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Libyan Secret Service  جهاز المخابرات الليبية

 

One of the first systems to be created by the NTC after the liberation of Libya was the Libyan Intelligence System (جهاز المخابرات الليبية). Their foremost task at the time, according to the NTC, was to "root out Gaddafi's loyalists". Probably due to the nature of their organisation, nothing was heard of the organisation ever since, leading to the Guardian to report some sort of "confusion over who has control of Libya's security forces." 

 

Law 7/2012: Establishing The Libyan Intelligence System:

It was not until the 6th of February 2012 that the NTC had finally published some information about the secret organisation. In its Law 7 (of 2012), regarding the establishment of Libyan Intelligence System (جهاز المخابرات الليبية), there are 103 articles detailing the organisation's structure and its duties.

Article (1) states that the organisation is known as جهاز المخابرات الليبية ('Libyan Intelligence System'), and that its employees are those subject to Law 7 and others who are subject to Law 12/2012.

Article (2) states that the various departments and divisions of the organisation shall be determined by decisions issued by the president of the Libyan Intelligence System.

Article (3) states that the system's objective is to achieve Libya's security and safety via the following:

  • Protection of Libya's secrets and the prevention of their leakage.
  • Resisting foreign intelligence activity against the safety and security of Libya.
  • Surveillance of foreign bodies, individuals and organisations alike.
  • Follow up of suspicious activities hostile to the safety of Libya.
  • Counterintelligence.
  • Ensuring the safety of Libya's interests abroad.
  • Opposing hostile activities from hostile countries aiming at the identity, values and the principles of the Libyan society.
  • Exposing strategies and hostile plots that aim to destabilise the security and the national unity of Libya.


Article (4)
calls for all other departments and organisations to cooperate with the Libyan Intelligence System to implement its objectives in accordance with its duties as assigned by the law.

Article (6) states that the head of the Intelligence System is a "Minister" and that his deputies are "Deputy Ministers"; the appointment of whom shall be decided by the government.

To read the full document, detailing 103 Articles, please download Law 7/2012:

pdf sign Law 7 (2012): the Libyan Intelligence System

pdf sign Law-27 (2012): Amending Law 7 (of 2012)

 

The Head of The Libyan Intelligence & His Deputies:

On the 12 of February 2012, the NTC issued a second law, Law 17 (of 2012), which names the head of the Libyan Intelligence System and his deputies, as follows:

  • President: Mr. Salem Abd Assalam [Abdul Salam] Alhasi.
  • Deputy: Mr. Salem Mohammad Alaswad.
  • Deputy: Mr. Mustafa Mohammad Noah.
  • Deputy: Mr. Mosa Omar Krimah.

pdf sign Decree 17 (2012): naming the head of the intelligence and his deputies.

 

 

 

5/6/2014:

Libya's chief of intelligence, Mr. Salem Alhasi, handed in his resignation on the 5th of June 2011. According to Libya Herald, the reason was the "breakdown in government", the absence of state authority, and the collapse of security in Libya (libyaherald.com/2014/06/06/libyan-intelligence-chief-quits/).

The resignation announcement, coincidently, was made on the same day the caretaker Prime Minister Abdullah Althini revealed that the Libyan government is fighting an "anonymous enemy"  that requires a "strong security service" which has not been effected to this day:

بالإضافة إلى حل جميع الأجهزة الأمنية وهو أحد الأخطاء التي ارتكبت في الحكومات السابقة فبناء جهاز أمني استخباراتي نحن الذي يواجهنا عدو مجهول غير معلوم ولا يتم التعامل معه بانتشار الجنود والأسلحة بل يتم التعامل معه بجهاز استخباراتي قوي وهذا لم يتم تفعيله حتى هذه الساعة

(http://www.pm.gov.ly/news/رئيس-الحكومة-المؤقتة-المكلف-الحكومة-ستقدم-كل-الدعم-لبنغازي-حتى-تثبت-وتقاوم-الخارجين-عن-القانون.html)

 

 

The Free Libya Armed Forces


  abdelfattah younes  


Assassinated Martyr Commander-in-chief of the Free Libya Armed Forces General Abdul Fattah Younis al-Obeidi
Photo source (facebook.com/Abd.AlFatah.Younis)

 

 

Why New Libya Does Not Have An Army?

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The Free Libya Army was commanded by General Abdul Fattah Younis. He was a member of the 1969 staged-coup and former Interior Minister of the ousted regime. He defected on the 22nd of February 2011 to the rebel forces in Benghazi with a formidable force of 9,000 soldiers including 3,000 special forces. Such a strong force would have provided the nucleus for a formidable army, had the self-appointed leaders were more careful in their planning, or less reckless not to see their shortsighted fate.

The "Free Libya Armed Forces" were formed from armed rebels (or revolutionaries), defected military members of the ousted regime, and armed civilians. The army was trained by foreign advisors and generals, and funded and armed by a number of foreign countries; allegedly to coordinate the fight against "tyranny" and liberate Libya from Gaddafi's grip.

As the general commander of the newly-created liberation army, Abdulfattah's forces made a number of advances along the Brega highway, but seemingly were stuck "back and forth" between Brega and Benghazi. Many Libyans, felt protected by the no-fly-zone, and driven by the strong urge to break free from tyranny, genuinely believed they could have gone all the way to Tripoli for the "checkmate". But instead the news of "stalemate" were circulated across the world, with the occasional firing in the sky before the media.

Ever since, the Libyan forces never managed to pass Brega until the end, when on the 11th of August 2011 events catapulted with lightning speed, and the oil terminal suddenly fell, just under two weeks before Tripoli itself fell, and just two weeks after the General's grotesque assassination.

Sensing 'sure dead end' along the Brega Highway, the Libyan Commander of the revolutionaries was reported by the transitional Prime Minister of the time to have proposed taking his army to Nafusa Mountain to attempt reaching the capital from there.

Instead, the rebels' general was assassinated a few days later, on the 28th of July 2011, after he was recalled to Benghazi for questioning by the NTC. Published sources at Wikipedia initially implicated a couple of brigades in the detention and the later assassination of the general. His body was said to have been found with bullet holes, burnt, one of his eyes removed, and beyond recognition; even though initially his body was reported "missing":

According to the New York Times:

"Mr. Abdul Jalil announced the death in a carefully worded speech that left many scratching their heads. Mr. Abdul Jalil confirmed that General Younes had been summoned for questioning by the judges, though he declined to say why . . . Mr. Abdul Jalil said that an armed gang had killed General Younes and the other two officers, and that at least one of the gang members had been captured. He declined to name the killer, or to say whether the gang had been working for Colonel Qaddafi, rebels who did not trust General Younes or some other tribal group or faction. Mr. Abdul Jalil then added that the rebel security forces were still searching for the bodies of the three dead officers, raising questions about how he had confirmed their deaths."

Source: nytimes.com/2011/07/29/world/africa/29libya.html?pagewanted=all

Contradicting explanations and justifications came out of Benghazi, angering Abdulfattah's family and tribe, who took to the streets demanding official statement from the NTC, and even threatened to take the law into their hands. Some Libyans say he was a double agent working for Gaddafi and that his assassination was instrumental in keeping the unity of the rebel movement, but there is no evidence to support these claims.  For example,  the newly formed "Democratic Party Libya" wrote in its website
(thedemocraticpartylibya.org/fatwah/4553318510):

"What is not in any doubt is that the execution of General Yunis by the Libyan revolutionaries was a direct result of the discovery of his treason . . . Gaddafi leaked to the revolutionaries recorded messages of his personal direct communications with Yunis that proved the latter's treason. The revolutionaries found him guilty and executed him, and subsequently broadcasted his confession online."

It is difficult to understand how Gaddafi would sell his presumed infiltrator, not to say anything of revolutionaries becoming judges of their own (executing suspects on the spot). Other Libyans however say he was among the very few revolutionaries in the group who had a genuine desire and the skill to build an army for post-Gaddafi Libya. But again how can one be sure of anything with lack of documentation and when transparency is invisible and contradictions are rife?

According to Mahmoud Jibril (dai.ly/HCZqT6), General Abdulfattah Younis told Abdurrahman Shalgam four days before the assassination that he (the general) would take his troops to Nafusa Mountain and continue to Tripoli to liberate the capital from there. Mahmoud Jibril also said that Abdulfattah Younis was very popular and liked by his people, and he even started to form an army while he was in Benghazi; adding that if the general is still alive today, Libya would not be without an army as it is today.

The fact that the NTC had, to this day, failed to build an army among other essential apparatuses required to run a country, and the fact that the ensued GNC had also failed to create an army or even a police force, Jibril's statements become more intriguing and bring some questions to mind. Who was really commanding the war at the time? If it was him, the General, then it is doubtful that he had the need to seek permission to take his forces all the way to Nafusa, after having lost hope doing his job along the Brega Highway!

Mahmoud Jibril later stated how the Qatari chief of the army was coordinating their final moves via strange 'requests' (dailymotion.com/swf/video/xq31xh). In this interview, he says he was asked twice by Qatar's chief of the army to postpone the rebels' attack on the capital, because the forces implementing the zone did not want to bomb the targets due to fear of inflicting heavy civilian casualties. But Jibril was puzzled to discover that 25 of the 28 scheduled targets were already bombed when the rebel forces arrived in the capital. He says it is "strange" that the UN-authorised forces asked for the Tripoli Operation to be postponed, twice, only for them to bomb the targets later.

Mahmoud Jibril also said that originally the storming of Tripoli was scheduled for July 2011 [(when the general was still alive)], but after the shipment of weapons (that was sent by Qatar) had disappeared somewhere in Libya, the operation was postponed. These strange decisions, he says, may indicate that the forces implementing the no-fly zone may had favoured "other groups" to take Tripoli (presumably other than the rebel forces assigned by the NTC); or maybe for "other reasons", he added.

pdf signPress Release 15: NTC's early statement regarding the assassination of Abdelfattah Younis.

 

Update: November 2011:

However, on the 28th of November 2011 the NTC had finally announced that the chief suspect named by NTC's chief military prosecutor Yussef Al-Aseifr was Ali Abdulaziz Saad El-Essawi (then NTC's interim Deputy Prime Minister), and that only three of these suspects were (then) arrested. At the time of the assassination, according to the above-linked interview, the Prime Minister was in Sudan – whose president is wanted by the ICC for war crimes against humanity, just as Gaddafi was then. Essawi denied involvement in the assassination of  General Abdul Fattah Younis, and told Libya Awalen he never signed any decision relating to Abdul Fattah Younis.

 

Update: June 2012:

With the wars and the chaos that followed the presumed liberation, Younis's file appeared to have been resided to the shelves of history. But then on the 12 of June 2012 Libya Herald reported that:

"Jumaa Obaidi Al-Jazawi, the former military prosecutor who ordered the arrest of assassinated former Chief of Staff, Major-General Abdel-Fattah Younis, was himself assassinated in Benghazi this evening . . . He was shot in the heart and died instantly . . . There were at least two previous attempts to kill him . . . At the time of the March attack, however, his oldest son, Ali, said Jazawi had survived two earlier assassination attempts. Jazawi’s brother, Rajab, also reportedly survived an assassination attempt after his name was listed amongst suspects accused of killing Younis. Jazawi worked under Ali Essawi, who served as interim deputy prime minister until he and a number of other ministers were sacked last August. Al-Jawzi was allegedly ordered by Essawi to arrest general Younis. Essawi denied any involvement."

Source: Libya Herald, article: /benghazi-official-linked-to-younis-killing-assassinated/

The 'motives' for such a brutal crime seem to have been obscured in the background by the intermittent debate over who could the executioner be? With the suspect executioner being executed himself, the enquiry is brought to its 'sure dead end'. Typical of any similar operation, the people 'may' or 'ought' never know.


Transitional Prime Minister reveals a "power that is higher than the Government" of Libya, but refuses to name it.

Speaking to the newly-elected members of the GNC regarding defence matters, the PM said there is "a higher authority" that had prevented his government from implementing some of their "decisions". When he attempted to continue, the Acting President of Libya, Dr. Magarief , asked him: "who is this power?" The PM pushed the microphone away, then turned towards the microphone and said: "a power that is higher than the government". From the principle of "transparency" Dr. Magarief politely requested from him, again, to name this "authority": "please name this power". But the PM dismissed the President's request by repeating: "it is the power that is higher than the government". The President kindly replied: "thayeb" ('Okay'). Dr. Magarief was later forced to resign after the GNC was reportedly forced to approve the controversial Law 13 (the isolation law). Some political parties said the law was passed by the gun (see GNC for more on this).

 

The First Anniversary of the assassination of General Abdul Fattah Younis:

On Saturday the 28th of July 2012, protestors burnt the Qatari flag outside Tibesti Hotel in Benghazi. The Libyan Observatory for Human Rights (المرصد الليبى لحقوق الإنسان - mrsdlibya.ly/) has called for a 'special court' to investigate the assassination of General Abdul Fattah Younis and his two colleagues, and to bring to justice everyone involved in the 'operation'. The Observatory also said Younis' assassination is a big 'conspiracy' against Libya and a service to the enemies of the revolution (مؤامرة على الوطن، وخدمة لأعداء الثورة); and that the NTC is largely to blame for their lack of immediate response to resolve the issue and for their apparent delay in dealing with resolving the issue. The assassination of al-Jazawi may signal a new wave in which 'assassination' may become the new dominant culture and justice in the absence of the law, the Observatory said (qurynanew.com/39259).

 

Update: 07 November 2012:

According to Reuters,

"A Libyan court on Wednesday ordered Mustafa Abdel Jalil . . . to be questioned by military prosecutors over the killing of the insurgents' top field commander . . . Eleven men, including a former deputy premier in the National Transition Council . . . have been charged in connection with Younes's murder but only one has been arrested. "The court demands the referral of Mustafa Abdel Jalil, former head of the NTC, to military prosecution for investigation in the case of Abdel Fattah Younes," Judge Abdullah al-Saidi said at a hearing for the accused. Jubilation broke out in the courtroom and about 100 people celebrated outside . . ." Source: reuters.com/article/2012/11/07/libya-court-idUSL5E8M7BAV20121107

 

Update: 17 December 2012:

On the 16th of December 2012 Libya Herald reported that they were informed by a "military prosecutor in Benghazi" that Mustafa Abdul Jalil will stand trial in connection with the assassination of Abdulfattah Younis; and that "Jalil had been charged with two separate offences, Misuse of Powers and Committing Acts that Would Harm Libyan Unity" (Libya Herald, article: /2012/12/16/abdul-jalil-will-stand-trial-very-soon-in-connection-with-younis-murder/).

Apparently, the misuse of power is a reference to defector Abduljalil's creation of the committee that had ordered the arrest of Abdulfattah Younis; and the latter charge is based on the fact that the decision to arrest Abdulfattah Younis could have created a "tribal war".

 

Update: 19 December 2012:

Coming just three days after the above update, the Libyan News Agency (lana-news.ly/ar/art.php?a=31240) reported that the Military Court of Benghazi had announced that it will no longer investigate the murder of Abdulfattah Younis, and that the case will be passed to the "High Commission for Military Justice (الهيئة العامة للقضاء العسكري)". It is not known if the decision is related to the recent protests in support of Abduljalil or not, but according to Libya Herald the Justice Minister is planning to amend the old law that allows "civilians to be tried in military courts", and that the minister had said that “Abdul Jalil is a civilian and the new law will apply to him.” When Libya Herald asked the Prime Minister Ali Zidan, his reply was that the law is still a proposal at this stage
(Libya Herald, article: /2012/12/19/no-more-trials-for-civilians-in-military-court-jalil-included-says-justice-minister/).

 

Update: 24 December 2012:



Mr. Abduljalil confirms the above two charges he was faced with, and gives his views about the early transitional period, about Gaddafi's proposal to divide Libya, and about the assassination of Abdulfattah Younis. Regarding the date of his next appearance before the court, namely the 20th of February 2013, he said that the decision must be approved by the judicial authority before it becomes legally bound, and that once the law is issued by the judicial authority he has no objection to abiding by. In relation to the poor performance of prime minister el-Keib's cabinet, and the present government too, Mr. Abduljalil revealed that there were difficulties faced by these governments, and that power was, as it is today, with those who carry guns.

 

Update: 20 February 2013:

Benghazi: the "military judge" Suleiman Arramli, head of the authority responsible for investigating the assassination of Abdulfattah Younis, has decided on the 20th of February to postpone the session until the 14th of March 2013
(lana-news.ly/ara/news/view/14782/تأجيل_النظر_في_قضية_مقتل_اللواء_عبد_الفتاح_يونس_إلى_الرابع_عشر_من_شهر_مارس_القادم).

 

Update: 14 March 2013:

on the 14th of March 2013, the permanent military court in Benghazi has ruled it had no jurisdiction in the case of Abdulfattah Younis, and that it had referred the case to the Attorney General; thereby bringing the case back to square one - just like Libya itself.

The session was chaired by judge Suleiman Arramli. The court announced its decision before the presence of one defendant, Mr. Salem Mohammed Miftah, and in absentia against the following defendants:

  1. Ali Abdul Aziz Saleh al-Issawi
  2. Muhammad Faraj Awad
  3. Akil Rashid Rakha
  4. Abdul Hakim key Mhammed
  5. Faraj Milad Ahmed Almqsbi
  6. Muhammad Faraj Mahmoud Bin Hamid
  7. Abdel Fattah Ali Absekri Almsheeti
  8. Mustafa Mohammed Suleiman Arroba
  9. Yousef Mohiuddin Ramadan Almjberi
  10. Mohi Mohammad Kamal Almjberi
  11. Jumaa Hasen Fdeil Aljazwi
  12. Rajab Hasen Fdeil Aljazwi

Sources:
lana-news.ly/ara/news/view/16743/المحكمة_العسكرية_الدائمة_ببنغازي_تصدر_حكمها_بعدم_الاختصاص_في_قضية_اغتيال_الفريق_عبد_الفتاح_يونس
qurynanew.com/50068

 

 

 

 

 

(2)

khalifa hafter head of libyan army

Chief of Staff Major-General Khalifa Belgasim Heftar
November 2011:

In November 2011 Major General Khalifa Belgasim Heftar was nominated chief of staff, with some opposition from some brigades. He was reported to have had some kind of disagreement with Abdul Fattah Younis early on during the war. Major General Heftar defected from Gaddafi's government in the 1990s, after the Chad War, before he fled to the United States and settled in Virginia. He returned early on to take part in the uprising. Some sources speak of his relation with the CIA, but no official sources can be found to validate the claims.

General Heftir has survived an assassination attempt, Aljazeera reported on the 11th of December 2011
(aljazeera.com/news/africa/2011/12/20111210181815984513.html):

"Heftir's vehicle was shot at while on the way to airport in the capital Tripoli on Saturday morning. Two vehicles had been waiting for the top military officer's convoy under a bridge, and opened fire as it passed. Sergeant Abdul-Razil al-Shibahy, a military spokesman, said that no one in the convoy was harmed and that soldiers arrested the two gunmen, who are in military custody for questioning. It was unclear who the two men were affiliated with."

In a separate incident on the same day, a gunfight took place near Tripoli's international airport between a group of former rebels from the Zintan brigade (the guardians of the airport) and soldiers who claimed to be from the Libyan national army, when the latter attempted to take control of the airport. The fight took place at a checkpoint close to the airport, with no serious consequences reported, except perhaps the discovery of the stolen Berber archaeological treasure, found in a sack in one of the vehicles belonging to the defeated unit that attempted to head for the airport.

Soon afterwards, the general was replaced by commander-in-chief number 3. It is not known why he was replaced so soon. As noted earlier, the assassination of Abdulfattah Younis may have been related to those who opposed the formation of the "Free Libya Army" for post-Gaddafi Libya. In an interview with Alwatan, General Khalifa Heftar did confirm such relation, by stating that after the victory of the revolutionaries the Libyan leadership was not oriented towards building a "Libyan army", but to the contrary the leadership was distancing all the qualified military leadership from the revolutionary, and instead substituting them with those revolutionaries and civilians who had no military experience. [This would appear to add a third charge to the above stated two charges.]

He then continues to say that this is a "fatal error", if not a "trick" (خدعة), created by some political leaders who could have had other "agendas" to serve "some foreign countries". The following section from the interview details the General's answer regarding this matter:

Question:

سيادة اللواء/ في رأيك لماذا تأخر قيام الجيش (القوات المسلحة) إلى حد الآن رغم أهميته في تأسيس وبناء الدولة؟
Why in your opinion the formation of the Libyan army was delayed to this day despite its importance to establishing and building the country?

Answer: (summarised above):

نرجع ونقول الذي حدث بعد انتصار الثورة وإعلان التحرير للأسف كان غير موجه نحو التفكير في بناء جيش وطني بل كان على عكس ذلك فقد استبعدت كل القيادات العسكرية المؤهلة والمحترفة والقادرة من الثوار ليتولوا غيرهم من المدنيين أو الثوار الغير مؤهلين هذه المهمة وهذا خطأ فادح وخدعة من السياسيين الذين قد تكون لديهم اجندات تنفذ لصالح بعض الدول الأجنبية التي لها أطماع خاصة في ليبيا، ولا أنكر بأن بعض الثوار انساقوا وراء تلك الخدعة المضللة وساهموا بشكل أو آخر في عدم إعادة بناء القوات المسلحة النظامية بتكوين الكتائب والمليشيات المسلحة والسيطرة على السلاح وعدم ارجاعه. إذاّ الحاجة أمست ضرورية لإعادة بناء القوات المسلحة بشكل سريع ليضمن أهداف الثورة وللقيام بمهامه الرئيسية. الذي يطمئن في الفترة الأخيرة أن هناك مطالبة شعبية كبيرة بإعادة بناء الجيش وهذا يدل على ارتفاع حالة الوعي لدى المواطن باعتبار الجيش يمثل الضامن الوحيد للاستقرار وهيبة الدولة. وبهذه المناسبة ندعو كل الضباط والجنود بالرجوع إلى معسكراتهم والقيام بواجبهم الوطني ومساعدة قيادة الأركان على القيام بمهامها في التسرع بعملية بناء الجيش فهم إلى جانب وطنيتهم أصحاب خبرة في التنظيم والإدارة وعلى المسئولين في الحكومة القادمة تخصيص الإمكانيات اللازمة لذلك.

Source: read the full interview with General Heftar at: alwatan-libya.com/more-23069-31-حفتر للوطن الليبية : مسؤولين يتعمدون عرقلة بناء الجيش الليبي خدمةً لأجندة تنفذ لصالح بعض الدول الأجنبية
The General had also stated the same view in another interview at: qurynanew.com/39348


On the 29th of July 2012, Major General Khalifa Heftar has survived a second assassination attempt in Benghazi. General Younis was assassinated on the 28th of July 2011! According to (alarabiya.net/articles/2012/07/30/229190.html), the General's car was shot at as he was driving home. Alarabiya also said that the General had denied that the attempt on his life had anything to do with the assassination of General Younis, and that he blames Gaddafi's loyalists instead.

 

 

 

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yousef manqoush ntc member

Chief of Staff Major-General  Yousef al-Manqoush
03/01/2012:

The NTC named Yousef al-Manqoush (Mangoush) as the new commander-in-chief of the Libyan National Army (reuters.com/article/2012/01/03/us-libya-chief-of-staff-idUSTRE8021DB20120103). The third commander in less than six months. He was appointed the Chief of the Libyan Army on the 3rd of January 2012. His tough job, presumably, is to create this army from scratch.

Overall, the chief of the Libyan army says progress is being made and the issue will be eventually resolved in the coming months. Six months later and still there is no sign of the army, and still there is no sign of the militias being disarmed.

However, the Libyan army and the intelligence chiefs have another job to scratch, and that is the emergence of 'mystery cells', seemingly responsible for most of the terror attacks, and the assassination waves, currently plighting Eastern Libya.

The odyssey continues to unfold with yet more events to prevent; and going by mythology, brave Odysseus must visit "hell" itself, and the Berber Amazons too, before he would eventually recover the occupied throne.

It was widely reported by Libyans during the first few months of 2012 that the NTC is issuing "licenses" to registered militias – the armed groups that have registered with the Ministry of Defence to operate under the approval of the NTC; apparently with the aim of integrating these registered units into either the national army or the police force. Additionally, militia members were offered the option to study, if they do not wish to join the army or the police. One NTC member said that even the option of "buying back" the weapons for "good sums of money" is available (see february17.htm for more). 

The Chief of the Libyan Army, Yousef al-Manqoush, was reported to have said that nearly 12,000 "NTC fighters" (also known as "rebels" or "revolutionaries" or even "unarmed civilians" before the war) will join the Libyan army; 5,000 of whom were already part of the Libyan army at the time. Now, that is one brick in the wall.

Manqoush Resigns:

On the 4th of June 2013, Libyan media reported the rumours that the GNC is to replace Yousef al-Manqoush. However, on the 9th of June LANA has confirmed that the GNC has "accepted" the resignation of chief of staff Major-General Yousef al-Manqoush. The resignation came after 31 Libyans were killed and 127 were injured on the previous day (08/06/2013) in Benghazi in clashes between "protesters" and government forces loyal to Libya Shield. The protesters were demonstrating outside the headquarters of the First Brigade of the Libya Shield Forces (Dera' 1), demanding the force be dismantled.

However, Libya Herald revealed that Mr. Manqoush had announced that four Shield Brigades, still operating in Benghazi, "would become army units" [*]. One of these four brigades, apparently (according to the same source), was under the direct command of chief Yousef al-Manqoush, and that this brigade: "is locally viewed as pro-Islamist and anti-federalist", and that its presence in Kufra has, "contributed to the violence there and it was withdrawn following demands by Tebus" [*].

The names of these four militias (that ought to have been integrated into the army long time ago) are (as given by Libya Herald):

  1. Deraa Battalion No.1
  2. Deraa Battalions No. 2
  3. Deraa Battalions No. 7
  4. Deraa Battalions No. 10

[*] http://www.Libya Herald, article: /2013/06/09/mangoush-resigns/

 

 

The Revolutionaries:

The Veterans Affairs Commission (هيئة شؤون المحاربين):

On the 30th of July 2012, the Veterans Affairs Commission (هيئة شؤون المحاربين) had blamed the current transitional government for the commission's failure to 'absorb' the revolutionaries of Libya, which, they say, had resulted in lack of stability and the loss of self esteem among the revolutionaries. The General Manager of the commission, Mr. Mustafa Assaqezly, holds the transitional government directly responsible for the commission's failure, because, he says, the government had refused to provide the required budget to ensure the integration of the revolutionaries into the army or the police force, as well as prepare others for training and further education abroad. The commission had completed all the preparations required to integrate the revolutionaries, but they have not received a single penny to implement their objectives.
Source: libya-alyoum.com/news/index.php?id=21&textid=10875

 

Libya's Revolutionaries Supreme Council ( المجلس الأعلى لثوار ليبيا):

The revolutionaries of Libya met in Sabratha on the 27th of July 2012, to prepare for the official formation of the Revolutionaries Supreme Council. The meeting was attended by the revolutionaries of the western coastal area, Nafusa Mountain, Tripoli and Mesratha. The aim of the council is to work towards protecting the revolution from the acts of terror currently plighting certain regions of Libya; ensuring the exclusion of Gaddafi's loyalists from all government offices; and fighting corruption and financial fraud. They have also agreed to form a political wing to the supreme council to oversee the functions of all ministries and government institutions in accordance with the law. The killers of Abdul Fattah Younis will pay the price for their crime, they were reported to have said.

On the 7th of August 2012, the Revolutionaries Supreme Council was officially established in a meeting held at Almahari Hotel, in Tripoli. The meeting was attended by a number of civil society organisations and revolutionaries from various parts of Libya. In their founding manifesto, published by Alwatan, the united revolutionaries of Libya pledged their dedication to protect the revolution and ensure the goals of the revolution are met, at a time when the other organisations and political entities were locked in their struggle for 'power'. They have also pledged to protect the revolution from being hijacked and from the elements that previously were part of the ousted regime. The manifesto deplores the current clashes and violence and calls for the revolutionaries of Libya to unite and restore the revolution to its correct path. It was the revolutionaries of Libya who liberated the country, and it will be the united revolutionaries who will make sure the goals of the revolution are implemented, they said.

 

Revolutionaries Supreme Council: March 2013 Update:

 



According to a report by Libya TV, Adel Atterhouni, of the Libyan Revolutionaries Supreme Council, has strongly condemned the actions and the violations of the current transitional government led by Prime Minister Ali Zidan, and called for withdrawing the vote of confidence for a number of reasons, which they said are needed to prevent the revolution from further deviation and instead steer it closer towards people's aspirations. They called for the GNC to appoint an independent prime minister who has no ties with any political party to set up a new government that includes independents and nationalists who had participated in the revolution. Also they condemned the opening of Libya's air space to foreign surveillance.

The statement also said the council is observing the corruption currently taking place and the systematic attempts to delay and obstruct treating the wounded revolutionaries; and that despite the UN resolutions prohibiting the presence of "any foreign occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan territory", the PM's government had invited foreign forces into the country. The government later denied the claims, and the prime minister Zidan (during his recent trip to Brussels) was assured by the EU that, if the EU council approves, the EU will provide assistance with "technical assistance" and help secure the borders.

There were also reports of "drones" flying over Libya after the assassination of Christopher Stevens in Benghazi, without any official confirmation; until the 20th of March 2013, when LANA said that the Libyan Air Defence announced that "drones" will start operation in Libya's air space. Libya TV adds that the drones are owned by Libya and will be controlled by Libyan pilots. The drones will be operated for photographic training and for air defence purposes, the Libyan Air Defence was reported to have said by LANA.

 

However, on the 22nd of March 2013  members of the General Gathering of the Revolutionaries Supreme Council from Albayda, Cyrene, Abraq, Alqobba, Assahel, Almerj, Tobruk, Ejdabya, Kufra, Sabha, Zintan and Tajaura have pledged their allegiance to the transitional government of Libya, and said they are ready to take up arms and fight for Libya's honour and glory. The statement included some demands from the GNC, which in fact have been widely demanded by many other organisations and councils from all over Libya. These demands  urge the GNC to:

  1. speed up the creation of the constitution committee;
  2. speed up the process of granting all the rights to the families of the "missing" and the "martyrs";
  3. pay more attention to the issues faced by the amputees and the wounded;
  4. demolish "central authority" and implement "local government";
  5. provide jobs for the youth;
  6. speed up the creation of the state's military and civil institutions;
  7. and put an end to all political-party disagreements complicating Libyan politics.

The revolutionaries of the second statement have categorically expressed their disagreement with the first statement made by the same council; thereby officially announcing some sort of a "split" within the Revolutionaries Supreme Council (RSC). The statement said the RSC suffers from internal administration problems and is yet to agree on a number of issues; for which the Libyans are urged to remember that no decision shall be final and legitimate until it has been agreed upon by all the members of the General Gathering of the RSC from all over Libya (facebook.com/photo.php?v=587144927965425).

A few days later, LANA said that Zawya's people, revolutionaries and civil society institutions declared in a statement issued on Thursday (28/3/2013) their disapproval of the (above) "statements" made by the Revolutionaries Supreme Council, and even said the RSC does not represent them and that they have no ties with the RSC. They have also pledged their allegiance to the transitional government of Libya, stressing the need for the government to make sure that Gaddafi's "symbols" do not return to power. They said they will retain the right to retaliate against any attempt to encroach on the state and its institutions, by declaring their readiness to defend the principles of the revolution including democracy, freedom of expression, and the rule of law.

 

 

(4)

major-general abdulsalam al-obeidi
Photo source: www.defense.gov.ly

Chief of Staff Number 4: Major-General Abdulsalam Jadallah al-Salheen al-Obeidi
29/07/2013:

According to the website of the Ministry of Defence [6], Colonel Abdulsalam Jadallah al-Obeidi was appointed Chief of Staff of the Libyan Army on the 29th of July 2013. On the previous day, many Libyans commemorated the death of chief of staff number one on the 28th of July 2013 – the second anniversary of Abdul-Fattah al-Obeidi's death. An inauguration ceremony was held on Tuesday, the 30th of July 2013, at the GNC's presidency office; where the President of the GNC, Mr. Nuri Abusahmain, congratulated the new chief and wished him the best of luck for building "the military institution" [1].

Colonel Obeidi was born in 1960 in Qubba (مدينة القبة). He graduated from Tripoli's military college with a master's degree in military science. Colonel Obeidi was a "field commander" of the rebel forces of the Eastern Region during the liberation war. General Obeidi said the time has come to build a "unified national army" to protect the country and defend its legitimacy. [One would presume the time had arrived long time ago.] The General also said that he is confident in the capabilities of his military colleagues to build "this new army" with a new "mentality based on allegiance to God and loyalty to the Homeland".

According to Solidarity Press [2], however, a number of army officers had objected to the new appointment, stating that although the chief is loyal and patriotic, he lacks "leadership"; adding that the GNC's decision to substitute a Major-General with a Colonel was "disappointing" – in reference to the fact that Mr. Abdulsalam al-Obeidi is a "colonel". However, this no longer appears to be the case, because the Ministry of Defence also said (in the same announcement [1]) that Colonel al-Obeidi has been "exceptionally" promoted to the rank of  Major-General by Law (70/2013), issued by the General National Congress (the GNC)!

Thirty three days ago, on the 27th of June 2013, the defence minister, Mr. Mohammed Barghathi, was dismissed by the prime minister [3] – seemingly for not doing enough to prevent the latest wave of violence that hit several cities including Benghazi and the capital. On the following day, the 28th of June 2013, the Acting Chief of Staff Salem Gnaidi contradicted the statement made by the prime minister Zidan (in that the army had received sufficient cash to enable it to do its job – to intervene in the violent clashes taking place between militias in the streets of the capital). Prime Minister Zidan was reported to have said the army had received "some LD2.5 billion" in 2013, and that nearly "LD7 billion" had been given "between 2012 and now" [4]. One week later, Mr. Gnaidi had survived an assassination attempt when the vehicle in which he was travelling came under a barrage of fire from "unknown" gunmen [8].

On the other hand, Solidarity Press reported [7] that Zidan's request for 300 million dinars from the GNC for the "Border Guards" was met with "opposition" from many GNC members, despite the GNC's attempt to pass the request. The objection may appear "strange", given the current chaos by the borders, but some GNC members said there was no apparent mechanism for how such large sum would be spent, and more important, it is not known which government institution the administration of the "Border Guards" belongs to [7]!

Libya Herald also said that Mr. Gnaidi said that "it was the General National Congress and not the Council of Ministers that had the responsibility of appointing the new army chief of staff"; while two weeks later the same source added that, “The government of Ali Zeidan does not want a national army,” said Gnaidi, speaking yesterday on Libya Awalan TV station. He said that instead it was trying to build up a new body parallel to the army, called the National Guard" [5].

  1. defense.gov.ly/modules/publisher/item.php?itemid=299
  2. presssolidarity.net/news/ONENEWS/10206-عدد_من_ضباط_الجيش_في_بنغازي_يرفضون_الرئيس_الجديد_للأركان/
  3. Libya Herald, article: /2013/06/27/mohammed-mahmoud-al-barghati-removed-as-defence-minister/
  4. Libya Herald, article: /2013/06/28/pm-and-army-chief-at-loggerheads-over-inadequate-funding/
  5. Libya Herald, article: /2013/07/14/army-chief-criticises-zeidan-for-not-building-libyan-army/
  6. defense.gov.ly/modules/publisher/item.php?itemid=297
  7. presssolidarity.net/news/ONENEWS/10402-أعضاء_من_المؤتمر_الوطني_يرفضون_طلب_زيدان_بمناقلة_300_مليون_دينار/
  8. lana-news.ly/ara/news/view/28263/نجاة_رئيس_الأركان_السابق_المكلف_بالجيش_الليبي_اللواء_سالم_القنيدي_من_عملية_إطلاق_نار_تعرض_لها

 

 

Conclusions:

Future Repercussions of Segregation And Militarisation of Libya Without An Army:

From the early days of the installed NTC and ever since premature liberation was declared, Libyan officials "found" themselves locked against each other and against the people they came to represent; openly contradicting the principles of the "February Revolution"; and needlessly segregating (free) Libyans into countless groups, such as true-revolutionaries, pretend-revolutionaries, federalists, Berber separatists, armed outlaws, persecuted Tebu, Gaddafi's loyalists, escaped criminals, border traffickers, foreign radicals, imported Salafists, NTC forces, armed militias and mercenaries, as well as the new "mystery cells" (the unknowns) reportedly created by the "Arab Spring".

Dividing Libya into nearly 400 "political entities" (or prties) while war was going on is a violation of common sense. Many of these big parties that went on to win many seats in the congress are now widely reported to have contributed to the failure, leading to the largest two blocks to freeze their activity at the GNC, as well as to their offices being attacked and vandalised by protestors. Still worse, "coalition blocks" were formed inside the GNC itself, dividing the national congress at heart (where it hurts). According to former NTC member Mr. Ahmed al-Abbar (Libya.tv; 08/04/2013, at 14:23), such groups appearing inside the GNC are illegal and violate the conditions stipulated by the Constitutional Declaration regarding both: parties and independents.

With the Libyan Army out of the way, and with some still throwing more spanners in the work (seemingly full speed ahead), the classification of people by tribe or party loyalty; dividing the country into military zones and countless political parties; the creation of "secret dungeons" to deal with those who worked for the old regime; and establishing special forces to protect those who are now working for the new regime can all lead to damaging Libya's reputation and stability, if not provide the catalyst for future conflicts to flourish between the alleged "weak government" and the so-called "powerful militias".

In an early attempt to bring the myriad of [created] militias under the umbrella of government control, the NTC was reported during the first few months of 2012 to have issued "licenses" to registered militias – the rebel groups that registered with the Ministry of Defence to operate under the approval of the NTC.

Many Libyans had objected to such bizarre and dangerous policies, and openly condemned the government's lack of power to state authority, or even guard Libya's fragile borders, catastrophically abused by "anyone" including criminals, terrorists and mystery men; just as they repeatedly complained about the officialisation of militias, stating that such loosing strategies will encourage the creation of "militia culture" – just as the controversial cash reward had increased the number of pretend-revolutionaries during the early months of liberation. (Many of the atrocities were linked to such pretend-revolutionaries, who aim to tarnish the reputation of "true revolutionaries".)

Nonetheless, registering militias and brigades as 'battalion units' within the army is not the answer, the Libyans said, and instead they called for all brigades to join the army as "individuals"; but seemingly no one was much interested in what people say, let alone what they want.

Many of these licensed rebel-militias were assigned to guard land-borders and seaports, only to sink in cross-border corruption themselves, and leave the borders in disarray to this day (July 2013). Land borders and seaports ought to have been the priority of the transitional NTC (and their advisors) from day one of liberation, if not before (as an exit strategy), to protect Libya's sovereignty – just as the NTC had pledged in its founding manifesto to : "ensure territorial security".

Despite the removal of the NTC seven months later, and despite the election of its replacement the GNC, the government seemingly is yet to deal with "outlaws" (regardless of flavour) the usual way they are dealt with from around the world. They are yet to protect their own headquarters, they say, let alone the whole of Libya AND the Libyan civilians.

All in all, there are nearly 40 GNC and Local Council resignations so far, the latest of which being on the 3rd of August 2013, when Deputy Prime Minister Mr. Awad Albarasi was reported by LANA to have announced his resignation in Benghazi. He said the sharp decline in security, the lack of an army, and the fearsome number of assassinations targeting loyal Libyans came as a result of the policies of the government, upon favouring "central authority" to deal with the issues facing Libya today.

The Deputy Prime Minister also said he worked hard towards building the institutions of the state, especially the army, the police and the intelligence service, but difficulties were faced because the government had not given any powers to the deputy ministers of the interim government; which, he says, led to the obstruction of all the efforts that have been made to address the worsening security in Libya and particularly in Benghazi [ lana-news.ly/ara/news/view/28190/ ].


 

The Clock is Ticking:

(1)

Unfortunately many Libyans can see the odyssey unfolding before their eyes, and for the sake of audacity they protested throughout the past 20 months or so about Libya slowly slipping down the slippery slope of "failed states", on par with Iraq and Afghanistan.

Now they speak of "resistance groups" being formed in the south of Libya, with some sources speaking of mergers being struck between the various groups of the Sahara, reportedly including loyalists, radicals, outlaw militias and border traffickers among other obscure groups; allegedly planning to initiate a Somali-style resistance on Libyan soil. Such groups have been arming themselves with a range of sophisticated weapons acquired from the massive stockpiles of weapons previously amassed by Gaddafi during his 42-year campaign.

By the end of July 2013, many Libyans began talking about a military coup brewing in the background. Libya.tv had reported on the 28th of July 2013 some rumours circulating in Tripoli regarding a state of emergency being declared, but no details were reported as to who might be behind the coup, or even where the information came from.

Today is the anniversary of the assassination of General Abdulfattah Younis. Today is also the day two massive bomb blasts were heard across Benghazi just as people were "breaking fast". Two days ago, three more people were assassinated in Benghazi in one day. Nearly 65 people were assassinated in Benghazi since liberation was declared (as of  28 July 2013).

On the 29th of July 2013, the JCP (Justice and Construction Party) condemned the attacks on its headquarters that saw the contents of its offices being stolen and burnt, as reported by LANA. The news agency also said the JCP considers these and other attacks a continuation of the attempted military coups that took place a number of times, including the last attempt on the 7th of July 3013, which targeted the GNC, the cancellation of the isolation law, and dissolving political parties.

The JCP cited the recent events as part of the attempt to destroy the 17th of February and send Libya to the dark corridors of the "unknown"; while according to Libya Herald, "There is speculation as to whether Barasi and his Justice and Construction party are plotting to remove Zeidan" (Libya Herald, article: /2013/08/06/zeidan-refuses-to-fully-respond-to-barasis-accusations-of-ineffectiveness/).

Also there are a number of reports speaking of Salafist "sleeper cells" in Tunisia, waiting for the green light; having been heavily armed by Libyan groups during the early months of liberation. Recent reports from Algeria (July 2013), however, speak of a group of terrorists escaping from prison in Niger, on their way to attack Libyan oil installations and other targets in Mali; consisting of mixed nationalities from the "Signers With Blood" radical brigade – reportedly responsible for the recent incident at nearby In Aminas, in which a number of both hostages and radicals were killed in an Algerian-style assault rather than response.

There are also reports coming from Libya regarding the business of arms smuggling into Niger and Mali for their ultimate destination: north east Algeria; where Tbessa and Mseila were said to be among the caravan stations used by traffickers to smuggle arms from Libya via Tunisia. On the 3rd of August 2013, LANA said Algerian Defence Ministry's forces had confiscated a consignment of weapons in Djanet (by the Libyan border, not far from Ghat); and also two 4x4 vehicles loaded with a variety of guns and munitions nearby. Five days earlier, Reuters reported seven Tunisian soldiers shot dead by gunmen by the Algerian border; which the Tunisian authorities later said they came from Libya.

The Libyan government, however, did not appear to report on such matters, nor appeared much bothered by the implications, except perhaps keep dismissing their neighbours' concerns as "unfounded claims", or else the acts of  released "prisoners" or "loyalists" who do not wish Libya's return to stability.

(2)

What is happening in Libya right now may be compared to how the tragedy in Somalia began, when the installed Transitional Federal Government found itself locked against the ICU, before the latter's splinter into so many radical groups including al-Shabaab ('The Youth'); only to plunge Somalia in a 20-year (bloody) civil war.

Similarly, both the Libyan transitional NTC and the transitional GNC were hurried in a way to face difficulties beyond their reach, then pressurised to come up with draconian laws, complicated electoral laws, and unjust declarations and decrees, while seemingly appearing powerless to effect the essential services required to run the country – like forming a police force or [how about] an ARMY.

After some initial criticism, both the NTC and the GNC came under attack from both the media and the armed militias – labeled "helpless" by the media, while the militias roamed free to take the law into their hands, and even force the government to pass laws by the gun. A few months later, oil production, electricity and water supplies were also badly affected; leading to a number of parties and independents to call for the government's resignation. Warnings were abundant from the start, but somehow the government says it is powerless to reverse the trend and instead urged people to take responsibility and respect the law they do not have.

GNC member, Mr. Jumaa al-Sayih, told Libya.tv that the "reaction of Tripoli's inhabitants was negative", and that people should do more to prevent such groups from intimidating the government by the gun. Government officials too did mention the negative response of the Libyan people, with one PM even condemning the silence of the majority.

On the 3rd of August 2013, LANA (lana-news.ly/ara/news/view/28183/) reported an incident in which two assailants (in a vehicle) fired at a Special Forces unit in Benghazi before they were chased by security personnel and civilians, firing behind them. This street chase-fight was a success and the two assailants were eventually arrested; but the incident signals a new kind of warfare the Libyans have never seen before, where civilians may be dragged into conflict with armed terrorists!? The peaceful civilians have elected a "government", and it is the duty of such government to protect the integrity of the country.

(3)

It is such sophisticated militias and heavily-armed "resistance groups" that may correct the path of the (failed by design) transitional government by repeating the Somali tragedy on massive scale, to ultimately drag Libya together with (still-standing) Algeria, Niger and Mali into a decade-long Saharan Conflict.

Such resistance groups have, in fact, started practicing nearly two years ago, under the governments' eyes, bombing targets on a regular basis (especially in Benghazi), assassinating scores of Libyan officials (especially colonels), attacking power stations (especially in Ramadan), blowing children to pieces, shutting down oil terminals and shooting inside other petroleum installations, selling arms in the open market for radicals and criminals, robbing banks, flooding Libya with Tramadol and Artan, and seeding corruption and crime and so many other uprooting acts of terror the "helpless" government still cannot prevent.

Such perceived failure (regardless of how) had already prompted the Egyptian Army to uproot the uprising and declare a military coup against the democratically elected government of Morsi on June 2013 – the long-term consequences of which may repeat the Black Decade massacres of Algeria to eventually link with Syria and beyond. The Army is already engaged in Sinai and also by the Libyan border, and (if it continues its military brutality) it is only a matter of time before the country is gradually dragged into conflict – just as the wars in Syria started not long ago. Many analysts had already speculated the fall of more (still-protected) Arabian dictators to the so-called Arab Spring, with Robert Fisk saying "Qatar may survive" the hurricane – probably meaning it will be saved for last!

(4)

Did not the Libyans and others peacefully uprise against tyranny to implement justice and observe the rule of law?
Violence is not the answer, and will never be the answer, but a recipe for disaster.
National Reconciliation is what your enemies fear from you; and only your re-actions can ultimately decide your fate!

No matter how powerful the enemy is, and regardless of who the real enemy is, it is the power of people united that can halt the final fall, only if people refuse to fight each other; abandon hate; burn all the weapons of destruction in a big bonfire for the world to see; begin the real job of rebuilding the catastrophic mess; and above all start protecting "their most valued prize of all", before it is too late. If not, both chaos and civil war may await the whole region, including the majority who love peace, those who laid down their arms long time ago, and the peaceful women and children (who always suffer the dire consequences of some men).

Dr. Magarief recently spoke of "national reconciliation" for good reasons, as he also urged people to "think" before they act, and "not to be pawns on others' chessboard". While people still hope the leaders soon realise that only them can build the legal force required to implement "law and order" amidst the inflicted chaos.


 

Human Rights & Abuses In Transitional Libya

 

 

Introduction:

According to some Western experts, democracy cannot be imposed on other people by the bomb, because it is the culture of the people that requires a slow process of democratisation. A Tunisian analyst has recently said delicious "degla" grows only in certain soil; without saying anything of knowingly transplanting degla in mud!  Many Libyans however still believe in the need to prepare the soil, regardless of type, before sowing the seeds (of their own desire).

People and leaders alike need to be educated about the "right way of history", about the painful consequences of "'inequality", about tolerance and peace, about the respect of "sovereignty" and "human life", about the respect of indigenous tribes, and about the true wisdom of science and "diligent dialogue" before they can tell right from wrong. Unless these issues are resolved, wars and their horrors will remain a "lucrative aspect" of human's alleged advanced culture. Can one see smoke without fire?

Wars have been around since the beginning, and so it follows whenever conflict erupts conflicting reports follow, the law disappears, unjust constitutional declarations appear, war crimes proliferate, human rights abuses flourish, looting bounces back without fear of retribution, archaeological robberies & vandalism thrive, chaos reigns, and audaciously the entire infrastructure of the country is often destroyed in the name of protection & change. The only way, it seems, to end human rights abuses is to banish the objective itself: "war", before time blows back full circle to recycle the same so-old cycle!

 

 

Critical Summary of the Transitional National Council's Objectives:

  • Ensure territorial security - [by leaving all Libya's borders open for criminal & radical cross-border activity].
  • Organise the movement to liberate Libya from Gaddafi's rule - [by grotesquely killing Gaddafi and leaving Libya unliberated].
  • Support local councils to restore normal life to the affected areas - [by not reporting the atrocities left to take place].
  • Oversee the creation of a constituent assembly to implement its goals - [by self-appointing more "helpless" members].
  • Draft a new, just constitution to be put to a referendum- [after imposing the Constitutional Declaration to deny the Berbers].
  • Organise a democratic election after the liberation of the country- [by barring Berber Constituent 8 from party-elections].
  • Represent the February Uprising officially - [by proposing to make polygamy easier and declare being "helpless"].
  • Create sub-committees to deal with the issues facing the people of Libya during the transitional period - [by effecting 374 political parties (or 'entities') while wars were still going on].

 

 

(1) The First Protests In New Libya:

Enjoying the newly "granted" freedom of speech, the Libyans are now taking an active role in debating the current issues challenging the country. The following are some of the issues debated in today's Libya, which the NTC urgently needs to address, not "urge", and assure the Libyan people that not only they are aware of these deeply-troubling issues but also they are capable and ready to present the beneficial solutions to tackle them and restore tranquility to Libya, once more.

The failure of the first temporary government announced by the former rebel prime minister Mahmoud Jibril, which contained names previously associated with the ousted regime, had triggered the first ever protest against the NTC. The long overdue second cabinet line-up, announced on the 22nd of November 2011 by the transitional prime minister el-Keib, had created even more protests than the previous government sacked by the NTC. Peaceful protestors took to the streets across Libya, shouting: "down to the new government", "the banks are empty", and other similar revolutionary slogans that express anger more than anything else.

 

 

(2): The Government Criticising The Government:

The transitional Prime Minister Abdurahim Elkeib had declared on Wednesday the 25th of April 2012 that the NTC is hindering his government’s efforts to hold elections on time, and that the NTC is running a "vicious media campaign" against his transitional government (pm.gov.ly/news/619.html). These are strong words to come from the transitional Prime Minister; but is it right for him to blame others for his government's failure to implement the law? Is it right for him to express this deep schism within the government when the Libyans are looking up to them to lead by example? Why cannot his government arrest whoever is attempting to obstruct the law including any member from the NTC? The Prime Minister had already answered "some" of these questions in the same statement he made at the above website, when he said:

"ولذا فإن الحكومة لن تتحمل هذه المسؤولية التاريخية وتبعاتها التي قد تنحرف بالثورة عن مسارها . . ."
: "Thus the government shall not take this historic responsibility and what it entails, which may deviate the revolution from its path."

 


(3): NTC's Draconian Law:

On the 2nd of May 2012 the NTC was very happy to publish its Law 37 (of 2012), without any consultation with the Libyan people, and in doing so it brought the whole world against its new "draconian" measures to curb "free speech". Even though the law's title, namely "Criminalising The Glorification of The Tyrant", gives the impression that the law primarily deals with curbing the activities of Gaddafi's loyalists, the Articles within the law clearly undermine the presumably granted freedom. Introducing such measures to control the opposition during the transition sends the wrong message to the watching world.

Like many other laws and declarations passed by the NTC, one can only guess the strategy behind such 'controversial' decision. The clue however was 'spelt out' by the transitional prime minister el-Keib when he was reported to have informed his English allies in London (on the 25th of May 2012) that Law 37 and other such laws will "disappear" after the forthcoming national elections! Nuri al-Abbar, head of the election commission, told reporters that he blames nobody for the postponement of the elections, because it was due to the fact that he wanted to make sure that voter registration had no links to Gaddafi (libya.tv/en/elections-postponed-until-july-7/).

However, "An NTC official told Amnesty International that the law aims to protect the sensibilities of victims of al-Gaddafi’s crimes, and to promote national reconciliation. Another official pointed out that the law was needed because some teachers continued to glorify al-Gaddafi’s rule in schools, threatening the “17 February Revolution” . . . Free speech must be guaranteed for all, not only supporters of the new government,” said Philip Luther."

There is no doubt that Gaddafi's officials and soldiers who committed crimes against the Libyan people need to be brought before Libyan law. But substituting one oppressive method with another makes Libyans appear detached from the reality of the democratic process when they are not, simply because such draconian measures were not passed by the Libyans themselves, but by others who appear to mis-represent them. This calls for all leaders to represent the aspirations of all the Libyan people and not misrepresent any of them in any way.

Hence the President of the Libyan National Council for Civil Liberties & Human Rights, Mohammed Allagi (a former minister of justice), said law 37 constitutes a flagrant violation of human rights, a serious setback, and an obnoxious duplication of the past, if not worse. He also criticised Article 13 of Law 15 of 2012 in an article published by the website of the NTC itself, at:
ntc.gov.ly/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=29:2012-05-10-13-21-30.

And according to the LFJL, "through the unilateral enactment of such laws, in the absence of involvement or consultation with key stakeholders including civil society organisations representing various interests of the Libyan public, the NTC is seriously undermining its own legitimacy."
(libyanjustice.org/news/news/post/23-lfjl-strongly-condemns-new-laws-breaching-human-rights-and-undermining-the-rule-of-law/)

The Prime Minister's Office run an online referendum on the issue at its website (pm.gov.ly/poll/3-2012-05-03-21-51-34.html), to ask the Libyan people for their opinion (after the law was passed and not before, of course), in which so far 66% of Libyans voted against the draconian law, and 33% approved the oppressive move (out of a total of 105,000 votes). But the opinion of Ahmed Bin Musa is typically Libyan, when he wrote: " . . . مبروك .. أنت اول سجين سياسي في عصر ثورة 17 فبراير أبداً" :- "congratulations . . . you are the first ever political prisoner of the 17th of February revolution".

According to Amnesty International:

"The law prescribes prison sentences for spreading false rumours, propaganda or information with the aim of harming national defence or “terrorizing people” or “weakening citizens’ morale” during war time. Law 37 of 2012 imposes life imprisonment if such actions “harm the country” . . . Libyans took to the streets in February of last year and paid a heavy price to get rid of such repressive practices, not to see them reintroduced,” said Philip Luther, Amnesty International’s Director for the Middle East and North Africa."

amnesty.org/en/for-media/press-releases/libya-ntc-must-not-curtail-freedom-expression-name-protecting-revolution-20


Update
: Law 37 Overturned by Libya's Supreme Court:

On Thursday the 14th of June 2012, Libya's supreme judge, Kamal Bashir Dahan, scrapped Law 37 and announced in a brief hearing that the court has decided to accept the appeal of Law 37/2012 because it is unconstitutional under the NTC’s Constitutional Declaration of the 3rd of August 2011.

 

 

(4): Is it "interim" or "transitional" council:

Most Libyans say the role of the council should have ended as soon as Libya was declared liberated (23 October 2011), and a new transitional government should have been elected to run the country before the final elections of an official government. They also said the "transitional" council should be elected from and by Libyans who had no ties with the ousted regime and who are well educated and have good experience and expertise. However, According to Reuters, "Interim government officials say it is impossible for them [to] sack hundreds of officials merely because they served under Gaddafi". Mustafa Abdul Jalil himself said during the war that he would resign as soon as Gaddafi's regime comes to an end, but then when he was asked after liberation why he did not fulfil his "promise", he was reported to have said that he was afraid the country will descend into chaos if he did. In reality, however, many Libyans blame the NTC (among others) for the effected chaos, and for the lack of the army and the police force they should have organised. Maybe the leaders can help by explaining why the NTC  has become 'powerless', 'helpless' and 'weak' only after they stepped forward  to lead.

 

 

(5): Lack of Security:

Many Libyans, especially women, say security during the war was fine. But after the NTC took over, that is after liberation was prematurely declared, armed gangs appeared everywhere, robbing, beating and kidnapping citizens including women, right in the open. Libyan families get stopped while in their family cars, ordered to step out, robbed in broad day light, and left on the road with nothing but tears in their eyes. According to a number of reports the recent clashes in Sabha, in which nearly 150 Libyans were killed and 475 were injured, were started after a dispute over a car. Some gangs desecrate holy sites, others rob businesses and shops, and some kill on the spot. Rape was also reported from various areas, and it was used as a weapon to spread "hatred" and "revenge" during and after the war. No one really knows who these gangs are, or even where they come from.

Why were these criminal gangs allowed to conduct their business in the open and spread terror in a civil society that never saw such crimes before?  Are they intent to fail the revolution? If so, why cannot the government do something about them? Why cannot the government do its job and protect the civilians by "all necessary measures"? Many Libyans say if the NTC cannot do its job, which the NTC openly admits, then they need to seek assistance from the Libyan people they claim to represent, or else go.

The reason for this, the Libyans say, is that the NTC had allowed members from Gaddafi's government to occupy places in the current interim government, and that Gaddafi's loyalists will not rest until they see the failure of the revolution. The NTC has responded by saying those loyalists who are found to be involved with corruption will be removed, but they cannot remove hundreds of Gaddafi's officials who were not implicated in "corruption". Well, at least this is the first official admittance that "hundreds" of Gaddafi's officials still are in the present government.

In a recent announcement in its website, the National Transitional Council said that in response to a number of complaints they received from a number of towns regarding some General Assembly candidates being Gaddafi's officials (who were either members of the previous regime or the "revolutionary committees"), they advised the public to send complaints to the representative of the High Court (found in each court), or else email the complaints to the email given below:

وردت أسئلة من بعض المدن بخصوص مترشحين للمؤتمر الوطني وهم من عناصر النظام السابق او ممن كانوا من قيادات اللجان الثورية وكان التساؤل عن كيفية الطعن فى هؤلاء المترشحين . وعلية نفيدكم انه يوجد ممثل للهيئة العليا في كل محكمة ويمكن أيضاً إرسال الطعون والمعلومات مباشرة إلى هيئة النزاهة على البريد الالكتروني libyannazaha@gmail.com او رقم الهاتف 3616816-021 فاكس 3616818-021.

(ntc.gov.ly/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=46:2012-05-26-11-44-57&catid=5:2012-04-09-22-24-52)

 

 

(6): NTC's Lack of Control:

One can understand the difficulties faced, and no doubt the NTC always needs a helping hand and support from all Libyans; but the Libyans still do not understand why it is taking so long for this presumed "change" to ever take place, and why it is taking this long to restore the essential services and security to the country. The NTC asked for more time, and it did welcome the "criticism" as a healthy sign of democracy, while sympathetic Libyans acknowledged the NTC cannot control the "negative" side-effects of war and of the armed militias, but not being able to restore the essential services and functions required for "life" is something only themselves they have to blame.

Some analysts questioned if the organisation was "shortsighted" in its approach to lead the Libyans out of the "quagmire", since the critics say the security of Libya should have been well "thought out" before attempting such destruction of infrastructure and central authority. During the "stalemate" situation the Libya Contact Group met in Istanbul on the 15th of July 2011, allegedly to seek a political solution to end the "civil war" in Libya – even though it never was a civil war, the Libyans said. Reuters reported on the day before the meeting took place that "Among items to be discussed in Istanbul will be a recommendation by a British-led team planning post-conflict Libya for Gaddafi's security forces to be left intact after a rebel victory in order to avoid errors made after the Iraq war"
(reuters.com/article/2011/07/14/uk-libya-turkey).

Did anyone take any notice (from both the Contact Group and the people not contacted) of the British team's recommendation? Was there really a "stalemate" situation that required a political solution? Was there a "political solution" to the (alleged) "civil war" in Libya? The NTC was keen to admit that it has a big problem to deal with, and that is how to disarm the heavily-armed Libyan population. Months after the capital Tripoli was captured, Reuters (reuters.com/article/2011/11/05/us-libya-weapons) reported that:

"At one massive bunker complex visited by Reuters at the weekend, thousands of rockets, mines, tank shells and even two Italian naval torpedoes lay in neat stacks ready for transport – with not a guard in sight . . . At another, larger ammo dump near Libya's second-largest city Benghazi, a single fighter stood guard over a tract of land dotted with bunkers stretching as far as the eye could see."

The UN too was keen to file a detailed report about the state of lawlessness and the widespread of human rights abuses that are taking place in (freed) Libya under the NTC, as well as about the spread of Libyan weapons across the whole region, without giving reasons as to why this had escaped its wise "attention" in the first place;  why it never provided a proven "exit strategy" from the start; and why it had ended its "protection of civilians" so soon while civilian homes were still being shelled.

  • "Making Progress in Libya: NTC must exercise authority and tackle militias" (politicsinspires.org/2012/03/libya-ntc-must-exercise-authority-and-tackle-militias).

  • The Struggle For Post Gaddafi Libya: by Jason Pack and Barak Barfi Policy, February 2012, The Washingtom Institute for Near East Policy.

  • Who is really controlling Libya? (aljazeera.com/programmes/insidestory/2012/01/20121279497910159.html).

 

 

(7): NTC's Lack of Transparency:

Enjoying the newly-won "freedom of expression", the Arabs and the Berbers were protesting in various towns across Libya including Mesratha, Zuwarah, Nafousa, Tripoli, Sebha and Benghazi against NTC's lack of transparency and lack of clear strategy. People say they were getting bored of "waiting", governments reshuffled, loyalists sacked, controversial laws & declarations, funds remained frozen for so long, talks of "civil war" echoed by the leaders themselves, and contradictions were more usual than common. For example, Moa'tasim was captured twice (the second time with his father), Saifalislam arrested three times, and Khamis ('The-Fifth') killed five times. But without a "body" one can never be sure, as Khamis was reported on the 25th of February 2012 to be still alive, with some Libyans saying somewhere around Regdalin. Saadi and Mohammad were also (said) to have been arrested on the 22nd of August 2011, but somehow Saadi still is in Niger and Mohammad lives in Algeria. When NTC's spokesman was asked by the media to explain one of these contradictions, he said "escaped" - presumably with some escaping more than once.

One of the biggest protests was in Benghazi on the 12th of December 2011, where tens of thousands of protesters took to the streets to express their "frustration" with  the way the NTC was handling the transition to justice and freedom. The dangerous slogans "agents of the enemy, the banks are empty" and "stealing the revolution" (and the subsequent "correcting the path of the revolution") clearly reflect the degree of anger and disappointment. On the following day the Guardian reported that protesters have set up a "tent camp" in Benghazi (in Maidan al-Shagara 'Tree Square'):

"We want to know who is the NTC," said Salwa Bugaighis, a Benghazi lawyer who quit the government earlier this year. "We want all the names." . . . Meetings are held in secret and voting records are not released. This lack of transparency is compounded by a log jam in many areas of government, from payment of salaries to rubbish collection and confusion over who has control of Libya's security forces."
guardian.co.uk/world/2011/dec/13/libyan-activists-demand-transparency-ntc

However, according to the Arabic site of the NTC, and as of the 27th of January 2012, the introduction to the list of NTC members (see above menu) speaks only of 33 members, while the list itself (below that) contains 43 members – still leaving 5 missing. No one from Zuwarah is listed among the 43 (ntclibya.com/InnerPage.aspx?SSID=71&ParentID=37&LangID=2"). Around the 23rd of February 2012 a third list appeared in the organisation's third website (ntc.gov.ly/NTCMembers.aspx), which contained 76 members, including 11 from Tripoli, 7 from Benghazi, and one from Zuwarah.

 

 

(8): NTC Headquarters Attacked:

On the 20th of January of Libya's first liberated year, 2012, protesters in Benghazi, including those who still in the "Tent Camp", broke their way into the headquarters of the National Transitional Government (NTG) in Benghazi (or the NTC). Smashing Abdul Jalil's parked Toyota Land Cruiser outside, the protesters threw "stones" at the headquarters, broke glass windows, and even threw a grenade, as they stormed the building  and demanded the resignation of the transitional "government". According to Reuters, "When Abdul Jalil . . . came out in an attempt to address the crowd, some protesters hurled empty plastic bottles at him, prompting security forces to fire tear gas." Reuters also said that one protester came out of the building carrying a set of loudspeakers and screaming: "Spoils of war!" However, according to english.alarabiya.net/articles/2012/01/21/189534.html, the protesters also demanded "sharia law be the source of the North African country’s future constitution", even though Article (1) of the Constitutional Declaration says just that. Something somewhere rings the bell; and let us hope someone somewhere answers the door.

 

 

(9): Human Rights  Abuses, Torture & Persecution in NTC's Libya:

Before the liberation day and during the war, reports began to leak out regarding human rights abuses committed by the rebels of new Libya (hrw.org/en/news/2011/07/13/libya-opposition-forces-should-protect-civilians-and-hospitals). Amnesty International has also published a detailed report on May 2011 about human rights abuses in both Transitional Libya and Gaddafi's Libya (mde190252011en).

No doubt, it is neither fair nor right to criticise the National Transitional Council (the sole representative of the aspirations of the Libyan people) for actions committed by "others" including the rebels during the months of the war; and the NTC did condemn the unacceptable acts and urged all rebels to respect the law.

But shortly after the capture of Tripoli and the premature declaration of liberation, the NTC was widely criticised by various organisations including Amnesty and the UN itself for "failing" to bring the situation under control, and for the widespread human rights abuses "with impunity", displacement of Libyan communities as a result of persecution, arbitrary arrests, mass killings, looting, arms proliferations, and even "torture to death" in free Libya. Such atrocities, according to Amnesty, are "fuelling insecurity and hindering the rebuilding of state institutions".

MSF pulled its staff out of  Mesratha's detention centres on Wednesday, after witnessing more than 100 cases of torture committed by the rebels against inmates. More disturbing, according to Reuters, MSF's "medical staff were being asked to patch up detainees mid-way through torture sessions so they could go back for more abuse," and that the Libyan Foreign Minister Ashour bin Khayyal told the agency (on the sidelines of an African Union summit in Addis Ababa) that: "Gaddafi's remnants committed actions that were an aggression to the revolution and to Libya and they will now receive the treatment they deserve."

Following the statement made by the aid agency Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF) regarding the torture of detainees in Mesratha by rebel forces, the NTC denied the claims and said it knew nothing about the torture, and that torture is not the policy of the National Transitional Council. The Libyans were indeed very pleased to hear that torture is not one of the policies of the NTC.

Giving the NTC the benefit of the doubt, one needs to come to terms with Amnesty International's reports, once more, as it has reported that officially recognised entities were indeed involved in the acts of torture:

"The torture is being carried out by officially recognized military and security entities as well by a multitude of armed militias operating outside any legal framework . . . Amnesty International said that while in some areas courts are reportedly processing civil cases, so-called “sensitive” cases related to security and political issues are not being addressed. Instead a range of mostly unofficial bodies, with no status in law, including so-called “judicial committees”, have been carrying out interrogations in various detention centres, outside the control of the judiciary." (amnesty.org/en/for-media/press-releases/libya-deaths-detainees-amid-widespread-torture-2012-01-26).

 

 

(10): Torture To Death in Free Libya:

In its recent report, "Libya: UN mission voices concern over detainee deaths resulting from torture", published on the 1st of May 2012 at (un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=41899&Cr=libya&Cr1=),

"The United Nations mission for Libya has expressed its concern to the country’s authorities over the recent deaths of three people in a detention centre in the north-western city of Misrata, saying it believes that the deaths may have resulted from torture. The detainees died on 13 April in the Zaroug detention centre, which is controlled by a committee under the supervision of the Ministry of Interior, the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) said in a statement . . . UNSMIL said it has also taken note of the cases of at least seven other people who were tortured in the same detention facility. There have also been allegations of torture and ill-treatment of detainees held by armed brigades in other detention centres, particularly in the capital, Tripoli, and in the towns of Zawya, Zintan and Misrata. The mission also voiced concern over the reported existence of some secret detention facilities run by the “brigades” and where detainees are at risk of torture."

These so-called "secret detention facilities" were reported previously by some Libyans to the Prime Minister, via the PMO's official website, but it seems no one bothered to take the matter seriously, let alone further. Events were left to continue, one after another to this day. The arbitrary arrests, reminiscent of Gaddafi's revolutionary committees, were apparently executed by secret cells (not to be confused with 'mystery cells') that come out at night, the Libyans say, to terrorise free Libyans.

Their Western backers now say they were let down by the NTC, and even said they are "embarrassed" by the human rights abuses taking place under the authority of a government they earlier supported with military might. Such outcomes, however, are predictable from the start, given the fact that the UN had failed to provide an exit strategy for post-Gaddafi Libya, and given the fact the UN had ended its military operations in Libya while wars were still going on across the country.

One would presume some kind of assistance is required to recover from the effected destruction of infrastructure, but unfortunately the Libyans were left to deal with the mess with no authority in sight, while taking the blame for everything in consequence. Before, it was the dictator's fault, they said; but after the dictator's grotesque death, it is now the people's fault, the leaders say.

 

 

(11): Financial Corruption:

During the wars, most Libyans and the world's media were busy digging Gaddafi's financial files and the lavish life-style of his children. Today, officials are just as implicated in squandering Libya's wealth. Most Libyans know that while they were deprived of their own wealth, hundreds of millions of dinars went missing from the country's treasury, which the NTC said it cannot find because of bureaucracy.

"The new leadership did not know the size of state assets, how their money was being spent, or what had happened to more than $2 billion transferred from the sovereign wealth fund"
[reuters.com/article/2012/05/08/us-libya-finances-idUSBRE8470E220120508].

The "revolutionaries" were awarded 4000 Libyan dinars each, with many of them fraudulently claiming the same award several times (by registering their names and even other fictitious names in more than one list). Many more civilians and infiltrators had joined the rebel movement (after liberation was declared) apparently to claim the reward money. Each family (regardless of the number of individuals in the family) was given 2000 Libyan dinars; and each Libyan citizen was give a mere 200 Libyan dinars (about £100 - hardly enough to cover a good shopping for the week).

On the other hand, the self-appointed leaders speak of hundreds of millions disappearing before their eyes, with no one quite sure where the money went, while at the same time distancing themselves from the responsibility for the two thousand million US Dollars that disappeared, just like that. Local councils too were reported to have been involved in massive financial corruption and theft. Embassies across the world were also reported to have been involved. The "wounded" saga of the Ministry of Health is, perhaps, one of the biggest fraud scandals in Libyan history.

The way the borders were left open and unguarded has also resulted in massive cross-border trade in illegal commodities, such as weapons, drugs, alcohol, poisoned and outdated food, Tramadol, petrol, cars, and even trafficking in "human beings", all of which have further spread the infection of corruption to dearly transform the Libyan society in many ways. All in all, most Libyans agree that corruption now is far worse than ever before. The later government of the GNC said it had introduced the "Identification Number" to prevent fraudulent claims of salaries, where one Libyan was reported by officials to have been claiming more than 100 salaries (all for himself).

 

 

 

(12): NTC's Laws:

The NTC was criticised from the start for issuing laws, decrees and press releases without any consultation with the Libyan people. The installed organisation gave itself the only legitimate right to represent the aspirations of the Libyan people, but in reality it gave itself the sole right to decide, legislate and implement whatever it sees right. Many of these laws, including the Constitutional Declaration and Law 37, came under sharp criticism from the Libyan people.

In June 2012, the "Libyan Revolutionaries Union", known as آثال , called for the NTC to stop issuing any further unnecessary laws until the new government is elected (almanaralink.com/press/2012/06/18751/مؤسسة-اتحاد-ثوار-ليبياآثال-تطالب-الم/). They have also stated that from the principle of transparency the NTC should not appoint any of its members, employees or relatives to any official position in the Libyan government, embassies or government firms and institutions; pointing out that the NTC's job was to lead the organisation of running the country during the vacuum created by the war, and not to govern the country itself according to their own ideals.

On the 27th of June 2012, the Defence Minister Osama Juwaili told Libyaherald that:

"The NTC are in the habit of issuing laws without first referring to the government or to experts. They are failing to consult with anybody”, he said. “These laws often conflict with the work of the government and restrict its powers”. The minister chose to cite again Law 11 as an example. “The NTC sent me a letter requesting us to develop a law to govern the operations of the defence ministry and the armed forces, and said we had just three days to do this. On the very same day, they passed Law 11 which did just that, so what was the point of asking me at all?” The NTC did not respond to repeated requests for comment on the minister’s criticisms." 
Libya Herald, article: /defence-minister-juwaili-launches-scathing-attack-on-ntc/


(13): Reports:

  • United Nations: a good example of the "change" referred to above is that while Gaddafi released all the "enemies of the revolution" and civil criminals from prison, their places were later occupied by thousands of the "enemies of the state", the dysfunctional state of New Libya. Read more about what the UN now says here.

  • Amnesty International Report Libya: human right abuses by both the imposed government of Gaddafi and the self-appointed TNC. Read Amnesty International Report (mde190252011en).

  • Amnesty International: for a list of the latest reports and updates about Libya and human rights abuses in Libya, please see:
    amnesty.org/en/region/libya

  • The Forgotten Victims of Nato Strikes: Amnesty International has documented 55 named civilians, including 16 children and 14 women, who were killed in air-strikes in Tripoli (5), Zlitan (3), Majer (34) Sirte (9) and Brega (4). Twenty other civilians were reportedly killed in Brega (2), Surman (13) and Bani Walid (5). Read the full report here.

  • HRW: The Human Rights Watch Report: "is the most extensive examination to date of civilian casualties caused by NATO’s air campaign . . . The most serious incident occurred in the village of Majer, 160 kilometres east of Tripoli, the capital, on August 8, 2011, when NATO air strikes on two family compounds killed 34 civilians and wounded more than 30." Download the full report.

  • HRW: before the liberation day and during the war, reports began to leak out regarding human rights abuses committed by the rebels (hrw.org/en/news/2011/07/13/libya-opposition-forces-should-protect-civilians-and-hospitals).

  • UN-authorised forces attack on Libyan Journalists: it was reported that some of the "acts" committed by the forces implementing the no-fly zone "may amount to crimes against humanity", when the forces bombed a number of civilian targets as listed in the above reports including the Libyan state TV al-Jamahiriya on July the 30th 2011, in which 3 journalists were killed and between 15 and 21 more were wounded . UN Security Council Resolution 1738 (2006) condemns acts of violence against peaceful journalists during conflict.

  • Officially recognised entities involved in the acts of torture including "torture to death": amnesty.org/en/for-media/press-releases/libya-deaths-detainees-amid-widespread-torture-2012-01-26).

  • World Report 2011: Human Rights of Tamazight Community. Download the full Human Rights Watch 2011 report about the state of Berbers in Libya.

  • Militias Threaten Hopes For New Libya: Amnesty International Report mde190022012en.

  • Write To Diplomatic Representatives of Libya In Your Country: Amnesty International Report mde190012012en:
    "Dear Ambassador, I am writing to express my concern about ongoing human rights violations committed by armed militias in Libya. I call on the Libyan authorities to rein in the armed militias, including to: Investigate and bring to justice militia members responsible for human rights abuses, including arbitrary detention, torture, extra-judicial executions, the forcible displacement of the Tawargha, the Mashashiya and other communities, and other human rights abuses; Take effective action to stop the repetition of such abuses; Ensure that communities displaced by militias, such as the Tawargha, are able to return home and are given adequate assistance to rebuild their lives, including compensation and assistance in reconstruction." Source: mde190012012en.

  • The Guardian: "Dozens of African migrants were left to die in the Mediterranean after a number of European military units apparently ignored their cries for help" (guardian.co.uk/world/2011/may/08/nato-ship-libyan-migrants ).

  • The Guardian: "The European rapporteur charged with investigating the case of 63 African migrants who were "left to die" in the Mediterranean last year has warned those responsible could end up in court" (guardian.co.uk/world/2012/mar/29/migrant-boat-disaster-legal-action).

 

 
 
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