.ly redirects to pm.gov.ly
Update: June 2021
It has been nearly five months now and the GNU website still is under construction. The GNU itself will come to an end in just over five months from now. This translates volumes about the GNU!
24 December 2021 Elections
"Calling for elections in the absence of stable institutions while competing for diplomatic and economic influence won’t rebuild the country — it will destroy it." [6]
As we saw under the 2018 Elections tab, the HNEC was forced to waste time and resources on the elections proposed by the UN-imposed PC on the 15th of July 2017 as part of its Roadmap [2, 3]. The HoR's president and the head of the HNEC both have rightly expressed their doubts about both the legality and the success of the 2018 elections proposed by Mr. Sarraj, and yet the UN and its allies went ahead with the project that was born dead.
Now, one would think the HoR (as a legislative body) and the HNEC would get their acts, and facts, together and prepare the laws and constitution and whatever else is required to hold the referendum, which was the subject of heated debate since 2011, but unfortunately nothing of the sort had happened. We still have no constitution; no referendum laws that are complete; and yet now they are preparing for another election project: the 24th of December 2021 elections.
Confusingly the 2021 elections, according to HNEC, are not for the final, stable governments, but for yet another transitional government, which is referred to as "the 4th transitional period" by the head of the HNEC, Mr. Imad Sayeh; when the GNU designate PM, Mr. Dbeibah, said the governemnt to be elected in December 2021 "will end all transitional periods".
However, according to HoR member Aesha Athbalgi, the December 2021 government will last for "four years" (see next video) — which is the usual period for elected governments in most democratic countries.
HoR member Aesha Athbalgi says the December 2021 government is for four years.
Constitution Should Be Ready Before Electing Yet Another Interim Government
Many Libyans (including HoR members [1]) fear that going ahead with s-electing another transitional government without deciding on the constitution is yet another mistake that could well lead to yet another disaster. The time allowed for drafting, agreeing and then voting for the constitution, around 11 months, is not enough to prepare and organise the elections.
In theory it is possible, but according to the LPDF agreement, "consensus" is the basis on which the constitution should be built, and this will not go down very well, simply because that is exactly what the Berbers and the Tebu have been saying all those years, but the leaders in Tripoli and Tobruk rejected such consensus and instead they are still preparing laws and amendments for the so-called "referendum" to vote over what many regard as basic human rights that should be enshrined by law.
Joint Constitutional Committee (JCC)
The Constitutional Conference, Gherdaqa (الغردقة), Egypt, February 2021. [Photo: HoR]
9 February 2021
The third round of the constitutional talks was held in Gherdaqa, Egypt, on the 9th of February 2021 by the "Joint Constitution Committee" (JCC). The JCC is made of members from the HoR and the illegal HCS. The head of the Libyan HNEC, Mr. Imad Sayeh, was also present. The event is organised by the UN.
Ironically, one of the results to come out of the meeting is the possibility of canceling or delaying the referendum on the draft constitution due to lack of time to prepare for the event(s). This means the possibility of delaying or canceling the 24 December 2021 elections — such news was delivered at the conference a few days after the new GNU was s-elected in Geneva. It is probably a good idea to move the whole of Libya offshore.
One critic [1] wondered if the constitutional saga is continuing because the transitional leaders want to stay in power beyond the proposed date, just as they have been delaying the draft constitution for nearly 10 years now!
Some Libyans say if 10 years are not enough to prepare the "draft" constitution, how many decades more are required to prepare the "final" constitution?
HNEC Says it needs 7 months to prepare for the elections
The head of the HNEC told the JCC in Egypt that he needs 7 months in total to prepare for the referendum. However, if the Libyans reject the contested draft, which is very likely giving the controversy surrounding the "consensus" versus "voting" saga imposed by the NTC and then by the HoR against the demands of the native Berbers and Tebu leaders, then we shall enjoy the fall back to square one.
The UN's Hidden Agenda
Some sources fear that the final elections date agreed by LDPF members, namely the 24th December 2021, was used by the UN as a tool to pressurise the 75 LPDF members to come to a quick agreement.
This is odd, because it recalls what the British said in 2016 when the UN imposed the PC (or GNA) without much thought to the dire consequence now are apparent to all: they hurried with the PC to stop ISIL gaining foothold in Libya; we have heard that before!
JCC Decides To Hold Elections In December 2021 Without Constitution
13 February 2021
Sabah Joumaa (HoR member)
(صباح جمعة)
The Joint Constitution Committee (JCC) had agreed on the 13th of February 2021 that if the constitutional referendum fails, and after the HoR confirms that the referendum cannot take place, then the 24 December 2021 elections will go ahead as planed without the constitution but based on the so-called "constitutional base" ( القاعدة الدستورية ) — whatever that means.
Also, the JCC agreed, according to HoR member Sabah Joma'a [5], that the constitutional referendum will take place after the presidential elections.
This confirm the old rumours that the leaders had no intention of agreeing a final constitution and hence their failure to do so for the past 10 long years. This is exactly what many feared in 2017 when the draft attracted major criticism from various legal institutions and Berber and Tebu leaders. The criticism was that the current leaders have a hidden agenda to elect a president and a final government without a constitution for some reasons known only to them.
The evidence for this could be hinted at by the fact that over two years ago, HoR's Libyan Army spokesman announced that the general elections of 2018 (see 2018 Elections tab) will go ahead even without the constitution.
المسماري : سنذهب إلى الانتخابات إذا رفض الشعب الدستور
On the 11th of October 2018 the spokesman of the armed forces in Cyrenaica (the LNA) said they will go for the elections even if the people of Libya rejected the draft constitution. This means that they knew from then.
According to the persecuted Libyan natives the proposed draft is a fascist constitution that should be rejected outright. Basic human rights cannot be voted for but should be enshrined by the constitution via consensus, they said. What if the majority vote to take your house away, or even worse deprive you of your head?
Conspiracy or Not! آلية جديدة لاعتماد القاعدة الدستورية . . . هل هي مؤامرة لعدم إجراء الانتخابات؟
Libyan transitional leaders do not want to leave their places by delaying referendum and elections.
آلية جديدة لاعتماد القاعدة الدستورية . . . هل هي مؤامرة لعدم إجراء الانتخابات؟
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yFlkXnH-wrc
HNEC Says JCC Results Are Not What Expected
The head of the HNEC, Mr. Imad Sayeh, was reported by Libya's Channel to have said that the results of the JCC in Egypt are not what they expected, obscure, and not clear; adding that the committee's statement made no reference to the 24th of December 2021 elections, it was not signed, and has no reference to Article 4.
He also said that the 24th of December 2021 elections are not for the final government of stability, but for "a 4th transitional period".
HNEC's general manager says passing the constitution hampers elections.
Work on Constitutional Base & Elections Has Almost Stopped !
HNEC fears the blame.
In an interview with 218TV, HNEC's general manager, Mr. Imad Sayeh, said he fears the HNEC might get the blame if the 24th of December elections are delayed. The truth of the matter, he says, is that the "constitutional process" has stopped and "the 24 of December process" has also stopped, for reasons that are not clear to the HNEC.
This will affect the HNEC's preparations for the elections, and, if the HoR decides to vote over the constitution before the elections, then it will also affect the HNEC's preparations for the referendum [7].
He also said that the UN's and the dialogue committe's work towards the "constitutional base" and the referendum laws has "almost stopped [7].
This "obscurity" and "lack of clarity", he says, will have a negative affect on the proposed election date, and thus, he concludes, that the HNEC shall not be responsible for such "stoppage"; and that "they fear they will get the blame for the HNEC's lack of ability to hold the elections on the 24th of December 2021"
These are serious revelations that add to the earlier rumours, in that the leaders are delaying the whole process.
Hence Mr. Sayeh asks: does the GNU have the "intention" and "the ability" to support and sponsor the elections on the time specified? This is the question the GNU needs to answer, he said.
Brotherhood hinders elections by insisting on referendum, says Libya's Channel https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1SY9HBVFa6E
انتخابات ديسمبر .. بين الإجماع الشعبي وعراقيل الإخوان
Libya's Channel claims in the above report that almost no one internationally or nationally disagrees with holding the elections in December as the only way forward, perhaps except the Brotherhood leaders who seem to hinder the elections to allow more time to establish their infiltration in order to reach the top job: the president.
However, it is almost certain that most international experts and many national analysts and many more Libyans agree that going to the December elections, or any other elections for that matter, without a constitution, without establishing law and order, and without dismantling the hundreds of militias plighting the country is not normal nor right. It can be imposed, but it is not what people in their right mind do.
بوقعيقيص says LPDF's Legal Committee has stopped working, and that no elections on the horizon.
Will there be elections on the 24th of December 2021?
[https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WwCk2cYkVmE]
According to Ahmed Sherkesi, a member of the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum (LPDF), the HoR and the HCS are using the "referendum card" (ورقة الاستفتاء على الدستور) to delay the 24th of December 2021 elections [8, 9]. Mr Sherkesi also noted that LPDF's Legal Committee had completed 90% of the "constitutional base" () and that the remaining 10% will be completed by the 10th of April 2021 (اللجنة القانونية أنجزت 90% من القاعدة الدستورية) [8].
While according to Ramzi Aljedi, the hindering HoR does not want parliamentarian elections because it was the HoR who formed the GNU government, and that the hindering HCS does not want a presidential elections because if the people elect a president then the Islamists will loose and it will be the end of their "Islamic Project" [10]:
(“الأجسام المعرقلة “النواب والدولة”، ومجلس النواب يعتبر هو من شكّل حكومة الوحدة الوطنية، ولذلك أعضاء مجلس النواب لا يريدون انتخابات برلمانية ورئاسية، والطرف الآخر (الإسلام السياسي) يريد انتخابات برلمانية ويرفض الانتخابات الرئاسية؛ لأن انتخاب رئيس مباشر من الشعب سيُنهي مشروع الإسلام السياسي) [10].
All in all, they are all in it together.
It is more than ten years and still there is no sign of the constitution; clearly indicating that they are all in it together from the beginning.
اللجنة القانونية لمتابعة التقدم في المسار الدستوري
The Legal Committee [LC] was formed from the UN-imposed LPDF members in accordance with Article 4 of the "LPDF Road Map". The committee consists of 17 members, whom the UN claims to have volunteered for the job. The 17 members were reported to have no legal expertise [1].
According to the UN's website, "Article 4 of the Roadmap stipulates that the mandate of the Legal Committee is to follow up on the progress of the constitutional process" [4] (لمتابعة التقدم في المسار الدستوري). Yet, in reality the LC had actually violated the Libyan Constitutional Declaration by becoming a constitutional committee itself.
Instead of "following up" what the constitutional committee does or had done, they reconvened recently (7-10 April 2021) in Tunis to create a constitutional base to decide if "presidential elections" be held in December or not (something they failed to do), and to prepare the legal foundations for the "parliamentarian elections" (which they said they succeeded to do but failed to publish any details).
Such legal duties clearly have nothing to do with "follow up", as alleged by the UN in its website [4]. It is however typical of most initiatives imposed (or organised) by the UN; and, according to some Libyan analysts and legal experts, is a clear violation of both the outcome of the Joint Constitutional Committee (JCC) (held in Gherdaqa on the 9th of February 2021), and of the mandate (or Article 4 of the Roadmap) by which the LC itself was created.
Watch the following two videos for detailed information about the violations as voiced by members of the Libyan Constitutional Committee themselves and by other Libyan legal experts.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=x3FStul0FXs The Legal Committee postpones presidential election mechanism!
Of particular importance is the statement made by Nadia Omran (a member of the Constitutional Committee) in which she noted how the UN and its legal committee had violated the agreement reached in Gherdaqa (الغردقة), Egypt, in relation to the JCC. For those readers and politicians who do not know what the JCC is, or are not aware of the outcome of the Gherdaqa conference, here is a quick reminder:
First of all, the conference took place very recently (on the 9th of February 2021) and therefore for the UN and others to ignore its outcome is strange.
Secondly, the conference in Gherdaqa was actually organised by the UN itself, and therefore for the UN to ignore its outcome is even more bizarre.
Thirdly, the conference in Gherdaqa included the "Joint Constitution Committee" (JCC). The JCC is made of members from the HoR and the HCS to prepare the constitutional requirements for the December 2021 elections. The head of the Libyan HNEC, Mr. Imad Sayeh, was also present, in addition to the organiser: the UN.
Fourthly, the JCC discussed what needs to be done regarding the constitutional base, and presented the recommendations to the HoR to include in the Constitutional Declaration (CD) via a constitutional amendment. The conference was concluded on the 9th of February.
Then for some unknown reason, Tobruk's HoR ignored the outcome of the conference and failed to approve the CD amendment required to pass the recommendations.
Tripoli's HCS ignored the outcome too.
The UN also ignored the outcome of the event it organised, and instead switched to the UN-imposed Legal Committee a few weeks later, in Tunis, to dictate a constitutional base by a "bunch" of Libyans who [reportedly] are not legal experts [1].
The Libyans should not accept this UN madness. How could the UN get away with this most absurd violation? This is not a game:- create a joint committee to compile a constitutional base; then when they do, ignore the results; and create another committee, in total disregard to the country's institutions and in open violation of the agreed mandates (Article 4).
Nonetheless, holding elections without a constitution would widen the chasm rather than bridge the gap. Hence, as stated by Nadia Omran, a constitution is required before any elections to hold the elected people accountable. For example, what happens when the elected government decides to set up a new constitutional committee to re-write the constitution to suit its needs? Aren't we all aware of what had happened after the elections of 2012 and of 2014, the results of which are total disaster that brought us thus far?
Incidentally, another speaker (in the following video) noted that the Libyans had indeed organised the 2012 elections and also the 2014 elections according to the current Constitutional Declaration (CD), and therefore, he asked, what has changed to prevent the next elections from being held in accordance with the same CD? If an amendment is required then such an amendment will take no more than a few hours to write, print and announce by the HoR's president. Remember, the amendment already had been agreed on by the JCC in Gherdaqa just a few weeks ago, and therefore it is ready to approve.
The 24 December Movement (24DM) should also take a note of this dangerous scenario, instead of campaigning and threatening a general strike and civil disobedience if the elections fail to take place on the 24th of December 2021 with or without a constitutional referendum. Ignoring the Gherdaqa outcome could also indicate, but not necessarily prove, that the HoR, the HCS and the UN "are in it together". The 24DM had already suspected the HoR and the HCS, and even demanded the GNU remove the head of the HNEC.
The problem is that the GNU too seems silent about the whole affair, instead of taking the lead and informing the public about "what is going on".
The Legal Committee has no right to legislate or deal with the constitution, and, as noted by Nadia Omran, the members of legal committee imposed by the UN are not legal experts, and this, she said, is very dangerous; adding that the "UN has another agenda".
The Libyans need to open their eyes and pay more attention to what the UN and its chain of transitional leaders are doing, as well as to what the movement, parties, groups and militias are doing to practically extend the Libyans' agony for an indefinite period; while foreign institutions and governments carve lucrative Libya according to their selfish agendas during a transitional period where no transitional government should be allowed to strike any international deals whatsoever. Such contracts and deals should only be struck once a full constitution is in place and once a final government and president had been elected. The constitution is required to regulate what any Libyan government should do and should not do.
شكل الانتخابات المناسب
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5VXCV7xEiv0
ناقشت حلقة اليوم من برنامج LIVE على قناة 218NEWS الشكل المناسب للانتخابات القادمة وعن معارضة البعض إجراء انتخابات رئاسية عبر الاقتراع المباشر من الشعب ، كما تم مناقشة إعلان القيادة العامة للجيش الوطني بناء ثلاث مدن متكاملة في ضواحي بنغازي تستوعب 12 مليون نسمة بعد لقاء المشير خليفة حفتر بأسر شهداء الجيش الوطني .
In the above video, Mr. Ibrahim Algheryani, answers a number of questions with an impressive accuracy regarding the current elections saga and the absurdity the Legal Committee attempting to impose on the will of the Libyan people. The answers he provided are obvious, documented, and known to most Libyans except perhaps to the leaders and of course the UN.
The UN continues to play with words regarding "what the Libyans want":
Ambiguity, lack of exit strategy, and implicit statements appear to be characteristic of any UN-led operation. Adding to the well-known "implicit objectives" of the UN-bombing campaign of 2011, is the "presidential and the parliamentarian elections" which the UN seems to refer to only as "elections":- without specifying the presidential elections in particular. Now the question is, why does the UN do that? Here is what the latest UN envoy to Libya had said most recently [3]:
ورأى أن اللجنة أمامها فرصة لـ«التقدم خطوة أخرى» نحو إجراء الانتخابات الوطنية في موعدها، وقال: «هذا هو ما يريده الشعب وهذا هو ما يستحقه. كما إن المجتمع الدولي يؤيد بشكل كامل إجراء الانتخابات في 24 ديسمبر 2021».
The UN envoy appears to be misrepresenting the truth (although it is hard to say intentionally or otherwise based on ignorance). Saying "this is what the Libyans want" when talking about "elections" in general does not represent the truth, and nothing specific about it.
There are no Libyans talking about holding "elections" on the time imposed by the UN, namely the 24th of December 2021 (see below for details on how the UN imposed this date).
Secondly, the Libyans are very specific about "presidential & parliamentarian elections", and not just the vague "elections".
Also what most Libyans want, if that is what the UN is interested in, is a proper constitution before any elections of any kind to be held in any time; and they have been saying this for 10 long, agonising years. What the Libyans want is a proper and final government of stability, instead of the countless elections and the transitional governments by the bucket, most of which organised by the so-called UN.
Still worse, the UN's website even misrepresented (intentionally or otherwise) the results of the LC that were concluded on the 10th of April 2021. First, let us quote what the UN had said in its website [5]:
"LC members worked for long hours and were able to overcome divisions and managed to reach consensus on a constitutional basis for the elections."
This is clearly wrong, because the LC did not overcome divisions and did not reach any kind of full consensus, let alone the consensus the Berbers and the Tebu have been campaigning-for for ten years now to no avail.
The truth of the matter is that the LC had failed to agree and reach a consensus regarding the "presidential elections", which they postponed [see above video for details]. Secondly, the LC had indeed agreed and reached consensus regarding the "parliamentarian elections", the results of which they failed to publish, and also they failed to say when they will publish such results; and therefore one has no clue to ascertain if they have reached any results at all until they publish (as of today: 12 April 2021).
The UN needs to be honest and transparent, and most important of all stick to the results of the Gherdaqa conference they themselves organised in Egypt just a few weeks ago. Given the fact that the UN's list of violations continues to grow by the year (as documented here), one can only presume the hijacked UN is seemingly misleading the remaining members of the true UN because the Libyans know well what had been done and said and dusted too.
Whose idea was it to hold elections on the 24th of December 2021?
Nonetheless, going to the elections on December 2021 without a constitution will ultimately lead to another transitional government the Libyans do not want, and might even destroy the country for decades to come.
This confirms the earlier reports (see LPDF tab) stating that the UN chose the date of "24 December 2021" in order to hurry up with the LPDF agreement that culminated in the selected GNU in Geneva on the 5th of February 2021. Ironically, the British said a similar thing when the UN hurriedly imposed the GNA in 2015/2016 in that they had to hurry up with imposing the GNA to stop ISIL gaining foothold in Libya: at the time the ISIL propaganda was full speed in the media and Sirte was turned in hell, with bodies littering the streets, the British PM joked.
Now, the date chosen (or imposed by the UN) seems to reveal yet another, implicit agenda, namely the UN chose the date so early without allowing enough time to sort out the errors that hindered all previous governments, and without allowing enough time to dismantle all the militias that are causing all the mayhem, and without allowing enough time to prepare the needed constitution, and without allowing enough time to resolve a host of other troubling issues, so that they can go for the elections without the constitution. It is simple; but the question is why? Why are there some Libyan governments (reportedly the HoR and the HCS) afraid of the constitution?
When transparency is invisible, honesty is lacking, and chaos is rife, then one is left to search for the needle in a haystack, in darkness. There are various reports speaking of the conspiracy to go for elections without the constitution, as noted by various Libyan sources, and as covered under the 2021 Tab (in the above green menu). Hence many organisations and governments (Libyan and international) quote the delay to hold the elections as a reason (that is as an excuse) not to hold the referendum. The fact that it had been now 10 years and still there is no sign of the constitution is more than evidence to prove the conspiracy as fact.
In conclusion the Libyans had never decided to hold the elections on the 24th of December 2021, and that it was the UN who imposed this particular date; just as they had imposed the LPDF itself, and just as they had imposed the GNA a few years earlier which resulted in more wars when the GNA supposed to be a government of national accord.
So why accuse the Libyans for something they did not say and they did not choose? The Libyans never heard of the date "24 December 2021" until it was announced by the UN. As a matter of fact the Libyans had had enough of the elections saga that seems to churn out more transitional governments of discord and wars - all under the supervision of the UN.
The UN claims that the LNC would include all the marginalised groups; but then when the show is over, the Tebu and the Berbers find themselves abandoned once more. To begin with, the Berbers do not consider themselves "marginalised", an "ethnic minority", or A "cultural component" of some sort. They are the natives of Libya, and thus they are no more, and nothing less, than "Libyans".
The so-called revolution should be for all Libyans without discrimination based on colour, gender, age, group or component; otherwise where is all that talk of "democracy", "freedom" and "equality" for all?
For a particular group of Libyans to run away with the revolution under international supervision, then turn round and say, well, the ethnic minorities, or the cultural components (the cogs of the broken wheel), need to be included in the UN-controlled dialogue is a complete farce, simply because "Libya" is for "all Libyans", and therefore there is nothing else to include or exclude.
Berber activists have already boycotted the referendum on Libya's constitution. The Libyan Tamazight Supreme Council had also rejected the outcome of the forthcoming referendum stating that the constitution is "racist and unjust".
They have also blamed the UN, CDA, HoR and the illegal HCS for the imposed segregation. On the 30th of September 2018 the Berber activists reiterated their earlier request which calls for the Berbers' rights to be included in the constitution without the need for voting because human rights cannot be voted for [15]; they must be implemented by law, the Berbers rightly say.
The use of Tifinagh ('Berber script') in conferences, banners and in press releases is always suspicious when it is not accompanied by official recognition. In such cases it is obvious that the "sacred" Tifinagh is no more than a lollipop. What the Berbers have been demanding for long, agonising decades is:
Full human rights just like the Arabs claim for themselves.
Full recognition of being the indigenous inhabitants of Libya.
Full constitutional recognition.
Tamazight to be officially recognised as one of the Official Languages of Libya.
Freedom of "thought".
Recover their dignity and live like the free and proud people once were.
And so many other rights the Arab leaders and their international supporters still deny in the name of bent democracy imposed during the "Arab Spring", which, judging by the name, is for Arabs only.
We all know, and perhaps not, how the NTC deceptively used Tifinagh in its banner when they were rallying support during the UN bombing campaign only for Mr. Abduljalil to turn round and call the Berbers "foreign agenda" when they began demanding basic human rights after the "premature liberation" of Libya. They were urged by the NTC leader either to "integrate" or else "disappear", as they were urged by world leaders to stand up only to enjoy the fall.
Not to say the GNC's use of Tifinagh propaganda only when their spokesman talks to the press, and never never in their official logo or documents, had anything to do with excluding the marginalised Berbers from the UN-supervised
2012 GNC elections, when they were barred
by NTC's law from taking part in Party Elections — the elections
many world leaders bragged as "success".
And, of course, when it comes to international help, the reader is advised to look no further than how
the Berbers were deceived by the hijacked UN
during the so-called Skhirat Dialogue of Morocco that ended up with the UN imposing their born-dead GNA, and with the Berbers being banished to their marginalised existence as 2nd-class denizens once the show was over.
One of the fake outcomes of the UN-controlled conference is that the participants agreed that the "transitional phase must be ended, definitively, with the adoption of a constitution based on a consensus that can unite the country"; when in reality the constitutional laws imposed by the NTC, then amended by the HoR, resulted in the Berbers and the Tebu boycotting the constitutional process because the Berbers demanded the process be based on "consensus" while the HoR insisted, and seemingly still insisting, on the never-to-be-seen "referendum" to vote over basic human rights. How on earth such upside-down logic be considered government?
Readers interested in the official persecution and non-recognition of the Berbers by the leaders need to go no further than the damn constitution of the born-dead revolution.
PC's racist call to revive "Arab Maghreb Union" is an insult to 40 million Berbers . . .
عبّر رئيس المجلس الرئاسي عن “أهمية تفعيل اتحاد المغرب العربي ودعم مؤسساته”
Head of the Presidential Council calls for activating the so-called " Arab Maghreb Union".
The president of the newly appointed Presidential Council, Mr Lemnefi, met with the Mauritanian Foreign Minister, Mr. Ismael Ahmed, to discuss what he calls the importance of activating the "Arab Maghreb Union" [4], despite the existence of at least 40 million Berbers in North Africa (The-Maghreb), who are not Arabs, and who will never be Arabs, no matter what the Arab dictators say.
A few days later, Mr. Lemnefi received a phone call from the general secretary of the so-called Arab Maghreb Union confirming the importance of the call to label the Maghreb with the "Arab" label.
Without a doubt, such a statement can only be a declaration of "racism", if not "fascism", as noted by various Berber politicians in the past, simply because Arabs are not the only inhabitants of North Africa, and, more importantly, such a statement clearly denies the existence of at least 40 million Berbers — the native inhabitants of the Maghreb before the Arab invasions of North Africa.
Such racist statements were reminiscent of the Gaddafi's dictatorial era, which many Berberists thought came to an end with the arrival of the 17th of February Revolution — albeit born dead. Imagine how Berbers feel when they hear the transitional leaders refer to them as being "Arabs" — just like Gaddafi had said: "the Berbers are the original Arabs".
The Maghreb is a union of Berber, Arab and Tebu peoples of North Africa, and therefore it is logical to call it "The Maghreb Union". Gaddafi wasted valuable resources and years being lured into the trap of "Arab Nationalism" by his masters to disastrous effect, before he turned to the coveted continent as "the King of Kings of Africa". Let us hope his fate is a stark reminder to his current successors.
Update June 2021
Tamazight Supreme Council Rejects Constitution & Constitutional Base Without Consensus
Tamazight Supreme Council of Libya rejects the constitutional project, the referendum, and the constitutional base without full consensus.
The council reiterated its position in that all the ethnic groups of Libya (Berbers, Tebu and Arabs) must agree via consensus on any constitution or constitutional base. It also calls for equal representation of Tamazight women.
The prophesy of the Berber Goddess "Libya" was simple: "coming of the day when that which is hidden shall be revealed".
UN Violations
The HoR condemned the UN's attack on Libyan sovereignty by imposing a new legislative authority
Around 112 HoR members were outraged by the UN's decision to impose a legislative authority in Libya, stating that such authority can only be elected by the Libyan people [1].
This is a reference to the fact that the LPDF, whose 75 members were selected by the UN, has the right to approve the proposed GNU that will be formed within the next 21 days if the HoR does not approve it. وفي حال لم تمنح الثقة يعود الأمر لأعضاء الـ75 لمنحها الثقة
This new measure, according to the HoR, constitutes a violation by the UN against Libya's sovereignty because only elected authorities can legislate.
One can only guess that the UN resorted to such "treachery" probably to avoid what had happened to the two governments previously proposed by the PC, both of which were rejected by the HoR. The third and last government the PC could have proposed actually never took place; probably because if it did and then rejected by the HoR too, it would have been the end of the PC; and so in order to stay in power the PC never proposed a third government, and as a result the GNA has been operating illegally ever since, with full international support, of course. The British said they had to hurry with the PC and GNA to stop ISIL gaining foothold in Libya? Five years later, the GNA is out and ISIL is still in Libya.
UN Violations Continue: the UN imposes a 75-Member committee on the forum
The HoR said that originally the UN supposed to mediate a Libyan Political Dialogue comprising 13 HoR members, 13 HCS members, and 14 independents, but "we were surprised", they said, to see the UN had imposed a long list of 75 members.
The change of numbers, of course, plays an important role when it comes to s-electing the final members of the interim government (that is now shrouded in bribery allegations). The irony is that any opposition to violations committed by the UN or any other international body against Libya and thus against the Libyan people is ignored, as if never took place. On the other hand, they are readily happy to provide the legal, financial and military support for a defunct government after it was ousted by the Libyan people via democratic elections ironically supervised by them.
The HoR published its 13-member list for the political dialogue via Decree 18 of 2020 (قرار-مجلس-النواب-رقم-18-لسنة-2020). The following is a copy of the decree, showing the 13 selected members:
LPDF Members Chosen by the UN
The following is the LPDF list of 75 members selected by the UN against the will of the Libyan Government (the HoR). The HoR presented its list of 13 members to the UN (as documented above), but they were surprised to see the UN publish a list of 75 Members.
The UN (via its Libyan office: UNSMiL) alleged that it had selected the 75 members from across Libya to represent all segments of the Libyan society. Tell that to the persecuted Berbers and Tebu! The UN has no right to select any member from any segment anywhere in the world, let alone all the 75. It is down to the LIBYANS to do that.
Many Libyan analysts, politicians and even militia leaders said the list selected by the UN does not represent the Libyan population, and instead it includes many ‘‘pro-Qaddafi’’ personalities, many ‘‘Islamists’’, and others from the Muslim-Brotherhood-led, defunct GNC.
Still worse, the UN did not publish its imposed list of 75 candidates until the eve of the start of the so-called "virtual LPDF", and thus not allowing the Libyan people and authorities to reflect on the list. This, according to some Libyans, is a "dirty tactic" to trick the Libyans into submitting to the UN's hidden agenda; otherwise why not reveal the list at least three weeks before the start of the conference so that the Libyan authorities have a say in the matter?
According to afrique2050.net [3] the UN-imposed list is broken down according to political affiliation and ideology as follows:
Sabha objects to the UN imposing a Muslim-Brotherhood member to represent them in Geneva
The UN seems to continue, unchallenged, selecting and imposing Muslim-Brotherhood politicians. The latest violation concerns constituency 6 (Saba-Shathi) in Fezzan, southern Libya. The constituency's statement specifically mentions Mr. Abdulla Othman, who is a resident of Tripoli and not of Sabha, and who was picked by the UN to "determine Fezzan's destiny via the Muslim Brotherhood", the statement said.
The statement also rises questions regarding the exclusion of women in Fezzan, and regarding the new conspiracy being woven against Fezzan in particular and against Libya in general.
The following is their statement condemning the UN for its latest violation:
HoR's Letter to the UN Regarding Selecting HoR Boycotting Member for the dialogue in Geneva
The HoR had objected to the UN selecting a member who had boycotted the HoR to represent them in the political dialogue, stating such act will send the wrong message [2]. The HoR reminded the UN that the active members of the HoR are the only official members of the HoR, and any boycotting member has no legal right to represent the HoR.
How many interim governments should we expect before the final?
Other members of the HoR also objected to the creation of yet another transitional government, instead of agreeing on a permanent elections to appoint a president, a legislative body and a final government for Libya. Many members and other independent analysts said another transitional government will make matters far worse than they are now, in the same way the the GNA resulted in more chaos and even wars across the country. The UN and its allies were adamant then that the GNA will bring the Libyans together, and end the chaos.
Anger over the UN bypassing the CD in favour of the LPA signed in Morocco
A group of seven Libyan political institutions expressed their anger over the UN's decision to impose a legislative authority in violation of the Libyan Constitutional Declaration [4]. The group includes the following institutions:
التكتل المدني الديمقراطي
تكتل إحياء ليبيا
تيار شباب الوسط
حراك همة شباب 23 أغسطس
حراك منظمة ليبيا الحديثة بالولايات المتحدة الأميركية
الحراك الوطني الليبي
المجموعة الأميركية الليبية
In their statement the seven institutions summarised their concerns as follows:
الزج بالشرعية السياسية كبديل للشرعية الدستوري
Considering the LPA signed in Morocco as the basis for the proposed Roadmap is illegal because the basis of all proposals and agreements must be the Libyan Constitutional Declaration (CD)
The group fears that such move replaces the constitutional legitimacy to legislate by unelected, political one.
تجاهل للقاعدة الدستورية الواردة في التعديل السابع للإعلان الدستوري، المتضمن توصيات لجنة فبراير
The group feared that the proposed roadmap ignores the Constitutional Declaration Amendment 7 regarding the recommendations agreed by the February Committee (FC) .
إسناد قاعدة دستورية للانتخابات إلى مؤسسات معنية بالعملية الدستورية دون تحديدها
Attributing the constitutional referendum base to unknown institutions without specifying their identities. This leave the door wide open for further violations and disagreements that could derail the whole process.
As a result the group reminded the UN to adhere to transparency and respect the constitutional traditions of Libya.
Fears
The UN failed to impose this latest transitional government around two years ago because Haftar began his military operations to free the capital Tripoli from outlaw militias and terror groups, and as a result the Ghadames conference, the site for the proposed conference, never took place.
The international community then allowed Turkey to come into the rescue to protect the illegal government in Tripoli, resulting in more bloodshed and wars. With the Libyan Army (under the leadership of Haftar) out of the way, the UN returned to its plan to continue from the Ghadames initiative.
Some say it would be wiser to abolish all previous governments, legally and officially under the UN's supervision, once they agree on a new government. Adding more governments to the existing line of governments is not right, especially in the absence of a "constitution". Without guarantees, some Libyans fear that the GNA will continue to operate from Tripoli; the HoR will continue to run from Tobruk; and the GNU will take office in Sirte. There is no mechanism in place to prevent this scenario.
Some fear that the UN can no longer be trusted regarding lack of clear strategies, including lack of exit strategy, lack of transparency, and regarding the proposed dates for the transitional governments mediated (or/and imposed) by the UN. For example this new government (the GNU) was initially said to last for 18 months, but later it was decided that the government will be in office until the 24th of December 2021. Now some analysts say the elections may not take place in the agreed time, and even if they do, the same was said about the imposed GNA when in reality the GNA is still in place five years later (and as of of today: February 2021).
رئيس حكومة الوحدة الوطنية يستلم ديوان مجلس الوزراء بطرابلس
13 March 2021: Prime Ministers Office (PMO)
It was reported today that Mr. Dbeibah has taken over the Prime Ministers Office in Tripoli [1, 2]. Following the takeover, the prime minister held meeting with the managers of the administrations at the PMO to prepare a "work plan" and a "mechanism" to coordinate with the ministries and institutions belonging to the Government of National Unity [1].
16 March 2021: Handover Ceremony (Tripoli)
Handover Ceremony (Tripoli)
Tripoli's UN-imposed PC and its GNA had handed over "responsibility" to the restructured PC and the GNU on the 16th of March 2021. There is no news as yet regarding the handover ceremony in Benghazi (see update below).
Handover Ceremony (Tripoli)
23 March 2021: Handover Ceremony (Benghazi)
Handover Ceremony (Benghazi)
President of The Supreme Council for Fezzan's Tribes Rejects Alkouni's Agreement With France
The president of the supreme council for Fezzan's tribes was reported to have rejected Alkouni's agreement with France's president in which Alkouni requested the support of France to secure the southern borders of Libya, stating, in a letter to Alkouni [4], that Alkouni appears to ignore the LPDF agreement that brought him to power. According to this agreement, all foreign forces of any kind must leave Libya. The 5+5 JMC had also stated that all foreign forces must leave Libya "immediately". Fezzan's Council rejects any kind of French troops or forces, the statement said (معلنًا رفضهم القاطع لأي تواجدٍ للقوات الفرنسية على أرض فزان).
The statement also reminded" the new Presidency Council (PC) that the PC is only an interim authority and has no right to sign any internal agreements (ولا يحقّ لهم إبرام أي اتفاقيات دولية، تترتب عليها التزامات على الدولة مستقبلاً) [4].
The truth of the matter is that Libya is infested with foreign forces of all kinds and nationalities including European forces, and all they have achieved for the past ten years seemingly amounts to no more than turning Libya into a jihadist wonderland infested with terror, wars, crimes, immigrants, corruption and chaos. It is obvious that there is something else going on, and that Libya would be much better without any foreign help or interference.
Coincidently, a few days later, NATO also offered to provide security assistance to the GNU if the GNU asks for it while the 5+5 JMC calling for all foreign forces to leave the country immediately. One sincerely hopes the GNU rejects the offer without hesitation, simply because such forces did previously offer the same help for the GNC and the PC/GNA; the results of which are loud and clear.
03 April 2021: PC's racist call to revive "Arab Maghreb Union"
عبّر رئيس المجلس الرئاسي عن “أهمية تفعيل اتحاد المغرب العربي ودعم مؤسساته”
Head of the Presidential Council calls for activating the so-called " Arab Maghreb Union".
The president of the newly appointed Presidential Council, Mr Lemnefi, met with the Mauritanian Foreign Minister, Mr. Ismael Ahmed, to discuss what he calls the importance of activating the "Arab Maghreb Union" [5], despite the existence of at least 40 million Berbers in North Africa (that is in the Maghreb), who are not Arabs and who will never be Arabs no matter what the Arab leaders dictate. A few days later, Mr. Lemnefi received a phone call from the general secretary of the so-called Arab Maghreb Union confirming the importance of the call to label the Berber-Arab Maghreb with the "Arab" label.
Without a doubt, such a statement can only be a declaration of "racism" and even "fascism", as noted by various Berber politicians in the past, simply because Arabs are not the only inhabitants of North Africa, and, more importantly, such a statement clearly denies the existence of at least 40 million Berbers — the native inhabitants of the Maghreb — the Berber empire without borders.
Such racist statements were reminiscent of the Gaddafi's dictatorial era, which many Berberists thought came to end with the arrival of the 17th of February Revolution — all be it born dead. Imagine how Berbers feel when they hear the transitional leaders refer to them as being "Arabs" — just like Gaddafi had said: "the Berbers are the original Arabs".
The Maghreb is a union of Berber, Arab and Tebu peoples of North Africa; and it is therefore fair and logical to call it "The Maghreb Union".
08 April 2021: LAB GNU-Budget Report
Benghazi's Libyan Audit Bureau has presented its report regarding the annual budget presented by PM Dbeibah to the HoR. Many Libyans are not happy the HoR is taking this long to approve the budget at a time when the GNU pledged to ease the current hardship by injecting cash into the straved economy. The 4-page report includes 18 observations and violations because of which it asks the HoR to rethink the proposed budget.
The HoR has rejected the budget proposed by the GNU [6]. The budget is too large for a government that has less than ten months in office. The HoR report says the proposed budget of nearly 100 billion without any plans or programs will negatively impact the Libyan economy. For full details see the 17-page report:
To find out more about PM Dbeibah and "corruption", download the Libya's Flawed Unity Government report, by Dr. Wolfram Lacher, a Senior Associate in the Africa and Middle East Research Division at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs.
HoR Condemns Foreign Interference in Libya's Affairs
7 May 2021
The HoR had condemned the joint statement made by the ambassadors of Germany, Italy, France, England and America as unacceptable interference in Libya's internal affairs. The HoR's statement said the joint statement does not help the national reconciliation which took long time to achieve thus far.
Odyssey Dawn: Saifalislam to stand in the forthcoming presidential election
11 June 2021
According to the Times [7], Saifalislam Gaddafi intends to stand in the forthcoming presidential election, which some Libyans hope it will be held on the 24th of December 2021.
The Times says, "He spoke by telephone . . . to clarify his relationship with a team of political representatives to whom The Times has since been speaking" [7].
Reportedly Saifalislam did not declare his interest to run for Libya's presidency before the election law was approved because he feared his opponents will change the law to include a clause to bar him from running for elections [8].
If so, this may explain the HoR's lack of interest to approve the constitution, as well as why the Draft Libya Constitution proposed in 2017 suspiciously left the flag and the anthem out of the picture.
