The conglomerate Berber tribes are the proud natives of North
Africa from immemorial time to the present day, including Egypt, Libya, Tunisia,
Algeria, Morocco, Mauritania, Niger, Mali, Burkina Faso and the Canary Islands.
Current estimates give 30 million Berbers still alive in North Africa today.
They have been denied their basic and advanced human rights, as they were persecuted
to varying degrees in most of the above countries. Even their own language, Tamazight,
is yet to be officially recognised in their own countries, despite the recent
and encouraging developments that took place in Algeria and Morocco, which did
allow some limited institutionalisation of Berber but nothing official as yet.
One cannot argue with the appointed oppressive despots, but
after the popularised uprisings in North Africa, Moroccans at last overwhelmingly
voted for a referendum to recognise Berber language as an official language in
the constitution; while Libya's NTC made no mention of "Berber" as
an official language in its recent "Constitutional Declaration" (of
August 2011), despite the Berbers' pivotal role in capturing crucial Tripoli.
The perplexed term Berberism is generally used to describe
the thriving "political movement(s) of the Berber communities in North Africa".
Berberists are the Berber activists who campaign for greater cultural and political
freedom for the Berbers or Imazighen of North Africa. The initial activities
of Berberists primarily revolved around cultural revival, picking the loose pieces,
and increasing awareness of the Berbers' persecuted state; followed by exuberant
growth of cultural associations to document the great efforts of the pioneers
and the martyrs of the Berber cultural revolution -- the peaceful revolution;
before they began to internationally campaign for the recognition of their unique
identity and Berber language Tamazight as one of the official languages
of the various countries of North Africa, as well as FOR an immediate end to
the economic neglect they were made to endure under "imposed" dictatorship
and corrupt monarchies. The Amazigh World Congress (AWC) was created in
1995, in exile, to organise the political and cultural movements in North Africa,
and to fight oppression in a jubilant world seemingly too alien to them and to
their dire needs.
The Berbers' struggle for freedom during the last 50 years
or so seemed to have gone unnoticed by the outside, civilised world, where they
were subsumed a semi-human state. Yet, all of a sudden, the Berbers were expected
to take part in what appears to be a complete shake-up of the politics of North
Africa & the Middle East, in what is known as "The Arab Spring" --
and for that they were as always happily prepared to do so for the sake of national
unity. Probably oblivious to the outside world, Berberists still commemorate "The
Black Spring" in many parts of 'Tamazgha', in wait
of the only 'Tafsuyt' -- the "Berber Spring", commemorated
in the sacred month of April.
No doubt, the right to self-govern is the aim of some Berber
organisations, as it is natural to be in charge of one's destiny; but the majority
of the Berbers have no separatist inclinations and no intention to divide any
unity for that matter -- if that is the problem worrying others who fully enjoy
the freedom of cherished identity. "Self-determination" does
not mean "dividing a country" at all but "uniting" it on
equal basis. Regarding whether autonomy has wide public support or not is
perhaps a voting matter for the persecuted Imazighen to democratically
settle, if were allowed to do so, of course. Egalitarian as they might be, the
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples does guarantee the Berbers
(and all other indigenous peoples) the right to self-govern. Like any other human
society, do dearly cherish their own identity and pride and need the same human
rights others take for granted. Full stop. The Berbers together with the Arabs
of Libya were united in their recent uprising, and both mutually, we hope, recognise
the full identity & integrity of the other, living together and equally dignified,
under the umbrella of One United Libya - simply known as Mother Libya.
* * *
R.M. Blench (1999) writes, in Archaeology
And Language, “Linguistic nationalism still engenders a rich emotional harvest
at present, often for good reasons, since the suppression of minority languages
is commonly a prominent feature of totalitarian governments. Democracies sometimes
encourage voluntary euthanasia among minorities through neglect" (Trigger
1989, Vol. 1, p. 3). Under such circumstances it is not surprising to
hear suicide figures amongst Canadian natives are in the increase; for which
analysts blamed poverty and the state of persecution they were subjected to,
like having 90% unemployment (at the time of reporting) and schools closing down
for nine months a year. When natives start to commit suicide because of political
persecution imposed by democratic conquerors, and because of neglect and lack
of economic development, then we must expect people first to get ‘bored of it’,
and then attempt to put things right once and for all. Only the collective will
of the people can do that. This could happen anywhere indigenous minorities and
abandoned natives continue to suffer the modern age. What is it that makes us
humans if it is not human language? Take that away from any mortal community
and you will end up with "nothing" but "mere animals".
The Main Berber Political Movements In North Africa:
The following is a list of the main political parties and armed groups found
in North Africa. See the timeline below for more information about each one of
these:
AA: The Provisional Government of Kabylia (Anavad
Aqvyli), France.
ABM: Armed Berber Movement, Algeria.
ADC: Democratic Alliance for Change (Alliance
démocratique pour le changement), Mali.
ARLA: Revolutionary Army for the Liberation
of Azawad (Armeé revolutionnare de libération de l'Azwad), Mali.
Arouch: Berber Arouch Citizens Movement
(Mouvement citoyen des Aârchs), Algeria.
ATNMC: Northern Mali Tuareg Alliance for
Change (Alliance touareg nord mali pour le changement), Mali.
CMA: World Amazigh Congress (Congrès
mondial amazigh), Tamazgha ('North Africa').
AMA: Amazigh World Assembly: AWA (l’Assemblée
Mondiale Amazighe), new name of CMA.
CRA: Coordination of the Armed Resistance (Coordinasion
de Resistance Armeé), Niger.
FFR: Relief Forces Front (Front
des forces de redressement).
FFS: Socialist Forces Front (Front des
forces socialistes), Algeria.
FLAA: Liberation Front Air & Azawagh (Front
de libération de l’Aïr et de l’Azawagh), Niger.
FLT: Front for the Liberation of Tamoust, Niger.
FPLN: Popular Front for the Liberation of Niger,
Libya.
FPN: Niger Patriotic Front (Front patriotique
nigérien), Niger.
IT: International Tuareg (internationale
touareg).
MAK: Movement for the Autonomy of Kabylia (Mouvement
pour l'autonomie de la Kabylie), Algeria.
MCB: Berber Cultural Movement (Mouvement
culturel berbère), Algeria.
MFUA: The United Movements and Fronts of Azawad
(Movements et Fronts Unities de l'Azwad), Mali.
MNB: The National Popular Movement (Mouvement
national populaire), Morocco.
MNJ: Niger Movement for Justice (Le Mouvement
des nigériens pour la justice), Niger.
MNLA: The National Movement for
the Liberation of Azawad (Mouvement National de Libération de l'Azawad),
Mali.
MOREHOB: Revolutionary Movement of the Blue
Men (Movimiento revolucionario de los Hombres Azules), Mauritania.
MPLA: Popular Movement for Liberation of Azawad (Mouvement
populaire de libération de l'Azawad), Libya.
MTNM: The Tuareg Movement of Northern Mali, Mali.
ORA: Organisation of the Armed Resistance (Organization
de Resistance Armeé), Niger.
PDAM: Moroccan Amazigh Democratic
Party (Parti démocrate amazigh marocain), Morocco.
PEMI: Moroccan Ecologist Party - Greens
(Parti écologiste marocain - Izigzawn), new name of PDAM.
RCD: Rally for Culture and Democracy (Rassemblement
pour la culture et la démocratie), Algeria.
UNAP: Union of North African Peoples, Tamazgha
('North Africa').
Map of Tripoli, with most
of Cyrenaica and Fezzan being part of colonial Egypt.
The Tripolitanian Republic (Aljumhuriya Attarabulsiya)
was created on the 16th of November 1918 as the first indigenous republic. It
was also the first ever republic in the Arab world. Among its creators were the
Berber Sulayman al-Baruni, a resistance leader from Yefren,
Nafousa Mountain, and Ramadan al-Suwayhli. The republic was regarded as
the first local attempt to create a "secular" state that is inclusive
of all the local tribes. Unfortunately the Tripolitanian
Republic never gained the full support in the 1919 Paris Peace Conference,
despite being recognised by Italy. At one stage the capital city of Tripolitania
was Gharyan, near Yefren, in the "Berber Mountain" (which Gaddafi renamed
the Western Mountain, in relation to the geographical location of the mountain).
Lacking the international recognition and support it needed
and due to the internal struggle for leadership the republic eventually disappeared
from the pages of history by 1923. As is often the case during conflict,
there are conflicting reports regarding the failure of the republic. The Conference
of Gharyan in 1920 attempted to resolve the issue, but somehow nothing
materialised, except the focus was shifted towards Cyrenaica instead. There are
those who say the Italians continued to support the Arabs as well as the Berbers
against each other (the classic divide and rule conspiracy), leading to the Italians
taking over the whole country; while on the other hand there are those who say
the Berbers in their cooperation with all sides put their Berber-issue behind
and instead concentrated on the presumed "national unity" (of a country
that never existed). This is not surprising, since they suffered badly during
the wars and since most people would cherish return to normality if it meant
con-cessions be made.
There was never unified Libya before then! It mattered little
to the colonial intruders if the imposed borders do reflect the cultural boundaries
and ethnic identities of the region(s) or not; resulting in so many African indigenous
communities being split over several countries. The Berber
Republic of the Rif, created by the Berbers
of Morocco in 1923, was brutally crushed by a combined Spanish-French army of
one quarter of a million soldiers, before handing over control of Morocco to
the Arabs. Probably it was the way the "Berber Crisis" of
1949 was handled that had prevented the Kabyles from creating a similar republic
in Algeria! Had the Tripolitanian Republic survived, it probably would have been
the first ever state in North Africa in which both the Berbers and the Arabs
were fully recognised and equal before the law.
By 1927 the Italian colonialists claimed the Tripolitanian
Republic for themselves, declared it a separate colony, and subsequently the
capital city was moved from Gharyan to Tripoli; keeping the Berber Mountain,
likewise the Rif Mountain, out of the way. The resistance in the east of Libya
was then rewarded by the hanging of its leader Omar Almukhtar in 1931. By 1949 Sayyid Idris
was assisted to proclaim the eastern region of Libya as "The
Emirate of Cyrenaica", appointing himself the Emir. But like
before, the UN failed to recognise the new country of Cyrenaica; and eventually
King Idris was installed as the King of the whole of Libya (Cyrenaica + Tripolitania
+ Fezzan) in 1951. During this period both Benghazi and Tripoli acted as official
capitals, but after the installation of Gaddafi in 1969 Tripoli became once more
the only capital of Libya. Viewed from start to end shows that Libyans (both
Arabs and Berbers) were powerless all along to decide their own true destiny,
and regardless of the attempts the events always succeed to circumvent.
1958:
In the year 1958, which the Berbers of Zuwarah call "Aseggas
n Etthawret" ('Year of The Revolution'),
a full fledged tribal war broke out between the Berber Ait Willul natives
of Zuwarah and the Arabs of nearby settlements including Rigdalin's. The
war was not documented. However, the events taking place at the time may point
to the Italian bombardments of Zuwarah,
where the inhabitants were repeatedly bombed out of their homes and forced to
flee south where they came in conflict with the nearby Arab villages. Most of
the land and farms around and beyond these villages belonged to Berbers from
Zuwarah. The picture described by Alan Ostler states that "The
Italians had again bombarded Zuara; but, when they tried to effect a landing,
Musa Bimbashi fought them off, for perhaps the sixth time . . ."They brought
out air-ships and dropped shells from them," the Kaimakam informed
me "but they have little luck". One of their shells fell upon
a tent, and bounded off, doing no harm. Others fell amongst a flock of
goats . . . All the women and children who were left are hiding in the palms
round Rigdalin; but it will be as it was before. Musa Bimbashi drives
the Italians away, and then the people come back slowly, and put their houses
in order, if they can find them. If not, they must go to the desert. So
the women and children suffer; but the fighting men are not at all affected" (The
Arabs in Tripoli, p. 310). During the 2011 February wars the Arabs of Regdalin
and Ejmeil had again attacked the Berbers of Zuwarah with rockets and missiles,
but the war once again escaped the scrutiny of analysts; and soon "foreign
agendas"
rained on them like hail, as we shall see below.
1969:
The issue of human rights in Gaddafi's Libya, regardless
of what had been said, is best summarised by the Libyan constitution itself,
which clearly states under Article 1 of Chapter 1 [The State] that “Libya is
an Arab country” and that “the Libyan people are part of the Arab nation.”
The reality, of course, is that the native Libyans are not Arabs. They are Berbers who
call themselves by the name Imazighen, and who despite being the natives
of Libya still campaign to this day for their full human rights, the right to
"identity", and the right to speak & write Tamazight --
denied to them by Article 2, which further declares that “Arabic is its official
language.” Hence, the first demand of the Libyan Tamazight Congress calls
for “The official inclusion of Tamazight constitutionally as part of the
Libyan national identity and national culture.”
Arab critics saw these demands as a product of colonial
cynicism, of foreign agendas, instigated to divide and rule, and was the subject
of a number of lectures and political propaganda(s) in Libya, and elsewhere,
in which one repeatedly hears that the Berbers are the "original Arabs". For
example, M. Mustafa wrote: “Regarding research into the modern ancestry of
the inhabitants of the North African regions, the colonial French-Italian-English
had concentrated on splitting and distinguishing between both races, the Berbers and
the Arabs." Then
he goes on to add that. "We write history on the basis of Libya being
part of the Arab world.” (History of Libya, p. 95, translation from Arabic.)
[As listed below, the "official" position
of the Berbers in Gaddafi's Libya has not yet changed in today's
NTC's Libya. The national one has.]
1970s:
Sifaw: the poems and works of
the Libyan poet and scholar Said
Sifaw Almah’rouq, from the Berber town of Jado (Fessat'u), in Nafousa Mountain,
had similar effects in Libya to those produced by the Berber Algerian scholar
Mouloud Mammeri, whom he met in 1971. Sifaw's work included a number of studies
about Tamazight grammar, language, and Berber mythology, especially his “Midnight
Voices”, a collection of fifteen Berber myths, in which he said, as I would translate:
“How can I rescue and preserve an oral tradition much hated and considered
a kind of superstition by its people?” His work was circulated (underground)
in Libya across the Nafousa Mountain, Zuwarah and Tripoli, while some of it was
published in Libyan official newspapers and cultural periodicals. He was so influential
and unusually diplomatic [to perfection], where when most Libyan intellectuals
being thrown from one prison to another he was invited by Gaddafi for private
sessions to talk and "gossip" about Libya and Libyan affairs. Even
during the arrests that followed (see below) Sifaw was judged innocent when
others were executed. This is not to say he was in agreement with the regime
in any way, but to the contrary
he was a stern Berberist afraid of absolutely nothing, and
a true genius and natural leader, who eventually paid the usual price of pride
and freedom. Fifteen years after Sifaw's tragic death, the Libyan Government
attempted to put pressure on the Moroccan government to block a lecture about
one of Sifaw's books on the 18th of June 2009. During the last difficult years
of his tragic life Sifaw spoke of two kinds of colonialism: "modern
colonialism" and "ancient
colonialism".
Ossan (Ussan): Berber activists
from Nafousa Mountain (Yefren) began circulating one of the first Berber publications
in Libya. The magazine was distributed secretly, from hand to hand. The magazine
continued throughout the 1970s and early 1980s, after which many of its members
fled Libya to live in exile. The magazine now can be accessed through its
website:
http://ossanlibya.org/.
1971:
In his speech on Berber tribalism and Libyan Berberism in
August 1971, Gaddafi had declared that those who did not believe the Berbers
are "the true and original Arabs" are “liars", and that
the language called the Berber language is a Himyaritic Language --
very much like what the IRCAM's agent was reported to have said last year in
Yemen.
John Wright has rightly replied: “He may have meant 'Hamitic',
but as it is, the philologically false but politically attractive implication
that the Berber language is south Arabian in origin stands attributed to him
. . . it would seem that ethnology, like history and philology, could be suitably
amended for political ends to force all Libyans into the 'Arab' mould. The fact
nevertheless remains that the Berbers are indigenous North Africans, while the
Arab . . . first arrived only in the seventh century AD (Libya, p.
198)".
1973:
The rise of Berberism in Libya in the 1970s was felt by the
new government as a dangerous movement that required an action. On the 15th
of April 1973, young, energetic Gaddafi stormed the Berber coastal
town of Zuwarah to deliver his historic speech, in which he openly attacked the
Berber identity as "the enemy of the revolution", and subsequently distributed
weapons to the Arab people in his “weaponising the people” program.
[The
people are well armed now; as if the consequences of one operation come to light
only at the next one!] The Berbers were baffled, while bemused behind
closed doors, by the harsh comments made by the self-styled "Brother",
as they felt they are as true Libyans as all other Libyans, if not the natives,
and as they did not understand why their language and identity came to be
so much the enemy of others.
Even though many Berbers (and Arabs), from various tribes,
had then supported Gaddafi, albeit they had no other option, they saw no harm
in speaking their language. They did not know if they had to abandon their eyes,
ears and legs too. The first thing Gaddafi did was to change the name of
Zuwarah to “al-Niqat al-Khams” ('The Five Points'), in commemoration
of the five declarations he announced in that day in Zuwarah, since he thought
the name itself is anti-revolution (meaning anti-coup). Berber names
are dangerous names. He later renamed "Nafousa Mountain" "The
Western Mountain"; and "Libya" the “Libyan Arab Jamahiriya
al-Shaa'biyya al-Ishtirakiyya al-O'thma”, effectively declaring Arabs as
the only people officially recognised in "revolutionary" Libya. Makes
one wonder why the Berber name "Libya" was to escape the revolution,
and how many kinds of revolution there are!
Ever since, whenever a chance came his way he verbally attacked
the Berbers and the Berber identity as a relic of imperialism, instigated to
divide and rule the Arab world. In one speech, he said:
"Berberism, what is Berberism; there is no Berberism"; and
in another he said "Berber language is the original Arabic language"
-- something the Berbers were shocked to hear since what he meant is rather the
opposite.
However, it emerged later that the government's open suppression
of the Berber rights in Libya had achieved the opposite objective, namely increasing
awareness amongst the Berber populations of their true identity, as Gaddafi's
speeches echoed across Libya, year after year -- a kind of free publicity campaign,
where the Berber question was popularised into a national issue. Identical events
were also taking place in Algeria after Bommedien's Arabisation campaign, started
four years before the arrival of Gaddafi.
1975:
A group of Berber activists from Zuwarah (Tamort) began to
take a more active role in the movement when they challenged the severe repercussions
and began distributing Berber publications and music tapes and records (imported
from France, Algeria and Morocco) in Zuwarah and Nafousa Mountain. Some members
of the group had also formed a music band and began singing in Berber language
in wedding parties and other social occasions for the first time in the history
of Zuwarah, just as many of the big Berber bands began their careers. The group
had contacts with other activists in Jado (including Sifaw), Nalut and Yefren.
Most members of the group left Libya to live in Europe and America, with the
aim of continuing their work in exile. They formed a cultural association and
produced a few editions of a magazine; but were quickly separated by differences
and swallowed by the harsh economic reality of the West, as they lacked funding
and support.
1980:
Zuwarah, Yefren, Jado: on
27 April 1980 the Libyan government had declared that any Libyan living
abroad who did not make arrangements to return to Libya would be "liquidated".
On the 28th of April the official newspaper al-Zahaf al-Akhdar ('The
Green March') stated that the programme of "physical
liquidation" had
begun. It warned that families of those Libyans who did not return from exile
to Libya would face reprisals." A number of Libyans began to fall victims
of the assassination program across Europe and the Middle East, and yet Libya's
diplomatic relations with these countries remained largely unaffected. To the
contrary, the British later said Gaddafi was a "great statesman" --
probably for completing the duty he was installed to execute. The
. . .
1981:
Berber Political Party: in 1980,
forty Berber citizens from Zuwarah, Jado and
Yefren were arrested and accused of forming a Berber political party. It was
reported that members of this party (or group) visited Algeria, where they met
with other Berber activists and scholars. "We returned to the mountain
with books and cassette tapes of Amazigh music”,Yusef Hefyana
recently said. They were brought before a revolutionary government court, charged
with "Berber Activism", and sent to jail
in 1981: three were executed, Said Sifaw was
proven innocent, and the rest were sentenced to between ten years and life imprisonment.
Some prisoners were released in 1988, after the government began to seek wider
public support in a corrupt and demoralised country. Their names are:
Saa'eed Sifaw Almah’rouq (Sifaw)
Yusef Saa'eed H'efyana
A'umran Busa'ud
Emh'emmed Lea't'er
Khaled Fedis'
Sliman REmd'an El-A'ezzabi
A'ali Eshshuri Ben T'aleb
Salem Musa Bari
A'umer Saa'eed Ismaa'il
Sasi Khlifa Sasi
Salem A'ali Salem
A'isa Khlifa A'isa
A'ali Salem A'ali Salem
A'ali Milud A'ali
Eshsharef Muftah' El-hemmali
Ah'med Mah'mud Ez-Zwawi
Abu Al-Qasem Saa'eed Maa'toug
Ah'med Khalifa Al-h'emdani
Ah'med Salen A'emran
Ah'med A'ali Salem
Ah'med A'ali Maa'toug
El-Hadi Sliman Henshir
Miluud Musa Madi
Bulqasem Musa Buqs'is'a
Musa Yusef EshShawesh
Sliman A'umer Khlifa A'umer
Salem Khlifa Gela'awi
Sliman Budeyya
A'ebdalla A'isa Budeyya
A'isa A'ashur Yah'ya Budeyya
Ett'taher Salem Saa'eed Budeyya
Sliman Bukhris' Budeyya
Nuri Ah'med Eshshuri
Ah'med Eshshuri
Muh'emmed Saa'eed Musa
A'umer A'eyyad Eshshemmat'i
A'ebdalla Khmis' Sliman Eshshemmat'
Yah'ya A'umer BEn Saa'eed
A'isa Salem Ah'med Saa'eed
Ah'med Salen Les't'a
Yusef Salem Saa'eed Zriba
A'ali Ah'med Bulqasem
Zuwarah: although any form of public protest is
banned at the time in Libya, in 1981-1982 demonstrations broke out in Zuwarah,
after the Arabs of a nearby village of La'jilat (Alajilat) attacked the Berbers
of Zuwarah. The initial confrontation started after a football match that took
place in Alajilat, around the 19th and the 20th of April 1982, but then it escalated
to bloody confrontation, with the Arabs using grenades, clubs, iron bars and
stones, injuring a number of Berbers and damaging their cars. When the wounded
began to arrive in Zuwarah, the residents were outraged and many more drove the
30 km or so to help those still trapped in the confrontation. Tension between
some Arabs and Berbers usually builds up over time, and then suddenly erupts
as soon as a confrontation of any sort takes place. The protesters in Zuwarah
carried slogans, saying: “revenge, revenge, Zuwarah we feed you with our
blood”, while the elders of the town took guns to the street and stood guard
on each side of the road, while others took the injured to the local hospital
in Zuwarah. This event was not reported then anywhere. The headquarters of
the so called Revolutionary Committee in Zuwarah was burnt, and it seemed that
the town was about to descend into chaos. 150 policemen were brought to Zuwarah
from the neighbouring Arab towns to help the security services keep peace
in the town, after the latter’s request to bering in the army was refused by
the Libyan government. The demonstrators were joined by people from all sectors
of the society, including older men (usually they stay out of such events), women,
workers, girl students, who were dressed in yellow and blue, and children --
a full public protest in which all Berbers were not afraid to defend the lives
of their sons. Such demonstrations were banned during Gaddafi's government, but
reason was unable to contain anger. Five people were arrested the next day, and
more in the following anniversary, by the security services.
1983:
Five Berber citizens from Zuwarah were arrested and tortured,
after the government began to realise that the cultural revolution of Zuwarah
is gaining popularity, as characterised by the widespread of use of Berber music
in wedding parties, and the use of Tifinagh Berber script in slogans and graffiti.
The prisoners were asked to:
Translate the Berber songs they sang in weddings and listened to in their
homes.
Explain the meaning of Tifinagh letters
littering the walls of Zuwarah.
Clarify if they knew "a Berber activist from Zuwara, who does not wish
his name to be here".
Say if they have any links with other groups in exile or in Algeria.
Name any friends they have from other Berber villages and towns in the western
Mountain of Nafousa?
It is clear from the above questions that the Libyan security
intelligence had rightly suspected larger coordination with other Berber activists
from Nafousa Mountain than they initially anticipated. But denial was not the
answer; if not the fuel to trigger bigger rebellions,
as some might realise now, and as others are advised to take a note.
1984:
In 1984, about 150 people were arrested in Libya, and a further 140 from Zuwarah
alone; several of whom were publicly hanged and shown in Libyan television; eight
victims were executed without trial, two of whom within one hour of their arrest,
and five of whom were Berbers; leading, shortly afterwards, to the burning of
the Crown Court building in Zuwarah. Some of those arrested before were arrested
again. Some of these names are as follows:
Sassi Ali Sassi Zikri, hanged on 03/06/1984 in Nalut.
Ah'med Ali Ah'med Sliman, hanged on 03/06/1984 in Nalut.
Muh'emmed Said As-Shibani, hanged on 04/06/1984 in Tamzin.
Abdel Bari Omar Mansour Fannoush Mijbiri, hanged on 07/06/1984 in Jalu.
Ferh'at A'emmar H'aleb, hanged on 10/06/1984, Zuwarah: when the inhabitants
of Zuwarah refused to sign his execution warrant, which the government was forcing
relatives to sign before the execution to make it appear as "the decision
of the people", the Libyan army sent its military fighter jets to bomb Zuwarah,
unless the inhabitants change their minds and sign the execution warrant. In
order to avoid the disaster, his family went around the town collecting
signatures for the execution of their innocent son.
O'uthman Ali Az-Zerti, hanged on 05/06/1984 in Souk Al-Juma'a (Tripoli).
Assadeq H'amed Ash-Shwiehdi, hanged on 05/06/1984 in Benghazi.
Al-Mahdi Rajab A'ebd As-Salam, hanged on 07/06/1984 in Tobruq.
1985: Gaddafi Attacks The Berbers Again:
On speaking about Berber Language, Gaddafi said: "If your mother transmits
you this language, she nourishes you with the milk of the colonialist, she feeds
you their poison."
1988:
Amnesty International Report: Collective
Punishment:
Amnesty International had reported in 1998 that: “In
March a new law came into force [in Libya] authorizing collective punishment
for communities deemed to have protected or helped those responsible for “terrorism”,
acts of violence, unauthorized possession of weapons or sabotaging people's power. Under
the new law, which also provides for the punishment of those who fail to report
such “criminals”, the authorities could cut off water and electricity supplies,
deprive villages or tribes of subsidized food, petrol and public services, and
transfer development projects to other parts of the country.”
Zuwarah suffered greatly as a result of this policy, where
the only desalination plant was out of work, which resulted in Zuwarah staying
without any regular water supplies for nearly 20
years. In addition to water, Zuwarah's main and only hospital was
closed down (purportedly) for refurbishment and redevelopment, but somehow the
project dragged on for years and years and still is out of service to this day.
Of course, many people believed this for awhile, but later it emerged that there
was a sinister objective behind the closure of the hospital: Berber women giving
birth had to go to the hospitals in nearby Arab villages, and therefore the birth
certificates of their children no longer carried "Zuwarah" as the "birth
place". Transferring the birth place to Arab villages increases the official
population of these villages while at the same time reduces the population of
Zuwarah. No projects or development of any sort took place in Zuwarah or any
other Berber town, compared to other Arab cities which enjoyed the wealth of
Libya on a grand scale.
And even though giving 500 Libyan Dinars as monthly benefit
for "lack of work" (and not for being unemployed) did help young people
to survive (on bare minimum), the effects of keeping them out of work for decades
had seriously impacted their morals and self-esteem. A persecuted state of existence,
discrimination, and a life of benefit without any regular water supplies or hospitals
is exactly what Gaddafi called "wealth is in the hands of people".
Two million dollars was what one of his sons spends in one single night on a
party to entertain his "high-class" guests in Casablanca. Gaddafi's
convoy reported a few years ago to drive through central Africa's villages, throwing
$100 notes out of the window, for the Africans running behind the convoy, hailing
the king of kings, to pick up.
1990 - 2000:
The Libyan secret service began interrogating parents in
Libya about their sons who were living in exile. One of the Zuwarah group had
his father called to their office in Zuwarah to answer questions about the whereabouts
of his son, but the father refused to go, telling them that he knew nothing about
his son. This wave of interrogation corresponded with the rise of Berber activity
in Europe and in North Africa, culminating in the formation of the Amazigh World
Congress in 1995 (see below). During the same period, however, there were a number
of cases where Libyan refugees were forced (or tricked) to return to Libya. Seven
Libyan men were reported to have been forcibly returned to Libya from Jordan,
and were arrested on 4 January 2000. Pakistan has also forcibly returned four
Libyans, who then disappeared in Libya. Amnesty International has documented
a number of cases of Libyan refugees returned to Libya, where they were arrested.
On 17/09/2950, the Libyan Tmazight Congress (Agraw
A’Libi N’Tmazight: ALT) was established
to demand the protection and developing of Tamazight cultural identity. The name "Libyan
Tmazight Congress"
(ALT) clearly shows the original feminine name "Tamazight", but years
down the line, it has been patriarchalised as "Libyan National Amazigh
Congress"
(LNAC), also known as CNAL.
Trouble erupted again in Zuwarah and quickly turned into
bloodshed and car breaking in Ramadan 2000. Then all of a sudden, as usual, the
king of the kings Gaddafi makes the unexpected announcement: the Berbers can
“speak and sing”; and consequently the Berbers were
granted some minor rights, like the right to use Tamazight names for their children,
and the freedom to openly speak about Berber culture. The leader was up to something!
Berberism; that is fine; but
"congress"! But as before, the concessions did not meet the demands
of the locals, but nonetheless were encouraging (and certainly temporary) moves
from the Libyan government.
To prove it, the Libyan government arrested a local Berber
music group, from Zuwarah, singing in Tamazight, before they were sent to jail
for three months, after they were, confusingly, ordered "not to
sing". Other Zuwaran musicians were banned from travelling abroad
to attend Berber events, such as the Berber music festival in Tangiers, Morocco.
To celebrate his farewell during the February uprising Gaddafi developed his
slogan further and urged people to "sing and dance";
which they later did around his corpse.
With the rise of Internet activity across the whole of North
Africa, the Arab regimes of North Africa had finally gave up their fight to suppress
Tamazight identity. Ever since, people in Libya speak openly about the Berbers
and Berber culture without any fear, and sing and circulate Tamazight music just
as they do any other music. However, their political rights remained Zero.
2001:
Saif's Democratic Reforms: Gaddafi's
son Saifalislam was the man behind these reforms, as he had promised to transform
Libya into a new and democratic country, and open it to foreign investment
and tourism. Also improvements in movement across the borders, free trade zones,
and the media were visible and seemed to have had a good start. But conservative,
and perhaps old, members of the Libyan government had openly opposed his reforms
for democracy, and as a result the ban on Berber names was reintroduced again.
Ever since, events moved back and forth, with the Libyan government seemingly
unable to make a firm decision as to how to proceed; until the people took the
law into their own hands in February 2011, aided by the UN's authorisation, implemented
first by the USA's then by NATO's military might, to protect the Libyan civilians "by
all necessary means"; which effectively (or rather implicitly) was
interpreted as a "change of regime", since Gaddafi himself was
classified as a threat to civilians, and since the
"crackdown" on peaceful protesters (who had become armed by then) will
not stop until Gaddafi has gone, as the British Foreign Secretary had said:
as long as Gaddafi remains the threat to civilian life will not go.
Saifalislam
himself, as one British academician noted, took the wrong turn, and talked about
their plans A, B and C, in all of which he and his father will "live
and die in Libya",
and therefore a clear statement from the Libyan government that they will not
stop fighting until they die; thereby bringing themselves under the jurisdiction
of the UN manDate. Most of the work was done in the mandate itself, and the rest
was done from the air during implementation.
The academician, who met Saif while he was in London
studying "democracy", said Saif was met by two choices: reforms or
his father, and he chose his father. In fact, long before the February events,
Saif's reforms were flawed, or rather opposed by the older members of his dad's
government, and contradicted his calls for democracy, by any means, as violent
groups loyal to his Libya al-Ghad organisation attacked
the Berbers of Yefren and called Berber activists "foreign agents",
destroyed properties, and chanted anti-Berber slogans (see 2008 below for more
on this).
Neither the UN nor any other leader made any mention of the
Berbers' plight in their calls for Libyans to rise up for freedom, despite many
of them openly speaking about "Les
Arabes" and the "Arab Spring" -- marginalisation
at all levels, all the way to the top. When some of them were asked why the "silence",
they said they do not interfere in "internal affairs". Well,
no comment(s).
2001:
Tawalt ('Word'):
In 2001, the Yefren Berber activist Mohammad Umadi (Madghis)
set up the Berber website tawalt.com, in exile,
to serve the Berber "word".
The site is done in the Arabic script and therefore you need to know Arabic to
read. The website now has an excellent collection of Berber scholarly publications,
poetry recordings, downloadable books, and a number of unpublished manuscripts
of Berber scholars and poets to whom time was not so kind. Also it has an encyclopedia
of knowledge with entries covering most aspects of Tamazight language and culture.
After the attacks on Yefren by Saif's followers from
"Tomorrow's Libya", Umadi posted the announcement “Tawalt closes its
doors” on its homepage in February 2009, and noted that the site will go offline
by the end of the year. Users did not understand the situation in Yefren and
Umadi was not in a position to say much (at the time), since the home of one
of his relatives was also attacked in the Yefren events just two months earlier.
After the February 2011 events, the site is now back and with a new style.
In February 2005 Belkacem Lounes was invited by Gaddafi
to visit Libya. This raised eyebrows straightaway! Why should the government
isolate itself and stay out of the equation when it can bargain its way in and
even attempt to steer the wheel? According to Ossan (http://ossanlibya.org/?p=23256),
part of the (Arabic) conversation can be summarised as follows:
Gaddafi: I am not comfortable
with the idea of the Amazigh Congress because it has a "foreign agenda". Lounes: what is the evidence for
this? Gaddafi: the biggest evidence is the location of
your headquarters in france. Lounes: give us an office in Tripoli
to work freely and we will move in tomorrow.
. . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . .
. . Gaddafi: the Berbers in Libya are a small minority,
and if it comes to a referendum they will not win anything. Lounes: even though I know the
Imazighen exist in Libya, but we can go to Zuwarah and Nafousa to make sure.
As for the "elections" issue, I can tell you right now that we are
more than you sitting here in your tent, and if we vote for the tent we will
take it away from you, even though you are the legal owner of the tent; and so
legitimate rights cannot be voted for.
The Ossan article continued to relate that after this point
in the conversation the meeting came to an end, and the Berber delegate eventually
left the capital without reaching any solid agreement with the Libyan government.
The talks collapsed six months later, after the Amazigh Congress said it had
realised the real intentions of Gaddafi: to manipulate and control the congress.
Gaddafi failed to be a passenger, let alone be in the driving seat.
2005:
Saifalislam Visits The Berbers:
after the Libyan Amazigh Congress held its session in London, Saifalislam visited
a number of Berber towns to tell the Berbers that the Arabs are Berbers as well,
in contradiction to what his father had said in that "the
Berbers are Arabs as well". This confusion was in fact the objective,
some Berberists said, as the government was merely attempting to infiltrate
and divide the Berber movement in Libya, as the peace accords had achieved in
Niger and Mali.
2006:
Confiscation of Berber Land: on
the 3rd of September 2006 the Libyan government passed Law (215) of 2006, which
declared the foundation of Zuwarah-Abu-Kemmash Free Trade Zone in an area owned
by the Berbers of Zuwarah. The head of the project, now fugitive Saadi Gaddafi,
was reported by Berber media to have confiscated around 45,000 hectares of Berber
land, stretching 60 kilometres along the coast (between Zuwarah and the Tunisian
border) and 30 kilometres inland -- way pass Regdalin and Ejmeil. Berberists
from Zuwarah were notnot to react, protested about the true motives behind the
project, which they said was designed to Arabise the area of Zuwarah, and called
for the resignation of Saadi and the appointment of competent experts instead
-- competents who would consider the local population into the workings of the
zone and encourage local jobs and investment including the use of Berber language
within the zone. Legally speaking Article (11) of Law 215/2006 says "It
is allowed to use English language as well as other languages, in addition to
Arabic, in all the dealings of the free trade zone", and therefore in theory
one can use Berber language (under the clause "as
well as other languages").
However, as anything else Libyan, the project
had never materialised, and today's NTC had already declared during the Liberation
Day (23 October 2011) that all confiscated land should be returned to its rightful
owners, and urged the Libyan people not to take matters into their hands and
instead wait of the law to implement justice. In fact "land
& indigenous peoples" is a global problem, disaster to say the least,
and it is no use insisting it does not happen in Europe, America, Asia or anywhere
else in the world where natives to be found. Is there?
2006:
Ban on Berber Names Lifted (temporarily):
In 2006, the ban on using Berber names in Libya was lifted after
Saif exercised his limited influence to introduce some reforms. However, as he
appeared to be in contradiction with the policy usually favoured by the conservative
circle of his father, the ban came into use later, before it was lifted again
in 2009, only to be reintroduced again shortly afterwards; and so goes the politics
of Gaddafi's government: total disarray and disorder, back and forth, promises
and reprisals, in a game that seemed to go on forever; eventually leading to
stagnation and death -- the ultimate re-form.
2006:
The Third Nalut Spring, Cultural & Tourist
Festival took
place in 2006. The first Nalut Festival, which took place in 1976,
was a great success and attended by several ministers from the Libyan government.
But then the events took the usual turn, and
the second Nalut Festival never took place until 2005. As noted earlier, there
was no doubt that the reforms did reflect "some" improvements, especially
after 2003 when the Libyan government began cooperating with the West, dismantling
its WMD program and restoring its relations with America. After the success of
the Berber festival in Nalut, the Libyan People's General Committee for Culture
later endorsed the festival as part of the cultural heritage of Libya. (See 2008
for a video about the festival.)
2007:
March: Gaddafi Denies The Existence
of Berbers: talking to Tuareg tribal leaders Gaddafi declared that no
Berbers are living in North Africa. Problem solved!
May: Head of Amazigh Congress Protests:
on the 3rd of May 2007, Belkacem Lounes, the president of the World Amazigh Congress,
wrote an open letter to Col. Gaddafi of Libya, in which he protested against
Gaddafi's denial of the existence of the Berbers in Libya, as well as he called
for all North African governments to commit to democracy and human rights. "There
is no worse colonialism than that of the pan-Arabist clan that wants to dominate
our people", Lounes wrote.
Libya Wikileaks Files:
A list of various Wikileaks files relating to Libya: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/wikileaks-files/libya-wikileaks/
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/wikileaks/8305559/WikiLeaks-US-embassy-cables-map.html
According to the document, the Libyan government complained
about the "unacceptable interference" by the US government in Libya's
internal affairs. "In March, Post informed
the GOL [Government of Libya] that an Emboff planned to travel to Zuwara (the
unofficial capital of Libya"s Berber community located approximately 100 km west
of Tripoli) to meet with local officials to discuss Libya"s Berber heritage.
On April 1, MFA Americas Desk Officer Muhammad Ayad convoked A/DCM and Poloff
to deny the existence of any Berber community in Libya and to accuse Post of "unacceptable
interference" in Libya"s domestic affairs. All Libyans are Arabs who migrated
to Libya from the Arabian Peninsula approximately 1,000 years ago, he explained,
adding that no Libyans speak any language other than Arabic . . . He added that "this
issue (the Berbers) is too sensitive for us (Libya) to discuss". 5. (C) Ayab
also passed a diplomatic note articulating the GOL"s objections (para 7); he
called the next day to recall the first iteration of the note and pass a more
sharply worded version (para 8) that denied permission for Emboffs to
visit Zuwara and threatened that the GOL could not/not guarantee mission
personnel"s safety if they insisted on making the trip. The ostensible concern
was that members of the Berber community would be angered by the implication
that they were members of a minority group, an implication that the dipnote likened
to depriving them of their citizenship,
and could assault Emboffs. (Note: Emboffs have previously visited the Jebel Nafusa
area and Zuwara, where members of the Berber minority take great pride in their
distinctive ethno-linguistic heritage and take pains to tell visitors that they
are not/not Arab, prefer not to speak Arabic and do not inter-marry with Arabs. Zuwara
is widely known for reverse discrimination: Berber inhabitants,
who constitute the majority of the town"s population, insist on speaking only
the Berber language, even with members of the town"s Arabic minority. End note.)"
August 2007:
With the
fast Berber developments taking place in North Africa and Europe, Gaddafi could
no longer afford to distance himself from the issue. He needed to know what was
going on also probably attempt to sow the seeds of division. As a move that
many saw as an investigative step to gather information (and some say to infiltrate),
the Libyan government suddenly granted its first permission to the Amazigh World
Congress to host a meeting in Tripoli in August 2007. The meeting was said to
discuss education and social integration of Libya's Berber population.
September 2007:
To further bolster relations with the Berbers, the Libyan
Prime Minister al-Baghdadi al-Mahmoudi and Saifalislam visited a number of settlements
including Zuwara, Nalut, and Kabaw, apparently to revitalise Libya's historic
Berber heritage by pumping investment "promises"
in the economically deprived and neglected Berber region. The Society
for Threatened Peoples welcomed the visits to the Amazigh towns.
2008:
Nalut Cultural & Tourism Festival:
Alhurra Channel hailed the event as a new beginning for the Berbers
under Gaddafi's government and remarked that what before attracted the death
penalty has become a public event in which the Berbers celebrated their Tamazight
culture without any fear of persecution. The Berbers also
began speaking in the open about their Berber identity, using Tifinagh publically,
and publishing websites openly documenting Tamazight culture. Being on the main
route to Ghadames the festival had attracted a number of foreign visitors and
tourists in their way to the desert sites of Acacus and Waw Nnamous, and in fact
the festival became so popular that many tourists come to Libya specifically to
visit the Tamazight festival, as they did visit the Berber festivals
of Ghat and Ghadames farther south. Nearly 750 tourists visited
the event in 2005; 3000 in 2006; and 7000 visitors in 2007. The following video
shows Alhurra's coverage of the festival.
Watch Alhurra's report about
the Berbers celebrating their newly won limited freedom at the 5th Nalut Festival.
The Goals of Nalut Festival:
Presenting traditional Berber heritage of Nalut and Nafousa Mountain.
Encouraging local voluntary work among the young generations.
Preserving and restoring the Berber archaeological sites of Nalut.
Reviving the native Libyan culture and engaging the new generations to participate
in preserving Berber culture.
Encouraging and promoting local tourism.
Work towards establishing an International festival to attract tourists from
around the world.
Encouraging the revival and preservation of traditional Berber industries
and crafts.
May 2008: Gaddafi met with tribal
leaders from Jado on May the 17th to yet again contradict the reforms promised
by his son Saif, when he warned the Berber communities that: "You can
call yourselves whatever you want inside your homes -- Berbers, Children
of Satan, whatever -- but you are only Libyans when you leave your homes." Some
members of the Berber community were bullied into issuing a statement agreeing
with Gaddafi that the Berber call for freedom and justice is an imperial plot
to divide the Arabs. It was basically fear that forced some Berbers to make
such statements as they feared Gaddafi's reprisals, which everyone knows how
they can be. Similar statements of denouncing Berber activists as agents of imperialism
were also made by some Berbers from Yefren after the events they endured, as
described below:
December 2008:
The Yefren Events: on the 24th of December
2008 violent individuals from the Revolutionary
Committees and Libya al-Ghad('Tomorrow's
Libya'), a reformist group led by Saifalislam, invaded Yefren and attacked the
homes of Berber activists and leaders, splattered hatred graffiti on walls, damaged
properties and threw large stones including at an old woman's house, while beating
counter-protesters and chanting anti-Berber slogans in a frenzied attack on the
Berbers and the Berber identity. The violence and the intimidation were widely
documented in Youtube, reported by Tawalt.com, and leaked by Wikileaks, as follows:
WikiLeaks:
ID: 09TRIPOLI22:
Date: 1/13/2009 14:57
Published by The Telegraph, London, United Kingdom:
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/wikileaks-files/libya-wikileaks/8294907/REGIME-ORCHESTRATED-ATTACKS-AGAINST-BERBERS-IN-YEFREN.html
"On December 24, individuals from the Revolutionary
Committees and Libya al-Ghad (Libya of Tomorrow) descended on the predominately
Amazigh (Berber) town of Yefren, attacking the homes of Berber leaders . . .
[including] beatings of counterprotesters and property damage . . . On December
27, Berber opposition groups based in Morocco issued statements . . . claiming
that the predominantly Berber town of Yefren . . . had been "completely
surrounded" by elements of the hard-line Revolutionary Committees and members
of Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi's Libya al-Ghad organization on December 24 . . .
On January 1, the first evidence of the attacks appeared on YouTube, featuring
a man identified as a RevComm member leading a group of 40-50 protesters contained
by about 20 national police officers in light riot gear. (Note: Two videos are
available at youtube.com/watch?v=P_P0tV693Wk and youtube.com/watch?V=YKzsQnl1im4.
End Note.) . . . The Berber website tawalt.com reported that protestors called
Berber leaders "treasonous traitors" and called for their deaths .
. . RevComm and al-Ghad members, joined by local police, initially targeted the
homes of Berber leaders Salem Madi (a close relative of Madi's), Imhemmed al-Hamrani
and Isa Sijouk. Other homes and businesses were subsequently targeted as well.
Madi and Hamrani had both been arrested previously in connection with their roles
as leaders of the Berber community, most recently after they attended a World
Amazigh Congress in Meknes, Morocco October 31-November 2, 2008." Read
the full report at
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/wikileaks-files/libya-wikileaks/8294907/REGIME-ORCHESTRATED-ATTACKS-AGAINST-BERBERS-IN-YEFREN.html
The Libyan Government attempted to put pressure on
the Moroccan government to block a lecture about a book written by the
Libyan Berber poet Sifaw on the 18th of June 2009.
August 2009:
In August 2009, the “Gaddafi International Foundation”
invited leading representatives of the “World Amazigh Congress” to discuss and
exchange information regarding the Berber’s situation in Libya. The UN (HRC)
welcomed the move, and said many Berbers "appreciated that the authorities
recently allowed the display of Amazigh signs at government-sponsored event."
(See the provided in the following entry: November 2010.)
18 November 2009:
On the 18th of November 2009, Khalid Zerrari (the
Vice-President of the “World Amazigh Congress”) was refused entry to Libya at
Tripoli International Airport. The reason for the intended visit was to attend
the funeral of Mohamed
Amrani -- a Libyan member of the Federal Committee of the World
Amazigh Congress.
Rights of Tamazight Community: the world report explores the current situation
of the Berbers in North Africa.
"The Amazigh (Berbers), Libya's main cultural and
linguistic minority, face discrimination and harassment by security officials.
Libyan authorities do not allow schools to teach, or media to use, the Amazigh
language. Libyan law also bans use of non-Arab Amazigh names on all official
documentation. In January Colonel Gaddafi criticized Amazigh New Year celebrations
as un-Islamic and not recognized by the state, saying they disrupted national
unity; an Amazigh organization reported that at least two people had been arrested
in connection with trying to organize celebrations. The Amazigh website Libya
Imal was among those blocked by authorities in January. In August Internal Security
officers arrested Amazigh activist Ali Abu al-Seoud and detained him incommunicado
for eight days in connection with his online writing on Amazigh rights. They
released him without charge."
Right from the start of the National Transitional Council
in Benghazi, the NTC declared that new Libya would be for all ethnic groups of
the Libyan society, and promised "minorities" their full rights,
but without explicit mention of the forbidden appellation 'Berber'.
'The draft manifesto included references to "minorities', 'ethnic groups',
'ethnicity' and the like, but it never specifically talked about the tabooed "Berbers".
Moreover, there were two versions of the vision, with the second containing some
"sensitive" language-based changes. The first version of the vision
published by the NTC can be read at ntclibya.org/arabic/vision-of-libya/;
while the second version of the vision at http://www.ntclibya.com/InnerPage.aspx?SSID=60&ParentID=37&LangID=2.
Both visions are undated, but they are published in 2011. Please note that most
of the statements, laws and declarations announced by the NTC are dated, but
only a few of them (including the election law) are undated.
For example, the red-coloured words in the first
vision were removed from the second:
"فهي دولة تحترم حقوق الإنسان ومبادئ وقواعد المواطنة وحقوق
الأقليات والفئات المستضعفة فالإنسان في ظل دولة المؤسسات والقانون ، مخلوق حر طليق
يتمتع بكل ميزات المواطنة بغض النظر عن اللون أو الجنس أو اللغة أو الاعتقاد أو
العرق أو الوضع الاجتماعي"
Translation: "Libya is a
country that respects human rights, the principles of nationality, the rights
of minorities and the weak, and that a human under the law is a free "creature" enjoying
all [or the full] advantages of citizenship regardless of
colour or race or language or belief or
ethnicity or social status."
Here is what the second and modified version of the vision says:
"ولكل فرد التمتع بحقوق المواطنة الكاملة بغض النظر عن اللون أو الجنس أو
العرق أو الوضع الاجتماعي." Translation: "Every
individual has the right to enjoy the full rights of citizenship regardless of
colour, race, ethnicity or social status."
The red-coloured word, namely "language" (which
in practice and reality refers to Berber language more than anything else), was
removed completely from the second version published at their official website.
Why? The above Article of the "vision" guarantees the Berber and other
languages: "the full rights of citizenship", which in
practice would make Berber language 100% equal to Arabic and thus its "implied" official
recognition -- which later (in their Constitutional Declaration) the NTC has
denied to the Berbers, and those who demanded such just rights were advised to "disappear" or
else "integrate".
The Constitutional
Declaration published on the 3rd of August 2011 did resolve this "dilemma"
(or problem, some would say) by considering "all other in Libya
as national languages", but not "official" as it did with Arabic;
and therefore the "loophole" that could
have allowed the Berbers an official status was categorically closed.
This means that the original intention of the NTC for some reason was changed
later to block the automatic right of Berber language for "full citizenship".
If it was left as they initially promised in their original vision then the Berbers
can press for "full
rights of citizenship" (which
naturally includes 'Berber Nationality'); but the later change and the intentional
mention of "national
language" in the Declaration ensure nothing goes beyond
"national" recognition. Whether it was a genuine mistake by the early
NTC or an intentional modification, one cannot tell, but the difference is clear,
and as pointed out by the Guardian (London, UK) the Constitutional Declaration
seems to have been influenced by planning advice from the UN, the US and the
UK (http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2011/aug/22/libya-government-post-gaddafi)
!
Other words and phrases that were also changed between the
two versions, coincidently some of which are found in the same paragraph, include "والانغلاق
الثقافي"
('cultural closure'), which was changed to "والعزلة الثقافية"
('cultural isolation') -- clearly different from the first because the first
phrase implies reasons of "cultural protection" by keeping one's identity "private" against
imposed "integration" (as stated by Human Rights Declaration of Indigenous
Peoples), like the fact that the Berbers do not intermarry with Arabs, which
the Berbers see as a natural right while some Arabs (but not all) regard as "exclusion" and
even "racism". While the modified second phrase regards the whole matter
as no more than unnecessary "isolation". The Berbers do not seek isolation,
but to the contrary their demands were clearly calling for "inclusion" into
the fabrics of the Libyan society as dignified as any other Libyan. They are
the natives of Libya, after all. (See our Libya page for more on the NTC.)
03 August 2011:
Tamazight ('Berber Language') as an Official Language?
The NTC's "Constitutional Declaration" openly excludes
the official status of Berber Language. On the 3rd of August 2011, the NTC has
issued a 37-point interim "Constitutional Declaration" to provide a
framework for the transition to an elected government, and to call for a constitutional
assembly within eight months. Here is the translation
of Article (1), in which Arabic is again the only official language:
"Libya is an independent and democratic country,
in it people are the source of power, its capital is Tripoli, its religion is
Islam, Islamic Sharia is its primary source of legislation, and the country pledges
the freedom to practice religious ceremonies for non-Muslims, and its official
language is The Arabic Language, and the country Libya guarantees the cultural
rights for all the components of the Libyan society and their languages are considered
national languages."
Reading through these words one senses the article was drafted to please the
minorities of Libya, rather than give them their full "constitutional" rights
and acknowledge them equally as one of the official peoples of Libya. It says
they can practice their cultural rights, but what about recognising them first
as
"human beings" who have their own "Identity", which both
Gaddafi and Algeria attempted in vain to Arabise? Why cannot both languages be
equal and equally recognised in New Democratic Libya? The NTC recently, speaking
to its European partners, said Libya will be a model of democracy in the whole
region and that its democracy will be similar to the kind of democracy that exists
in Europe. Well, they could start at home, and only time will tell, as people
need to see and enjoy not hear democracy. However, one cannot resist the temptation
to ask: how many kinds of democracies are there out there? As far as most
people know, there is only one democracy : 'people's
government'. New Libya
should be 100% democratic and its government should represent all the people
of Libya; otherwise the tens of thousands of Libyans who died have died in vain
and not for democracy. All Libyans should put their differences aside and work
together for free and democratic Libya that is fully inclusive of all Libyans.
But downgrading a language to a national status indicates
the language is not indigenous to that country, as in nationalising a
foreign company, or, as one Berber recently commented, foreigners who had acquired
Libyan "nationality" in recent years cannot be compared
with Berbers who had been in Libya for thousands of years. This means that nationalising
something or someone usually indicates the foreign nature of that something or
someone. Fair enough; "but they are not aliens", the Berbers say.
In principle therefore speaking of "minorities rights"
and "protection of minorities" makes the Berbers feel alien in their
own home and more so feel like they were living in a "conservation camp",
where tourists can flock in to have a glimpse at the fast-dying ancient clan.
Minorities all over the world, basically, are humans, dignified humans at that,
and they should have full human rights including the right to self govern as
stated by the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, if
they choose so.
The Imazighen of Libya, and of North Africa, do not
seek the "right" to use their language, and are well capable of "protecting" themselves
and their language(s), as they did for at least 50,000 years (or so). But what
they are foremost fighting for is the constitutional recognition of their "Identity",
which naturally includes the recognition of their Berber language Tamazight as
one of the official languages of Libya, simply because it was in use in Libya
long before the Arabs arrived in North Africa from Arabia relatively recently.
Thus Imazighen reject the term "minority" and
instead demand from the NTC to recognise them as "people", as "Libyan
people", and as "the native people of Libya". What sort of norms
that call the "majority" Moroccan Berbers "minority" in
their own home?
If unprotected constitutionally a language may eventually
die. On average, one language goes extinct every week in this modern age, simply
because of democratic and totalitarian governments' open neglect. Berber language,
however, is one of the oldest languages on the surface of the earth. Libyans
need to be clear about one thing: there are so many countries in the world which
have a number of official languages without these countries being divided nor
ruled by imperial powers -- if they are not the imperial themselves. Democratic
countries usually declare a number of languages as official languages, if there
are that many, like in India where 23 languages are listed as official languages
in the constitution. While dictatorial countries usually dictate one language
( always the ruling language) and downgrade all others (often the indigenous
languages). And there are countries that do not list any official language at
all, like in America where the American constitution does not really specify
any official language.
1-5 August 2011:
Representatives from the Amazigh World Congress visited the
Berbers of Nafousa Mountain between the 1st and the 5th of August 2011, in support
of the Berber uprising in Libya. They were accompanied by Abderrezak Madi, a
member of the Libyan National Transitional Council from Yefren, as they visited
a number of Berber sites in the mountain, including communication centres in
Yefren, Jadu, and Nalut. Were they plotting to divide the world? No; they were
simply talking about recognition of identity, the smell of freedom, and life
with dignity and pride, in peace, of course! That was considered a crime before,
and only time will tell if that stays the same.
Open Letter To The NTC: the Libyan
Berber Congress (ALT: Agraw Alibi n Tmazight)
wrote an open letter to the chairman and members of the National Transitional
Council (NTC) and to the Executive Board on the 17th of September 2011, praising
the struggle of the Libyan people for freedom and calling for the official recognition
of Tamazight Rights.
The letter, titled (حول استحقاقات الحق الامازيغي في ليبيا
: on the merits of the Berber right in Libya), contained a 14-point
declaration outlining:
the current sufferings of the Berber communities which threaten their physical
existence and aim to Arabise their identity;
the Berbers' resistance to the tyranny of the old regime and hence were among
the first to rise up during the February Uprising;
the unity of the Libyan people regardless of race, language, religion or
colour;
the need to rewrite Libyan history away from "racism" and "personal
gains", as most of the injustices suffered by the Berbers were due to "an
upside-down reading of history";
the importance of the Berber issue as a national issue for all Libyans and
especially so for those who speak Tamazight ('Berber language');
individual and group rights are basic human rights and not "gifts" that
can be granted;
the Berbers' rights include cultural, linguistic, religious, political, legal,
administrative, developmental, educational, and media rights;
the recognition by all Libyans that the time for justice has come, at a
great price of sacrifice;
the constitutionalisation and nationalisation of the Berbers' rights is
a primary demand the Berbers cannot let go and will not bargain;
The Berbers' rights shall not be grouped with terms like "minorities" or
"majorities" as these rights are a fundamental part of any human society;
the Berbers' rights are rights of the Libyan people as a whole, since there
are no Libyan Arabs or Berbers Arabs, but all there-is is (one) Libyan
people who came to speak a number of languages;
mature leadership and recognition of the Berbers' rights is essential to
the stability of Libya, as pitfalls can yield severe repercussions and therefore
curtailing the freedom of expression ought not be confused with respect and
peaceful life with dignity and cooperation.
Interesting letter.
Watch Libyan Berbers singing the Libyan Independence Anthem in Tamazight
in Martyrs Square (previously Green Square), Tripoli.
http://youtu.be/3PIGv9AVh1M
26 September 2011:
First Libyan National Amazigh Congress:
“Officialise
Tamazigh language and support national unity.”
The First Libyan National Amazigh Congress was held
in Tripoli on Monday the 26th of September 2011. Political analysts commented
that the event signaled the first expression of Tamazight political identity
in the history of Libya. The conference was attended by a number of delegations
and journalists, Libyan academicians, Berberists, Belkacem Lounes (then president
of Amazigh World Congress), Fathi Benkhalifa (then head of Libyan Amazigh Congress),
and representatives from the NTC; in which the Berbers demanded constitutional
recognition of Tamazight from the temporary government of Libya (the NTC), in
support of the "national unity".
The debate was probably fuelled by the recently published
Constitutional Declaration of the NTC, in which only Arabic language was declared
as official while making no mention, by name, of the language "Berber",
else known as "Tamazight" by the Berbers. A Berber declaration emerged
from the conference, outlining a number of demands and clarifying the national
identity of the native population of Libya. They even criticised the NTC for
not including any Berber leaders in its temporary government which they self-appointed
among themselves. The organisers agreed to form committees representative
of the various Berber towns and villages to follow up their demands and recommendations
that were presented to the NTC regarding officialising Berber language within
the constitution, and called for Berber lawyers and law experts to assist
in formulating provisions and legislations in a legal document which then can
be presented to the interim Justice Minister for consideration into the temporary
provisions until the full constitution is drafted in 8 months time. That is they
called for urgent temporary laws regarding the protection of Berber language
to guarantee the Berbers their rights during the current transition period, and
argued that without recognising Berber language constitutionally the language
will have no legal protection.
We already saw in an earlier manifesto issued by the NTC
that its draft constitution will be subject to a referendum and it will be passed
if it gains a majority which may be anything above two thirds. The Berbers
certainly will not be able to reach this majority when it comes to voting, while
others argue that aggregating up with larger groups of men does not by itself
legitimise any cause, as pointed out by the President of the Amazigh Congress
to Gaddafi in the past. Hence one of the main points made by the organiser of
the conference, Mr. Fathi Salem Abu Zakhar, was that "Language rights
are not a matter that is subject to a vote . . . We want the government, and
the coming government, to grasp that the language is part of the Libyan equation." While
Salem Qinnan, a Berber representative of the NTC, emphasised that Tamazight is
a national language which the Berber communities will work with their Libyan
brothers [and sisters] to root firmly in the Libyan constitution.
Reuters (http://uk.reuters.com/article/2011/09/26/uk-libya-berber-language-idUKTRE78P4RJ20110926)
This is the problem: brothers and sisters. The moderate Arabs
and Berbers of Libya often speak of each other as brothers & sisters, and
that is healthy; even Gaddafi's son Saif attempted to grant the Berbers greater
freedom during his foiled & failed reforms, as for example when he allowed
them to use Berber names for naming their children - something that was denied
to them by his father and his old, conservative, dubious circle. Many Libyans
are very supportive and wholly agree that the Berbers are the natives of Libya
and should have their full rights respected. They have shown this during the
February uprising for freedom, justice and democracy. But there are some Arabs
in Libya who still seem to take liberty in stigmatising the Berbers to justify
their persecution under the pretext of national unity and thus miserably fail
to realise the historical truth and instead went on to denounce African Berberists
as agents of "foreign imperialism".
Speaking to one Berberist from Zuwarah one gets the impression
that the NTC has a sensitive task at hand, and surely it has, and for that we
should give it all the support we can, including our advice; and that the Constitutional
Declaration's omitting of the Berbers' official status is part of a long odyssey
through which the NTC hopes to diffuse the tension between the two peoples of
Libya and gradually introduce the Berbers' rights to the majority of Libyans,
who still oppose the move and who still see the Berber identity as a threat to
their theoretical unity. Whether this diplomacy is genuine or not, what the Berbers
had and still have to deal with is that they were made to have no identity
of their own, at all, and were only recognised to exist in relation to something
else, often secondary in nature -- for example, as agents of the west, or as
the following Libyan Facebooker sums it up: "what is it with the Libyans;
we got rid of Gaddafi and now we have the Berbers?"
Such expressions can only reflect the conflict and fear some people have within;
but history repeatedly states moderation is the key to life and extremism is
its dead end; and therefore the future for Libya is bright, full of sunlight,
free, positive and hopeful. The leaders of transitional Libya need to guide and
organise, not rule, the transition according to the will of the people they represent.
The time for Libyans to truly build a new, all-inclusive, and democratic Libya
has come. Gaddafi's oppression and contradictions have gone. Or
have they?
The constitutional recognition of Imazighen is a "Red
Line", Berbers say!
No constitutional legitimacy without Tamazight, protesters
say.
The failure of the first temporary government announced by
the former interim prime minister Mahmoud Jibril, which contained
names previously associated with the Gaddafi regime, had triggered the first
ever protest against the NTC when demonstrators from Mesratha took to the streets
and declared they will never be ruled again by anyone who served Gaddafi -- not
even with "one word". The long overdue second cabinet line-up, announced
on the 22nd of November 2011 by el-Keib, has created even more
protests than ever before. Protestors took to the streets in Benghazi, Jado and
Zuwarah, holding up banners saying: "down to the new government",
"No to a government of outsiders" and other similar slogans
that express anger more than anything. One Berberist noted that: "Our
people want . . . to know why we are being isolated. Our people fear that there
will be repetition of what happened during Gaddafi's rule".
A few days later, on Sunday the 27th of November 2011, hundreds
of Berbers peacefully stormed the prime minister's office in the capital Tripoli
and called for greater representation and constitutional recognition of their
Berber identity. Chanting "no difference between Amazigh
and Arab", and "we are the indigenous people of Libya; give
us our rights and we want them now", while waving Tamazight flags,
pushed their way past the security at the gates, before they were stopped by
the entrance to the PM's office. They asked to speak to the prime minister, who
appeared an hour later, wearing a cap in the colours of the Berber flag -- an
insulting gesture the Berbers say. How many hats has he got?
He tried to defuse the angry crowds with irrelevant rhetoric,
while avoiding to address their specific issue of recognition.
The angry protesters shouted back: "go home!", "go
home", while hailing empty cans, forcing the prime minister to flee
back to his office "within minutes" -- presumably the first
thing he did was to throw the "hat"
against the corner of his room!
When the protesters attempted to follow him, they were stopped
by his "ministerial guards"; leading to an argument but no violence.
The Berbers played a crucial part in the war for freedom from oppression and
persecution, and without the checkpoints at Wazin and Ras Ejdir the western part
of Libya would have remained 100% under Gaddafi' control. The Berbers were also
among the first to enter Tripoli and Bab Alaziziya, and their militias now control
several districts of the capital. In response, the local council of Zuwarah,
Libya's first elected council, has suspended relations with the NTC and withdrawn
its representative from the National Council.
There is no doubt that diligent dialogue is
always required to negotiate solutions and therefore suspending all relations
perhaps is a matter for the Berbers to vote for! Zuwarah's councils have no right
to make such euphoric decisions without consultation with the people of Zuwarah.
However, the head of Zuwarah's local council, Abubaker Attelloua', who signed
the document suspending relations with the NTC, signed another document on the
following day pledging support for and cooperation with the NTC. Like Nato had
said after the job was "completed with precision", Libyans now need
to resolve their own problems on their own. Some members of the NTC, on the other
hand, had accused the Berber protesters of being manipulated by foreign sources,
just like Gaddafi and others had said before them.
It was reported in the media that Fathi Turbil, the current
Youth Minister and the human rights lawyer whose arrest back in February sparked
the first protests for justice, has again sparked a heated debate among the Berbers
and the Arabs of Libya when he made "racist" anti-Amazigh remarks
and threatened members of the NTC who were calling for Tamazight to
be listed in the draft constitution!! A lawyer taking up the role of prosecution
to deny the defendant both: justice & freedom, because he was self-appointed
in the name of "revolution". For the sake of free speech and "lack
of definitions", one only needs to look up the definition
of revolution to know the outlawed truth! Other NTC leaders also made similar
remarks, which many Berbers came to see as "inflammatory" and "unnecessary"
at this critical stage.
(See http://ossanlibya.org/?p=21292 ; http://www.newstatesman.com/blogs/the-staggers/2011/11/amazigh-arab-libya-wail-public ;
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=t3qv62V_-N8 )
First of all, Libyans must realise
this is a "transitional government"
and not a permanent one, and should recognise that ministerial jobs cannot be
awarded for those who took part in the fight against the ousted regime -- even
though most of the fighting was done by foreign forces from the air. Indeed one
should worry if government posts are assigned on such merits. This means that
Libyans need to stand united and give the transitional government a helping hand.
All Libyans need to know that nearly all Berbers cherish the unity of Libya as
they always did. This Berber protest representing most of Tripolitania is also
taking place in Arab areas like Benghazi -- the spark that ignited the uprising.
Sebha also complained about their exclusion, and probably many more Libyan communities
felt the same but preferred silence for one reason or another!
But equally important the transitional council
needs to listen and take into consideration the issues troubling the population
they ought to represent; and therefore it is important that all major communities
in Libya are included in the transitional, temporary government (including the
congress) so that each representative from these areas can competently represent
and put forward the issues relating to their community. Why is this required?
Because the temporary government needs to secure the country, which they say
they cannot do, and restore peace to the hundreds of heavily-armed communities
from across Libya before they can do anything else. In order to disarm angry,
turbulent revolutionaries and peaceful protesters and bring the country
under just control, one needs to convince these people that there is really a
revolution going on, and that all Libyans are
now 100% equal before the law. All Libyans need to feel they are free and fully
recognised on equal terms in every sense in this "free Libya"; otherwise
they have no reason to stop protesting as they did before in February. Instead
of telling them "this" and "that", and all kinds of names,
give them their overdue rights and they will love you -- something most
leaders refuse to fulfil.
Freedom then was not a matter of voting, it was a matter
of martyrdom, they said. The Berbers "yesterday" were urged by the
NTC to pick up arms and die as martyrs when they were called "The Lions
of Nafousa"; but now, they are back to being "agents of foreign agendas" who
must lay down their arms and "disappear"
-- even though such decision one would think is for all Libyans to vote for and
not for one person to dictate. It is always okay for the ruling party to criticise
the persecuted part, but it is never right for the persecuted to speak out the "truth".
Libyans need to "wake up", before
they can
"rise up", accept the integrity of the Berber identity and respect
other people in the same way they seek the same respect for themselves. No one
can successfully argue against the principle of "equality".
Secondly, one needs to know that
the Berbers were wrongly criticised for protesting about not getting any ministerial
jobs, which is not true, since that was not the only thing the Berbers were protesting
about (see video below). Maybe some media outlets like playing with destinies
and editing selected stories to manipulate responses according to preconceived
objectives, as their critics say, but the truth of the matter is that the Berber
protesters' main demand was (and still is) the constitutional recognition of
their identity and language by the temporary "constitutional declaration" (of
August 3, 2011), which the self-appointed rebels wrote without any authorisation
or approval from the Libyan people.
The Berbers also say the NTC and the new government have
"deliberately excluded them". When the controversial
constitutional declaration was announced a few months ago, the Berbers protested
and complained (at all levels), but apart from Reuters and few others no one
took any notice of their legitimate struggle for freedom and an end to persistent
persecution. The Arabs of Libya need to understand (peacefully and with an open
heart) that the Berbers' case is different to theirs because the Berbers were
stigmatised and marginalised by all the previous governments of Libya, ending
with their identity itself being outlawed, as it is still denied to them so far,
and them being attacked as "sons of Satan" and "agents of colonialism".
All the recent manifestos, constitutional declaration, resolutions, press releases,
and interim governments are flawed, as they have miserably failed to recognise Tamazight language
& identity as part of indigenous Libya -- something they need to do
now rather than later. What excuses are there that are preventing these writers
from writing a few more words that will ensure stability and security in volatile
Libya? Well, it all depends on the "intentions"!
Thirdly, some critics replied
to these questions and issues by saying all these demands can be supplied later
once the new constitution is voted for by people and once the new government
is elected. But the constitutional declaration was already written and announced
by the NTC way back on the 3rd of August 2011, and therefore this does not make
any sense. No one has forced the NTC to write and publish this on the 3rd of
August, and in fact it would have been much better for the security of Libya
if it was not written in the first place, until, as they say now, a proper constitution
is endorsed by the elected government of next year. The NTC mentioned Arabic
and even other laws regarding culture and faith in its temporary constitutional
declaration but failed to mention Berber. The NTC should have recognised the
Berbers' identity on the so-called
"Liberation Day", but they did not. If this temporary constitution
is "nothing" and "transitional"
and the Berbers should wait for the final copy, then why bother writing it in
the first place? By mentioning only one language (Arabic) and not the other (Berber),
one is lured to worry about "hidden agendas" and "hidden
intentions".
Where is the wisdom to lead by example and secure peace? If
they had kept both identities out (Arabic and Berber), then the Berbers would
have had nothing to complain about. Many Libyans even asked the daring but simple
question: who gave them the legitimacy to write a constitution without consultation
with and feedback from the Libyan people they claim to represent? Is what the
Libyans feared during the massive wave of defections happening right now? Or
was it a staged operation to oust the previous and hijack the next? Both not,
we hope!
4: a very important point said
by another Berber politician (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Cu8G8rebNiU&NR=1)
was that the Berbers backed the NTC at the start of the uprising because
the NTC claimed it will represent all sections of Libya for justice and not just
for Benghazi -- not that Benghazi is happy now! And he added that the Berbers
make up nearly a fifth of the country and therefore they must be equally represented
in the temporary government simply because the new government will draft the
constitution (via the self-appointed 'constitution committee'); and therefore
the need for the Berbers to be included in this "drafting committee" to
make sure their rights, not demands, are represented. Quite a valid point, one
should agree. Article (30) of the NTC Constitutional Declaration
says people will be allowed to vote only "yes" or "no" about
the
"draft constitution", and that if only two thirds say yes then the
constitution will be approved. The Berbers were outraged, because they said the
matter of identity is not a matter of "voting", and that being a minority
they will never achieve any victory via this confused system of democracy.
The Berbers fear if they surrender
now and accept the current marginalisation then nothing will happen. They also
fear that if they accept this imposed "yes" or "no" system
and agree to voting, it would mount to no more than signing their own "marginalisation
decree". Some Berber activists have already called for boycotting the forthcoming
elections unless the constitution was amended to include them before the voting
begins; but they are advised to rethink their strategy because that might be
just one of the reactions they were lured to enact! Human rights are not a matter
of vote. Full stop. They are grounds for "revolution, the NTC and many others
had proclaimed!
Watch Umadi speaking to some protesters
outside the Prime Minister's office in Tripoli.
The YouTube shows mixed emotions, with one very angry protester (almost in tears)
accusing the current government of allowing previous regime loyalists to come
back via the back door.
http://youtu.be/CZP_6UxM0oU
The first demand listed by the first speaker in the above
video link calls for the constitutional recognition of Berber language & identity.
One speaker said the Berbers never demanded any ministerial job before because
they were promised the appointment of the new government will not be based on
personal relations and city assignments, but on merit and competence. But once
the new government was announced they were let down, they said. Many of these
ministers, they say, including the Prime Minister himself, were educated and
lived in the West and hence detached to a certain degree from the Libyan society,
its workings and its needs. Debatable point, but it is healthy to ask such questions
when basic human rights are denied in the name of revolution and at a cost of
30,000 Libyan slaughtered. Many Libyans, both Berbers and Arabs, from Zuwarah,
Nafousa, Mesrata, Sebha, Benghazi and many other Libyan cities and villages still
ask the same question: what for?
When the NTC was gathering momentum early on, it promised
to hold elections within six months; but then this was later changed to 18 months.
Wartime rebel prime minister Mahmoud Jibril warned Libyans
and their partners regarding the "dangerous power vacuum" which "foreign
powers might exploit" to their advantage, and called for full elections
within six months, instead of waiting until mid 2013. But he was also reported
to have singled out the Tuareg Berbers as Gaddafi supporters, which is not true,
because most Tuareg Libyans are against the previous regime and sincerely support
the fight for freedom and justice; and because his government was rejected by
Libyans because it contained so many ministers previously loyal to the ousted
regime. His remarks regarding Gaddafi setting up a Berber Tuareg country in the
south of Libya were seen by most Berbers as "inflammatory" comments
designed to create "friction". The Berbers generally feel that there
are those Libyans who are playing the "Amazigh Card"
against the "Arab Card". NTC's Ali Tarhouni also warned that 90% of
Libyans are still politically voiceless and unrepresented (Reuters.com/). Hopefully,
establishing contact with all Libyans and representing their needs equally will
lead to positive dialogue and cooperative approach to guide Libya out of its
darkest period in history. Otherwise back to square one.
Why take things out of proportion at this volatile stage
when simple recognition of identity is the "magic word" ?
First of all, Libya needs peace and all Libyans need to know
that only peace can defeat war. But Libyans have a problem to effect "diligent
dialogue", and that is "lack of definitions", "lack of understanding" and "lack
of democratic experience", resulting from the various dictatorships imposed
upon them -- always by force, of course. "Words" no longer mean what
they mean, terms occasionally hijacked to meet political ends, transparency is
invisible, and some media stories edited to achieve desired public opinions.
Berber protesters during the revolution were rightly hailed "revolutionaries" and "lions
of Nafousa", but now they were sent back to being the "agents of foreign
agendas". Why this sudden and sad change when the people remained the same
and still are "shaken", "disoriented", and "healing
their deepest wounds"? There is no need to condemn "protesters" because
without protests many of these defected leaders would have remained loyal to
Gaddafi, and therefore "protesting" is a healthy sign of democracy
the NTC ought to encourage and respond to positively.
In theory, the NTC did welcome the protesters' cries for "transparency", "published
policies" and "equal representation in the transitional government".
But in practice, whenever Libyan revolutionaries and ordinary citizens demonstrate
or protest, they were labeled by all sorts of names, including "sleeper
cells" (still loyal to the old regime of Gaddafi), "agents to sabotage
the revolution" (just like Gaddafi had said before), and, of course, the
historic "agents of foreign agendas" (used by various dictators to
suppress the voices of their own people). Tens of thousands of protesters took
to the streets of Benghazi, whom we all know they are not Berbers, demanding "transparency" and "clear
policy" from the NTC among other things.
All Libyans need to know that the Berbers fully support the
NTC and what it represents, as they have always called for justice, freedom,
dignity and loving peace. The NTC must rest assured that the Berbers took a leading
role in the revolution and that they will continue supporting the "revolution" for "dignity", "independence" and "freedom".
This however must not be confused with revolution for "integration", "disappearance" and "inclusion".
Mr. Abdel Jalil in the above video does not provide any evidence
for the alleged foreign link between the "foreign powers" (presumably the
same as the foreign powers he cooperated with during the operation that saw at
least 30,000 Libyans dead) and the "Berber activists" (who have been
peacefully demanding no more than their basic human rights). Where is the evidence
for this foreign agenda?
Nonetheless, the honourable leader did make the inflammatory
and unnecessary comments, which everyone agrees serve no positive purpose. He
starts by telling his Berber brothers and protesters (mentioning Suleiman Dogha
by name) that "in Libya we have three authorities: judicial, legislative
and executive, and that the highest judicial post was given to the Amazigh [Imazighen]." This
is a reference to the appointment of judge Kamal Dehan, a Berber from Zuwarah,
as the Supreme Judge in Libya. Mustafa Abdel Jalil visited Zuwarah late in the
evening of the 11th of September and thanked the people and the "revolutionaries" of
Zuwarah for their participation in the "revolution", and also informed
them of the appointment of Kamel Dehhan as the head of the Libyan High Court.
Secondly, Mr. Abdel Jalil, likewise Prime Minister el-Keib,
so far has managed to avoid speaking about the issue of constitutionalising Tamazight "identity" and "language" as
the primary cause of the protests, and instead easily criticised the ministerial
demands of the Berber protesters as "euphoric reactions" deviated from "the
path" and activated by "foreign political agenda" from outside
Libya (video, minute: 1:30). It would have been more reasonable if the
NTC came out, met the people, and exercised the benefits of democracy by explaining
to people the issues at hand. Cannot we talk first before we start arguing? Aren't
we supposed to walk before we run?
The NTC needs to, first of all, organise debates and conferences
across Libya to discuss what the Libyans themselves need and should do about
the Berbers and about the Arabs, as well as discuss all the other more important
issues; and only then one can find out what the people want, which the NTC says
is exactly its objective. They need to educate all Libyans about
all the real components of the Libyan society and learn to live with them, equally
dignified we hope.
One is tempted to wonder if this is a deliberate deviation
from the true cause of the protests to label the Berber "revolution" for
justice and freedom as a "separatist movement" that must "disappear",
or it was an error of judgment! For example, the Berber Tuareg of Libya, Niger
and Mali have been labeled as "terrorists", "bandits", "traffickers", "greens" and "slave
masters", when in reality most of them are just Berbers. Add to them the
Berbers of Nafousa and Zuwarah as agents of foreign forces and you have a complete
categorisation of the entire Berber tribes, like Gaddafi had said, as "enemies
of the revolution". What did they do or say to deserve this persecution
at this regional level? What did they ask for? Constitutional recognition of
their language and identity, freedom of expression, official representation,
sharing the wealth, etc. One would assume all these constitute proper grounds
for revolution, but ambiguously they do not when it comes to the Berbers or many
other indigenous peoples!
Of course, there is always the possibility of misunderstanding,
since the "definition" principle implies "Arab Revolution" from
the Arab perspective; the Berbers should not have a perspective of their own,
and should not have an identity of their own; and hence they should "integrate",
he says -- presumably "integration into another's freedom". A kind
of sub-freedom or semi-human state, expected from "good Berbers", who,
Abdel Jalil adds, are "his friends". But those Berbers who speak for "unconditional
freedom" (which his ethnic group Fully enjoy with the "aid of foreign
powers" and the implied UN mandate) must "disappear",
he says.
He also said they had meetings with "intelligent Berbers" over
the Berbers' rights and that only time will show the services "will be" provided
for them in the future; but those who are calling for constitutional recognition
and are manipulated by foreign agendas have left
the meeting room, and those he too says have "his
amnesty". Merciful mother knows most Libyans agree that those are "harsh
comments" that could have been avoided for the common good, and that addressing
the Berbers' and the Arabs' demands directly with them would have been the ideal
way to lead forward out of Libya's darkest period in history. What do you think?
This means that we now have been divided into two classes
of Berbers: "intelligent Berbers" (who will be rewarded later); and "foreign
agents" (who must "disappear") -- not an intelligent catalyst
to restore peace to a war-torn society. Why cannot the honourable Leader tell
his people right now what "services will be provided later to the Berbers" ?
Why has no one so far from the NTC had the courage to address the issue of "constitutionalising
Tamazight" in the open?
All Berbers are strongly urged to remain united with
their Arab and Tebu brothers and sisters, as they have always been, and resist
all attempts to divide. Libya must stay united for freedom and justice
(for all Libyans) and uphold the principles of the Uprising for the good of Mother
Libya. They must do this peacefully and only through "diligent dialogue".
If others would like to spread negative rumours about the Berbers then that is
up to them; they are free after all to express how they feel; they should not
be afraid to bring their fears to the open; they should be who they are, as that
is exactly what all Libyans want to see: to get to know the NTC.
The NTC leader also advised the Berbers to avoid "seclusion",
despite their "exclusion" by his draft
constitution, and despite the Berbers' main demand being "inclusion" in
the first place, which he refuses not only to provide but even to "talk
about". Apply the
"definition" principle to the above red-coloured words and the problem
the Libyans need to peacefully resolve begins to take shape. Why take things
out of proportion at this volatile stage, honourable leaders, when simple recognition
of identity is the "magic word" ?
Libyan Amazigh Congress "Born
Dead", says Dogha: in an interview with Libya TV, Suleiman Dogha
spoke some strong words about the current Berber situation in Libya, particularly
about the Amazigh Congress. The following video is in Arabic, but the main points
covered include the Berber flag, which he says the Arabs should not worry about
since all Berbers recognise the independence flag (Idris' flag) and that the
Berber flag only symbolises Berber culture; before he moves on to the main point:
the Amazigh Congress. He says the Libyan Amazigh Congress is associated with
Gaddafi and even took money from Gaddafi when its members were going back and
forth, but when it came to the recent government they failed to say anything
to represent the truth. Dogha also said the congress
"played on our blood"; is "one of the biggest Gaddafi's mercenaries";
and "was born dead", and as such he does not feel proud to
associate himself with the Amazigh Congress. Of course, Dogha himself was loyal
to Gaddafi and Saifalislam in the past, as documented in Youtube (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AOjESrnT104).
Dogha speaking about the NTC, the Berber flag, and elections:
http://youtu.be/cTR4qR3kqyA
Regarding the recent disagreement between the NTC and the
Berbers, he said that instead of accusing the Berbers of being agents of foreign
influence, the NTC should instead concentrate on granting the Berbers their rights.
It was them, the NTC, he says, who wrote the draft constitution and spoke about
respecting other cultures and therefore he asks: why should the NTC create tension
when peace and transparency were expected? He warns the Berbers to be aware
of the possible exploitation of the "Amazigh card"
during the forthcoming political elections, when ministers or candidates may
promise them their rights just to win their votes! Voting, he adds, should not
be based on "promises made now" and delivered later, but instead it
should be based on transparency and clear policy, and it is this policy he urges
the leaders to lay on the table! He also urges the leaders to constitutionally
recognise all the identities making up Libya and grant them their equal
rights. The TV presenter, Hassan, does not seem to realise
that the Tuareg are Berbers.
06 December 2011:
Prime Minister el-Keib speaking in Libyan Radio apologised
to the Berbers regarding the "racist" remarks made by NTC leaders in
that the Berbers being manipulated by foreign ideologies. He also apologised
for not including Berber politicians in his transitional government and promised
to look into the matter. As far as the Berbers and the Arabs of Libya are concerned,
the NTC is supposed to organise the movement for justice & freedom and represent
the "aspirations of all Libyans "equally".
06 December 2011:
NTC's leader Abdel Jalil addressed the local councils and
the people of Nalut in Tuesday the 6th of December, assuring them that Tamazight
culture and language are respected by all Libyans and that the Berbers need to "integrate" into
the Libyan society and avoid "exclusion" (الاندماجَ
في المجتمعِ الليبي، وعدمَ التقوقع). The Berbers have no intention of confining
themselves to seclusion or self-imprisonment, as they do not need to
integrate because they are already well integrated into the fabric of the Libyan
society for thousands of years. What they need is recognition, inclusion,
and human rights to live with dignity. What they need is for the leaders
to stop calling them "agents of foreign ideologies". They
have been excluded for so long by all the previous governments, and now they
are urged to come out of "exclusion"
without "inclusion". The Berbers do require their basic "human
rights"
not be confused with "respect". [http://www.libya.tv/2011/12/مصطفى-عبد-الجليل-يدعو-الشعب-الليبي-إلى/ ]
15 December 2011:
Libya's First Tamazight Song Festival: (15
December 2011, Benghazi): the festival was organised in association with Libya
Channel and Free Libya Association. Attended Libyan Berber bands include: Ossan,
Tindi, Ghasro,
and Mhamed Qlou.
Amnesty International: for a list of the latest
reports and updates about Libya and human rights abuses in Libya, please see: http://www.amnesty.org/en/region/libya
The first rebellion in eastern Kabylia took place in 1859
and continued until 1871: European colonisation without a doubt had caused great
pain and destruction in North Africa (and elsewhere). Being the majority inhabitants
of many parts of North Africa at the time, the Berbers strongly resisted the
colonisation of their countries, and history is full of accounts documenting
the Berbers' struggle for independence in Niger, Mali, Libya, Algeria and Morocco;
and therefore those Arabs who still claim that the Berber question is a manifestation
of the colonial 60s policy of "divide and rule" need to read
their own Berber history -- going back not decades, not centuries, not millenniums,
but millions of years when humans hardly spoke a single word!?
1920s:
A group of migrant Berber Kabyle workers formed a political
party in France, in 1926. The party called itself The
North African Star (ENA). It was founded
by Hajj Ali Abd el-Kader as a "secular" group aiming for "self-determination",
and was headed by Messali Hadj -- one of the founders of the Algerian national
movement. Both Abd el-Kader and Messali were previously members of the French
Communist Party (PCF). Among its founding members are: Imache Amar, Djeffal,
If Djilani, Belkacem Radjef, and Belghoul. However, Messali's objectives differed
from the original party's aims, as he called for "compulsory education in
Arabic at all levels", and subsequently the ENA was eventually dissolved
on the 20th of November 1929. Messali then went on to establish the Algerian
People's Party (PPP), the Movement for the Triumph of Democratic Liberties (MTLD),
and the Algerian National Movement (NAM).
1940s:
Taos Amrouche (Ṭaweṣ A'meroush):
Ṭaweṣ A'meroush, The Goddess of Kabyle Song.
Marie-Louise-Taos Amrouche (4 March 1913 - 2 April 1976):
a unique, Kabyle singer and the first Algerian female writer. The atmosphere
she conveys to the future generations is unbelievably powerful and "unique".
She was deeply influenced by her mother Fadhma Aït Mansour as much as by the
oral traditions of the Berber Kabyle culture. Her first autobiographical novel Jacinthe
noir was published in 1947, and her first album Chants berbères de
Kabylie, released in 1966, was a powerful collection of traditional Kabyle
songs that ignited the revolution. She was among the first Berber activists in
Algeria, and a founding member of L'Académie berbère in 1966 (or 1967)
-- an organisation primarily dedicated to documenting Tamazight ('Berber Language').
According to one Berberist, the Academy was created to "alphabetise
Berber language'. Lack of education in Tamazight is without a doubt to blame
for the Berbers' ignorance of their "true" history, as they were fed
various alternative systems of negligence, war and poverty. Poetry and music
had a major role in the Berber revolution, simply because Berber song is rich
in Berber history, struggles, mythology and "accumulative wisdom";
and therefore the poetry of Fatima Ait Mansour and her children Taos and
Jean Amrouche is one of the most contributing factors to the revival of Tamazight
in Algeria; further fuelled by the verses of Mouloud Feraoun, Ferhat, Ait Menguellat,
Idir, and of course, Mouloud Mammeri – the poet who descended from a line of
poets and directed the Centre for Anthropological, Prehistoric and Ethnographic
Research (CRAPE). Before the advent of the internet, music tapes and albums were
largely responsible for spreading the Berber awareness across North Africa; where
Berber music attracted the enmity of the local Arab governments. The popular
Algerian poet and singer Lounes Matoub was assassinated in 1998 for using music
and his mouth to express his manifested fears.
1949:
"The Berber Crisis of 1949":
The Berber crisis in 1949 is very similar to the Berbers'
struggle for freedom during the Italian wars in Libya, in that both were eventually
led to postpone their "identity" issue for the sake of "independence" or
"the national unity". Algerian Berberists recognised the need for a
democratic and true independence, while Arabists had "Arabism" in mind.
To pacify the Berbers, likewise the Moroccan Dahir, the French attempted to enforce
the same mashed-up customary-religious law in 1949, but both the Arabs and Berbers
were wary; resulting in rather similar fate. The Berbers' true ideals of "absolute
freedom" were hard to compromise, and so the conflict continued to this
day (2011).
1950s:
Mohammed Bessaoud was regarded as the spiritual father of
Berberism in Algeria, who fought during the independence wars between 1954 and
1962, and reportedly the designer of the modern Berber flag.
1961:
The Paris Massacre:
The details of the Paris protests remained hidden from the
public until 2011, when Yasmina Adi was shocked to discover the appalling repression
of Algerian protesters in Paris in 1961. Piecing together the missing gaps in
the official story, after gaining access to police and state secret archives,
Yasmina was able to tell a different tragedy -- almost erased from recent French
history. The new evidence was presented in a film, aired recently at the Dubai
International Film Festival in December 2011, and titled "Here
We Drown Algerians - October 17, 1961". The film retells the
story through the testimony of many Algerians who were dragged off the streets
by police, and uses images of thousands of Algerians held in detention centres
during the deportation wave that followed. When French Algerian protesters joined
the fight for independence and defied a curfew on the 17th of October 1961, they
were met by heavy police brutality, ordered by the Paris police chief Maurice
Papon. "Dozens of bodies were pulled from the River Seine."
Even though France said only 40 people lost their lives during the crack down
on peaceful protesters, Yasmina says the true figure may never be known, but
it could be 400. More than 1,500 Algerians were expelled. In an article
published by Reuters, Andrew Hammond writes:
"Adi took the title for the film from graffiti daubed
on a bridge over the Seine on October 28 1961 and caught on camera before the
authorities could remove it . . . She says France's unwillingness to offer more
public recognition of what happened in those days contrasts with France's championing
of Arab Spring causes such as Libya, which was taken up by President Nicolas
Sarkozy and Bernard Henri-Levy . . . "Sarkozy has said a few weeks ago why
should Turkey be in Europe? If you Turks want to be in Europe you have to recognize
the Armenian genocide. Before giving lessons to others, France ought to look
at itself in history," she said. "As citizens we should not allow
ourselves to be manipulated by methods, images, language, because they cross
time and governments take up the same methods and language."
http://ca.reuters.com/article/entertainmentNews/idCATRE7BF23A20111216
1962:
Soon after the so-called Algerian independence in 1962, Arabic
was adopted as a national language, and the first act of the ensued Algerian
Arab government was the suppression of Berber studies at Algiers University
in 1962. The Algerian FLN (Front de Liberation Nationale) called for
the unity of all Algerians including the Berbers during its long struggle for
independence, while later it was criticised for considering the Berbers the enemies
of the people. Similarly, Gaddafi's verbal attacks on the Berbers of Libya, including
the blunt declaration of the Berbers being the enemies of the revolution ('the
staged coup'), had without a doubt popularised the Berber question as a national
issue; further fuelled by the recent Constitutional Declaration of the new NTC
and its marginalisation of the Libyan Berber identity in August 2011.
1963:
FFS: Hocine Ait Ahmed: the traditional
Socialist Forces Front (FFS) of Hocine Ait Ahmed, also known as FSF, was established
on the 29th of September 1963, to oppose the one-party state and campaign for
the integration of Berber cultural demands in its political vision. He
quickly led a rebellion against Ben Bella (the leader of the new independent
Algeria) in 1963 and 1964, after which he was arrested and imprisoned. He fled
to France after his escape, where he lived for 23 years. Ben Bella was eventually
ousted by Houari Boumedienne in 1965, to begin his agenda: the Arabisation program.
Again, when Gaddafi was (also) installed four years later, he too began introducing
the word "Arab"
into the politics of Libya, as in Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, and turned the Berbers
the original Arabs. Hocine Ait Ahmed’s rebellion was considered by some to be
“The Swan-Song” of "Kabyle particularism", culminating
in 1974's “Larba'a n'Ait Irathen”.
1965: in mid 1960s, however,
the Algerian government banned the Berbers from issuing Tamazight names for their
children, and limited the transmission of the Berber radio to
four hours a day.
1970s: the Kabyle radio broadcasting
channel (Channel 2), whose existence was threatened several times in the 1970's,
has seen its status and role strengthened. The airtime has been increased and
dialects other than Kabyle were introduced in some of the programs (Shawi for
the Aures region and Mozabite for the Ghardaia region). The Berber radio was
later outlawed after the introduction of 1992 Arabisation Law.
1971: the government abolished the Berber language
courses at the University of Algiers.
1975-76: Berber students found in possession
of Tifinagh were arrested and sentenced to prison.
1977: trouble erupted in 1977
during the Algerian football championship final (between a Berber team from Kabylia
and a team from the capital Algiers). While the Arabs played their usual "Arab
national anthem", the Berbers were shouting: "a bas les arabes" ('down
with the Arabs').
1978: the Berber star Ait-Menguellat's concert
was banned.
1979: while the Arabs continued
to press ahead with the Arabisation program after the death of Boumedienne, the
Berbers began to protest against the movement, which they say aims to eliminate
their identity. Berber students at the University of Tizi-Ouzou organised a strike
to protest against the Arabisation program. The refusal of the Algerian Berber
Minister of education, Mohammed Cherif Kharroubi, appointed in
Chadli's first cabinet in 1979, to speak his mother tongue Tamazight was badly
received in Kabylia at a time when he could have had urged the government to
respect human rights.
1980:
The Berber Spring: (The Amazigh
Spring): the aforementioned student strike quickly spread to other schools across
the region, leading to the government crack down in April 1980. After Mouloud
Mammeri's lecture in Tizi-Ouzou, modern Algeria saw the first true Berber motivated
movement, where demonstrators were no longer confined to students, activists,
artists and scholars but also included people from all walks of life: labourers,
industrial workers, shopkeepers, children, women, and according to some sources
Arabs too. The Algerian national flag was publicly burnt at Oued Amizour, and
the sentencing of 21 people to between one and five years in prison soon followed.
This massive public participation has entered Berber history as "The
Berber Spring", commemorated thereafter in April and known as Tafsuyt ('Spring').
The Berber department at the University of Tizi-Ouzou was created in 1980.
1988: public protests and riots
spread in Algeria once more. The government responded with violence, when it
was preaching "peace initiative". More than 100 killed.
1989: MCB: the Berber Cultural Movement:
the political events that were started in 1988 in Algeria
led Berberists to express themselves more openly. Consequently, one was able
to distinguish between two politically organised branches, close to RCD or FFS,
and the “culturalists” branch made of activists who were determined to continue
their action in an autonomous way in the MCB or in the cultural associations.
The “Berber Cultural Movement” (MCB) held its first meeting
in July 1989 in Tizi-Ouzou, with the ambition to establish a
permanent representation of the “Berber civil society”. The MCB can be credited
for many large gatherings, such as a series of imposing demonstrations in favour
of the Berber language and culture including the one held in Algiers on January
25, 1990, several general strikes in Kabylia, and the general school boycott
in Kabylia (starting in September 1994). See the following report by the Immigration
and Refugee Board of Canada regarding the treatment of some members of the Berber
Cultural Movement by the Algerian government, at:
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/topic,463af2212,469f279a2,3ae6ac0f78,0.html .
RCD: the Rally for Culture and
Democracy (RCD) was established by Sa'id Sa'di (Said Saadi) in 1989, after
he separated from Ait Ahmed and left the MCB to form his own party. The RCD is
a secular movement that became a recognised political party by 1990, before it
declared its opposition to the religious movement in Algeria in 1991, which grew
in influence after the rule of President Chadli Benjedid came to an end in 1992.
This led to limited improvements in relations between the Algerian government
and the RCD, based on the saying: the enemy of your enemy is your friend.
In 1989 the popular singer and revolutionist Ferhat Mehenni,
in a joint declaration with the Berber linguist Salem Shaker, called for
the United Nation to supervise a local poll for the people of Kabylia to form
their own government and run their own affairs within Algeria.
1990:
Berber University: even though
a Berber Department was created at the University of Tizi-Ouzou in 1980s, Tamazight
Language and Culture Department in Tizi-Ouzou did not become a reality until
the end of January 1990. The goal of this institution was to set up a Master
level graduate program in Berber language. The official announcement of its creation
was on the eve of January 25, 1990. After nearly a full decade since the events
of Spring 1980, the Algerian Higher Education Ministry finally accepted the presence
of Berber (cf. Chaker 1989/90, chap. 9). One year later (October 1991), a second
Berber Department was created in Bougie. The late 1990s also witnessed the emergence
of numerous Berber groups, associations and websites, dedicated to reviving Berber
culture and the recognition of Berber identity and language.
1991:
Another important change is television. Since the end of
1991, there is a brief daily broadcast of the TV news in Kabyle and Shawi. Algeria's
public television network ENTV said it will launch several new channels, including
one for the ethnic Berber minority, but it will not open the sector to private
firms. ENTV plans to broadcast in the Berber language Tamazight and offer channels
dedicated to sport, information and youth in a bid seen partially aimed at trying
to reverse the Algerian addiction to French TV channels.
1992:
The Algerian government passed a law in 1992 to Arabise higher
education, but both Berber and French languages continued to be used; followed
by another law in 1993 to Arabise communications and government departments.
Civil War breaks out in Algeria, claiming nearly 200,000 lives by the end of
the decade -- "The Black Decade".
1993:
The Berber writer Tahar Djaout was assassinated outside his
home in June 1993. Wikipedia says he was assassinated by the GIA. Tahar
was a Berberist, journalist, and the editor of Ruptures. In its first issue,
January 13 1993, he wrote: "The year that has just ended saw freedom
of expression and democracy groping along, struggling with pain, stumbling, but
getting up once again and continuing to resist . . . After three decades of wandering,
of fragile construction, and of monumental blunders, Algerian society has come
to understand that everything has to be started from scratch, that we have to
rebuild it all on a more solid foundation. Mohamed Boudiaf understood this well,
and it cost him his life."
"Silence
is death: the life and work of Tahar Djaout", By Julija Šukys.
1994-1995:
After the school boycott in the Berber region of Kabylia,
lasting full year, the government began to consider the introduction of Tamazight in
Algerian schools. Some talks were brokered between the government and some of
its Berber allies, due to their united stand against a common enemy.
1995:
The High Commission for Amazighness
(HCA): after a school boycott in Kabylia in September 1994, the government
engaged in negotiations in March-April 1995 with certain factions of the Berber
Cultural Movement (the “MCB National Coordination”). The Algerian government
rejected the initial claim for the recognition of Tamazight as a 'national language'
alongside Arabic, arguing that would require a constitutional amendment which
was not part of 'the prerogatives of the government' -- whatever that means.
However, the authorities did admit the legitimacy of the Berber demand for the
institutionalisation of their language, particularly its use in education and
teaching; and thus “The High Commission for Amazighness” was created shortly
afterwards by a decree dated May 28, 1995. On the 7th of June 1995 the
president nominated the HCA to take all necessary initiatives and make any propositions
with respect to the teaching of Tamazight language, and thereby becoming the
first North African state to take such measures. In 1995, the Algerian president
L. Zeroual established an agency to introduce Tamazight in Education. Even though
Berberists were aware that the move was an "administrative spin" rather
than a recognition in law, and that the nomination of Mohamed Idir Aït-Amrane as
head of the HCA fully symbolises this aspect. Critics pointed out that the human
composition of the HCA also deserves scrutiny, as its leadership included neither
a single known authority in the Berber language nor a single known personality
of the Berber culture. Instead, the majority of its officers were representatives
of the state-related institutions, and generally little known activists selected
from similar associations. It was clear that the government’s concession was
to further divide the forces within the Berber movement.
1996:
At the beginning of the 1996 academic year, a decision from
the Ministry of Higher Education imposed the establishment of a licence degree
in Berber Language and Culture in the two Berber departments. However, Berber
experts had expressed their reservations, considering the fact that minimum conditions
to ensure a satisfactory training had not been met.
1997:
In 1997 the Algerian government passed a law banning the formation
of political parties based on religion and ethnicity; forcing the RCD to update
its policy to accommodate the new law.
1998:
To bolster the previous law of 1997, another Arabisation law
came into effect in 1998, stating Arabic language as the only official language
to be used in all the various government departments as well as in business transactions
and the media. The Berbers were outraged since the implications were inflammatory.
For example, the Berber radio has become illegal, and doctors were forced to
write prescriptions in Arabic. This led to riots erupting in the Kabyle region,
further fuelled by the assassination of Lounes Matoub.
The Berber Kabyle singer was a prominent Berber activist who advocated secularism
at a time when the religious movement was a source of serious concern to Algeria
as a whole, and criticised the Arabisation laws introduced by the government.
During the civil war of 1992, the religious armed militia (GIA) added Lounes'
name to its hit list of artists and activists. He was abducted in 1994, but was
released two weeks later, following a large public demonstration. In October
1988 Matoub was shot five times, and was hospitalised for two years, where he
received 17 operations. Almost ten years later, on the 25th of June 1998, Matoub's
car was stopped at a roadblock and shot at by masked gunmen, leading to his death,
and wounding his wife, Nadia Matoub, and two sisters-in-law. Within hours
of his death thousands of angry protesters gathered outside the hospital, leading
to a week-long violent riots and confrontation with the police, during which
government buildings and government-owned shops were attacked, and Arabic signs
were destroyed. On the 28th of June 1998 tens of thousands people attended his
funeral. Coming under pressure from various groups, the president Zerual agreed
to let a UN team investigate the incident.
ABM: the
Armed Berber Movement: emerged after the assassination of the Algerian
Amazigh singer Lounes Matoub. It was reported that the ABM threatened to avenge
Matoub's death and even assassinate anyone who attempts to implement the Arabisation
law, as it declared its total opposition to the Arabisation policy -- many called
“a new Arab conquest.” Their intention was made clear by the name chosen
to represent their organisation. The group was practically unknown before the
event of Lounes.
1999: Tamazight Will Never Become Official:
After long period of conflict and controversy, Algerians went
to the polls in April 1999. Out of the seven candidates only Bouteflika remained
in the list, as the others pulled out amid charges of widespread electoral fraud.
Obviously, Boutefliqa won! During his "peace initiative" tour, president
Boutefliqa visited Tizi-Ouzou on the 2nd of September 1999, and shocked the local
Berbers by announcing that not only Tamazight language would never become "official",
but also a referendum must be held before the language can be made "national".
The Berbers have always insisted that the matter of Tamazight Identity will never
be a matter of Arab voting, with some even saying Arabic was never voted in the
first place! Hence lucky politicians say: "we don't live in a perfect world" --
the world they made.
Eighteen-years old high school student Massinissa Guermah (1983 - 2001) was arrested
by the Algerian gendarmes on the 18th of April 2001, and three days later was
reported to have died of gunshot wounds inflicted by the gendarmes. Contradicting
explanations were circulated, including accidental shooting and arrest for attacking
a police officer. The gendarme responsible for the murder of Massinissa, namely
Merabet Mestari, was sentenced to two years in prison by an Algerian military
court, in November 2002. The relatives of Massinissa and tribal leaders have
condemned the judgment, and expressed their desire to see the murderer and his
accomplices (a dozen other gendarmes) tried by a civilian court. Although Massinissa’s
body clearly showing bullet holes, the gendarme responsible was only convicted
of “involuntary homicide and involuntary injury with a firearm”.
The event was received by the Berbers with wide-spread anger,
further fuelling their campaign against the Algerian government's Arabisation
program; ultimately leading to protests erupting in the region and in the capital.
The government issued its ban on all forms of public protests in Algiers. A major
and peaceful demonstration of nearly 10,000 people was organised on the following
day in Tizi-Ouzou by the MCB. Even though the Berber leaders urged demonstrators
to protest peacefully, violence erupted after the demonstrations quickly spread
across the region.
First to follow was Amizour (near Berber Bejaia), where rioters
set buildings and cars on fire, and then Beni Douala, where police responded
with tear gas and government gendarmerie retaliated with further arrests. The
wounded began to arrive at hospitals. Roads were blocked. The president spoke:
"promising" the Berbers constitutional and economic reforms, and acknowledged "identity
issues" are at the heart of the conflict (previously created by the Arabisation
program).
Statistics released in 2002 by the Algerian Human Rights League
reported 90 people have died and 5000 wounded, of which 200 became permanently
disabled, and thousands of arrests, torture and arbitrary detentions -- figures
that often come out of a war zone. And yet, "Algeria ecxperts" speaking
to Aljazeera in her Inside Story (in 2012) openly proclaimed the Algerian government
did not discriminate against the Berbers of Algeria. While the al-Arab newspaper
reported at the time that Algeria's banning of demonstrations, heavy policing,
and its determination to confront these “dangerous deviations” was in
response to the received public criticism for its relaxed laws towards the Berbers’
uprising; where Berberism was only proposed as "barbaric aberration".
However, the Berbers continued to press ahead with their demands and many more
people died and injured during the protests of the 5th October 2001. London's
newspapers reported that allowing troops to move against demonstrators was a
direct response “to a Berber-led anti-government march by almost a million
people last week in the capital.” On the 5th of October 2001, the BBC's
website reported that, “The Berbers have rebuffed a series of concessions
offered by the Algerian government, including of their language, and have vowed
to press ahead with the mass rally. Berber leaders from the Kabylie region said
the offer fell short of their demands, and that the government was trying to
engineer a split in their long-running campaign for official recognition and
justice.”
(http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/middle_east/newsid_1579000/1579403.stm).
Arouch: the Arouch
Movement (Berber Arouch Citizens Movement) was created to take action
against government brutality and demand justice after the killing of 126 Kabyle
peaceful protesters by Algerian troops. The name Arouch is the plural of Arch
-- a traditional Kabyle form of democratic political assembly. In what has become
known as Tansiqeyyet Al-A'oroush, or Laarac,
the Berber demands included the judicial trials of the paramilitary policemen
involved in the killing of 126 unarmed Berber civilians; an economic emergency
plan for the deprived Berber areas; the official recognition of Tamazight - the
Berber language; the withdrawal of government troops from Kabylia; and greater
democratic reforms.
Tamanrasset: at Tamanrasset
Mr Bouteflika announced he is not the captain to abandon a sinking ship in a
crisis, but he will not accept a revolution. When Hocine Ait
Ahmed urged the United Nations to investigate the recent unrest, and a number
of Berber groups and web sites called for the perpetrators of such crimes to
be brought to justice for crimes against humanity, Arab officials rejected any
international intervention. The International Crisis Group (ICG), in its report
on Algeria, argued that the Kabyle protests are not ‘ethnic disturbance’ but
‘a result of inadequate political representation’, and that ‘the Kabyle political
parties and the popular protest movement known as the “Coordinations”
must consider their behaviour and goals’
(www.crisisweb.org/home/index.cfm?id=1869&1=1).
MAK: in 2001, the Algerian revolutionary
poet and artist Ferhat Mehenni formed a political group calling for (self) autonomy: Mouvement
pour l'autonomie de la Kabylie (Movement for the Autonomy of Kabylia: MAK).
Its name in Tamazight is: Timanit i Tmurt n Yeqvayliyen.
The movement was ahead of its time and therefore it was reported that it had
no wider public support at the time, even though people still are afraid to freely
express themselves regarding
"autonomy", "independence" and other "strong" matters.
Having said this, the aim of the group is shared by many Berberists from all
over North Africa. Only democratic voting can decide how many Berbers are in
support of autonomy across the ten countries. Remove the dictators, introduce
peace and secular democracy, then ask the people what they think of it all. They
will tell you. But these are too dangerous requirements that the Berbers' critics
say are "unrealistic"
to achieve. Of course. The reasons for this are obvious and should not
be viewed as negative or "separate tendencies". For a start,
the Berbers and the Arabs are different in so many ways, and therefore it makes
more sense if the Berbers decide their own social, cultural, economic and political
affairs in harmony with their own culture and traditions, like any other group
in the world, in the same way the Berbers cannot tell the Arabs what to do --
imagine the thought taking place! The group later set up The Provisional Government
of Kabylia in exile, in France (see below for more on this).
2002:
Then on the 12th of March 2002, the Algerian president Bouteflike
declared that he decided to include Tamazight in the constitution as a national
language, but not an official one. Under pressure from Tamazight communities
of Algeria, Boutefliqa's government also promised the rehabilitation and the
promotion of Tamazight and the creation of the “High Committee for Amazighity” -- less
than year when King Mohamed VI set up the Royal Institution for Amazigh Culture
(IRCAM)?
2005:
In January 2005, the BBC’s website has reported that, “Algeria’s
government has signed a deal with ethnic Berber leaders, promising economic aid
for the restive minority and more recognition for its language.” The agreement
relates to the “-Kseur Platform”, which lists the Berber’s demands drawn up after
the unrest in 2001, including the official recognition of Berber language, and
greater economic investment in the Kabyle region.
2006 - 2009:
Algerian Regime Racism Against Berbers
عنصرية النظام العروبي الجزائري:
150 Berber teenagers were shot-dead by the Algerian Security Forces (0.39 minute
of the video), but the Berbers are not giving up lightly. See the following link
(http://www.youtube.com/embed/6aNnINzCOAs)
for a short report about the Algerian government's brutal response to peaceful
Berber demands for freedom and dignity.
2008: the Algerian government
banned the general congress of the CMA in Kabylie.
2009: members of the Council
Federal of the CMA in Tizi-Ouzou were arrested.
2010: a Human Rights Seminar
was held in Tizi-Ouzou on the 23rd of July 2010, to promote human rights. The
event was organised by the CMA (World Amazigh Congress), the AFK (Kabylie’s Women
Organisation), and the Kabylie-Solidarité Organisation, in coordination with
the IPACC. Approximately one hour after the seminar started, around twenty policemen
burst into the hall and ordered those present to stop the session. While
the police were confiscating all material and equipment found inside, those who
were leaving were arrested and taken away in police cars to the local police
station. After interrogation and identity verification, the detainees were released
in the evening.
2010:
Provisional Government of Kabylia:
President: Ferhat Mehenni.
Lhacène Ziani: Minister of the Kabyle Language, Education, Universities and Training.
Mr. Lyazid Abid: Minister of Communication, Justice & Human Rights.
Website: http://www.kabylia-gov.org
Declaration De Tanger (http://www.kabylie-gouv.org/tiserriḥt-n-Ṭanǧa-n,499.html?lang=taq)
The Provisional Government of Kabylia, known as the Anavad
Aqvayli, was established on the 1st of June 2010, in exile in France, as
a temporary government. The head and founder of MAK was appointed as the President
of the government, with nine ministers (including two women). Accusations circulated
around the internet that the movement is a "separatist group", aiming
to divide Algeria, but as we saw elsewhere these were false accusations designed
to discredit the movement and suppress the Berbers' fight for justice and freedom.
The Berbers have no problem with living together with the Arabs as brothers and
sisters, as they did for the last 14 hundred years, so long as both equally enjoy
the same democratic freedom. The unity of Libya, Algeria or Morocco is not on
the table, but justice and equality are. In fact the Declaration on the Rights
of Indigenous Peoples guarantees the Berbers the right to self-govern; and therefore
self-autonomy does not mean a separate country, as many would have others believe.
Ferhat Mehenni
According to the president himself, the government was set
up to represent the Kabyle people, whom were treated like strangers in their
own country, as well as campaign for basic human rights and cultural and political
freedom, others openly enjoy and take for granted. If the Berbers are marginalised
and collectively punished, then they have the right to get together and help
run their own excluded communities -- even though deprived of their share of
the national wealth they can only do very little to effect noticeable change.
The Kabyle government should have both: recognition and a budget from the Algerian
government.
Instead, the president Ferhat Mehenni has been, during his
life, arrested 13 times and imprisoned for three years; as he has became a target
of a number of assassination attempts. He has survived five assassination attempts,
so far. The last
attempt took place in Tunisia on the 26th of January, 2011, after he was "lured" to
Tunis to meet international media figures. This is how dangerous it is to be
involved with Berber culture and politics; and it is time for the world
leaders to utter the forbidden word: "Berbers".
Have you ever heard any of these world leaders who speak about imposing democracy
on the region ever mention the forbidden word? Silence, the Imazighen say,
is an indication of guilt!
12 January 2012:
Berbers Celebrate The New Year: Yennayer:
Aljazeera: Inside Story: The Berbers, Autonomy & Unified
Berber Entity.
If you are a Berber then you are advised not to watch the
video, because it "boils the blood".
The 12th of January has now been presumed the day in which
the Berbers should celebrate the festival of Yennayer, the New Year, across North
Africa. Like many other Berber "things", repression and denial of one's
heritage without a doubt had produced some of the most obfuscated results. Regardless
of the day, the year itself is most controversial of all. If the year 950 BC
was chosen to start the calendar from, based on the year the Libyan Shoshenq
became the King-Pharaoh of the Egyptian XXII dynasty, then pursuing the same
line of thinking one finds it hard to understand why one cannot start from before
3100 BC and see what the "Palermo Stone", the oldest document in the
world, has to say about the line of pre-Dynastic Libyan Berber kings and queens
whom history had practically forgotten? The original Berber Calendar, for
the sake of clarity, is an agricultural calendar,
in which the course of stars and constellations was pinned in the heavens to
reflect and regulate seasonal changes and activities on earth, such as plowing,
sowing and harvest, to ensure maximum benefit and prosperity. It has nothing
to do with political propaganda of kings or warmongering rulers and dictators
of the later periods.
However, unlike the other protests sweeping Libya, Tunisia
and Morocco, the Kabyles of Algeria took to the streets in celebration of the
new year to press for autonomy -- a kind of hard-core uprising even the west
seems eager to suppress. They have been doing this for some time now, and long
before the recent popularised uprisings began. The MAK (Movement for
the Autonomy of Kabylia) organised the new year protests, in which nearly 10,000
people took part, calling for an end to repression and the right to run their
own affairs -- something most nations take for granted, except the Berbers and
like-others who must "disappear" and give-up their "unrealistic" rights
for dignity and identity. Assimilation and forced integration into another's
identity is however very real.
The above Inside Story asks the right questions: is a unified
Berber entity achievable? Does a unified Berber entity pose a threat to the existing
regimes in the region? But don't you think this is a question the Berbers ought
to be asked to answer? One of the speakers (apparently an English Algeria expert)
infuriatingly proclaims that the Algerian government did not discriminate against
the Berbers -- please read the above timeline to decide for yourself.
Two of the three speakers in the above debate stated that
the autonomy movement is a minority group mostly based outside Algeria and that
it has no wide public support inside Algeria. This may be true, but most Berberists
fled North Africa for Europe to save their lives because of their daring ideals
that were outlawed in their own home. How many outspoken Berbers were imprisoned
and shot dead for their strong views of identity?
One only needs to look at the number of attempts on the life
of Ferhat Mehenni (as we saw above)
to realise the true danger serious Berber politicians face right now in North
Africa and in exile too. It is therefore misleading for experts to speak in such
manner without regard to the sufferings of the Berber activists and with disregard
to the security issues involved. People all over North Africa have been suppressed,
intimidated, imprisoned and executed for speaking out the outlawed truth, and
therefore it is not possible to speak about "public support" for the
autonomy until all dictatorships were removed, democracy introduced, and then
a referendum is held for the people to settle the issue in a democratic way.
Until very recently Berbers in Libya faced death for openly saying they are Berbers
to the authority, and so one can only imagine the consequences if they spoke
about "self-determination", "independence" and "revolution",
even in today's Libya. People need to be free first before they can speak out
their political and even other, more daring, views. How can one make a general
statement as sensitive as that without consultation with all the people? Well,
it is called political propaganda.
Secondly the Berbers' demands are not "unrealistic" and
have nothing to do with "language", as one speaker said. They
have to do with true freedom (not integration into another's freedom), with the
political will to decide one's destiny, and with the right to identity and nationality
as recommended by the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples. Whether a unified entity is achievable or not, or whether the Berbers
can do this right now or not are issues, no doubt, the Berbers and their friends,
if any, must tackle and deal with in a civilised manner. All countries were
built from scratch, or else were invaded ready-made, and so things take time
to develop, given the right support and adequate funds.
One speaker even said that the issue of identity has failed
to bring the
"democratisation of Algeria". Everyone knows that only bombs, guns
and revolutions can bring the downfall of dictators, as in the case of Gaddafi
and Saddam, and that if there is such an "identity card" that can
bring dictators and their ideals down just like that, then that card will be
worth more than the planet's weight in diamond. Currently there are at least
140 dictators and semi-dectators ruling and ruining nearly half of the world's
countries. Many of these countries have no identity issue, and many of these
dictators suppress native identities, silence dissent, and terrorise the rest.
So what does that say?
The good news is that international media and experts at last
began to respond to the Berbers pleas to join the debate, in the open, and that
in itself is a great victory the Berbers are proud of to achieve. Without a firm
political and administrative body overseeing the transition to freedom, based
on scientific principles, the Berber revolution could well descend into (perceived)
cultural anarchy and political chaos.
One of the earliest Berber revolts started in 740 AD (around
122 AH), in Tangier, Morocco, before it spread to the rest of North Africa and
Spain. The rebellion, said to be led by Maysara al-Matghari, was triggered in
response to the state into which Berber North Africa was brought to after 641
AD. Under the Umayyad Caliph Hisham ibn Abd al-Malik, the Caliphs and sultans reportedly began
to treat the native Berbers with indifference as they viewed them inferior and
pagan tribes who were "barbaric" and "unorganised", to whom
they claimed brought civilisation.
It was also reported that the Berbers were frequently assigned
harsher duties during the ensued wars, like stationing them in the frontline
while Arab forces were kept in the rear. The revolt achieved a degree of
success, as the rebels succeeded in liberating a number of provinces; but the
Arabs strengthened their positions and held on to their command-and-control centre
at Kairouan. Even though full victory was not achieved by the Berbers, the limited
success saw the creation of a number of Berber States and Dynasties across the
Maghreb ('The West'); thereby transferring control of most of North Africa back
to the Berbers, as the Caliphs of the east lost complete control over North Africa.
Some Moroccan historians consider this revolt to be the beginning
of Moroccan independence, as Morocco never came under foreign rule since, until
the 20th century when modern colonial armies invaded Africa and began sharing
the spoils of the weakened continent - Mother Africa. However, the independence
of Morocco from France in the 20th century, in which France passed on control
to the minority Arab population of Morocco, was only seen as such by the Arabs
of Morocco, as the Berbers of Morocco became second class citizens in their own
country, and therefore true independence of Morocco from the perspective of the
740 AD revolt, it can be argued, is yet to be realised.
1918:
The Atlas mountains, without a doubt, had provided the Berbers
of Morocco with greater protection from the various invaders who roamed the coastal
plains. Analysts had pointed out that for most of the past 13 centuries the High
Atlas mountains have been exclusively controlled by groups of armed Berber leaders
who refused to submit to the Arab sultans of the low coast, as much as they resisted
pacification from neighbouring Europeans; especially between 1918 and 1920 when
the Rif tribesmen revolted against the French and Spanish penetration of
Morocco. As a result, and long before independence, the colonial French, who
controlled the lowlands of Morocco between 1912 and 1956, allowed the Berbers
of the mountains to continue their tribal authority and sovereignty and left
them out of the equation; just as the Italians did in Libya when they granted
the Arabs of Libya complete control over Libya for the first time in history.
1920s:
The Berber Rif Revolution: 1920 - 1926:
Centuries after the Spanish massacres of the Berbers in the
Canary Islands, the Spanish conquest of Morocco was fiercely resisted by the
local Berbers, whose leader Si Muhammad n-Si Abd al-Krim al Khatabi (AbdelKrim)
came close to victory in 1921, after he inflicted a humiliating defeat on the
Spanish army. After World War I, the Spanish distributed nearly 63,000 soldiers
across the northern and western parts of Morocco. The local Berbers fought back
on several fronts, including at Anwal or Anual, where they slaughtered nearly
19,000 Spanish soldiers in 1921. The Berber general, in command of the formidable
and well-trained army he formed from fighters from the Rifi and Jibala tribes,
inflicted a second defeat on the Spanish and effectively succeeded in expelling
the Spanish from Morocco.
The Spanish generals called for French help and returned with
a formidable force, and, according to the association for the defence of the
Rif War, they even used German-manufactured toxic gas to
quell the Berber revolt in 1920s; of which many people continue to die of cancer.
Apparently, according to some Moroccan activists, the details of this horrific
crime have been suppressed by both the Spanish government and the Arab Moroccan
monarchy. The attempt to stage a conference on the issue was also blocked by
the Moroccan authorities. This policy is symptomatic of politics overall where
politely the politicians make military onslaught seem humanitarian mission, even
though many say "violence is not the answer".
This victory allowed the Berber general to form the Government
of the Republic of the Rif on the 1st of February 1923. The government
had a good start, introduced reforms, legal and administrative departments, the
smell of freedom, and even sought international recognition from Western European
countries including France and the UK to bolster their newly won independence.
Euphoric as they might have been, the leaders of the victory, however, were not
contended with this limited achievement, and quickly went on to liberate other
regions then still under French control. The colonial masters began to worry,
and with the humiliation of defeat hard to overcome, they ganged up and assembled
a larger army; where they returned on May 1926 with vengeance to ransack the
independent Rif in vendetta with a force of an estimated 250,000 soldiers. Unable
to sustain his short-lived victory against the onslaught of two powerful foreign
nations, the native Berber leader Abdelkrim went into exile, where he died with
dignity in Cairo in 1963, just as Hannibal had voluntarily declared his absolute
freedom from the limitation of the flesh, abroad. Perpetual
flames of sorrow and hope never die.
1930s:
The Berber Dahir: the French-created
Berber Dahir, the Berber Decree, was said to have triggered both Moroccan
national movement as well as national divisions; by which the French protectorate
had hopped to gain partial control over the Berbers' property and state of affairs
as well as of Morocco overall in line with the best of its regional interests
- today's European politicians call "our doorstep". Most observers,
however, agree on that the creation of the decree on the 16th of May 1930 had
indeed propounded Berber egalitarian doctrines and customary law against the
religious legislations of the new comers to doctor pacification of the ever-resilient
native Berber rebels of the free Atlas mountain, they tried very hard to pacify
but failed to obfuscate. Pan-Arabists, on the other hand, were quick on their
feet, drumming up selfish-freedom and confused democracy while brandishing racial
tension and boasting ideals of jealously and hate as they proclaimed to be the
only legitimate authority to oppress the Berbers and confiscate their land. Hail
Mother; failing to see its doomed destiny the colonial mashed-up law was ultimately
cancelled. The scrapped "contract", the decree to hijack the Berbers'
will and sacred Azref to stigmatise them, has gone.
Both the Arabs and the French fighting over the control of
Morocco is without a doubt a historical fact, but sowing seeds of division is
not correct, since until then there was never an Arab state encompassing the
whole of Morocco, just as in Libya where the Italians handed over control to
the Arabs in what until then seemed a stateless state -- as it is now (2011). Foreign
manipulation of the various identities of many "doorsteps" from
around the world is without a doubt a fundamental principle of current civilisation,
but one must realise
"who was doing the talking" and who "was making the deals of greed
and self-denial". Thousands upon thousands of Berbers were slaughtered defending
their sacred home from both French and Spanish forces before they successfully
created the Berber Independent Rif.
MNP: The Popular Movement: the
National Popular Movement party (Mouvement national populaire) was a
recognised political party founded in 1957 by the Berber Caid Mahjoubi Aherdane and
Dr. Abdelkrim al-Khatib. In 2003 the party became a member of Liberal International;
and in 2006 the party merged with the Democratic Union (Union démocratique).
However, the average seats usually won by the party varies from 30 to 40 out
of 325 seats.
The Moroccan Istiqlal ('Independence')
Party considered the Berber identity as a relic of imperial colonialism. Therefore,
what independence means to an Arab is not really what it means to a native imperial
Berber. Would they one day realise this will not work? In 1958 the Berbers of
the Rif, however, rebelled again. But the crisis was settled against their
wishes by the inclusion of the Rif into unified Morocco; and hence, for the first
time in this very long historical saga, complete control was transferred to the
minority Arabs while the majority and native Berbers were downgraded as "colonial
agents". Who was it who made the deal with the colonial powers? Who destroyed
the Berber Rif? The BBC’s Rabat correspondent Sebastian Usher reported that although
an estimated 60% of Moroccans are Berbers,
“Morocco’s constitution enshrines Arabic as the country’s
only official language,” and that “The fact that Berbers were the original
inhabitants of North Africa before the Arab invasions of the 7th century has
been seen as a potential challenge to their authority by Morocco’s Arab rulers
ever since.”
(http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/3108678.stm).
The colonial powers were somewhat unhappy with the rebellious
and proud Berbers who resisted all attempts to surrender. They are not easily
moulded into other forms. For some reason the 'colonial masters' succeeded in
leaving behind a phenomenal number of dictators and corrupt monarchies aftermath
the so-called independence tsunami. After independence the Moroccan constitution
declared Morocco part of the Arab world and proclaimed Arabic as its only official
language and thereby omitting Berber completely from the equation. Without the
help of French and Spanish military this would have been impossible to achieve.
1956: the abolition of the Berber
chair at Rabat's Moroccan Institute for Advanced Studies.
1960s:
In the 1960s, the Berber reputable College at Azrou was the
only scientific school in Morocco at the time. However, according the www.adrar.nl
one cannot say much about the real intentions of the Ministry of Education as
there are no documents accessible to the public which would outline the language
policy of Morocco.
1970s:
After the failed Berber coup in 1971,
Tamazight language was ousted from the royal palace, and Arab teachers were posted
to the Atlas mountains to teach Arabic, in an aborted attempt to Arabise the
region, at the same time Berber activists were calling for an end to such actions
and for Tamazight to be recognised as an official language. In 1972 the Berber
general M. Oufkir, (/Oufqeer/) the most outspoken critic
of king Hassan's government, was executed and members of his family
were imprisoned after they refused to renounce the name Oufkir. During
the 1970s and 1980s many of the Berber high ranking officials in the Moroccan
government were forced to retire long before the age of retirement, followed
by a sharp slow in recruitment. The Berbers became a danger to the king. Berber
underground movement, active since the 1930s, took their fight to the open and
began demanding their rights as free citizens of Morocco. By the 1978 the Moroccan
parliament gave up the suppression policy and finally agreed (or promised) to
set up an institution to study Tamazight culture, but this did not materialise
until 12 years later.
1978:
Foundation of the Berber association "Tamaynut" (tamaynut.org)
in Rabat, to campaign for greater rights for the Berbers of Morocco. The association
was formed by a group of Berber activists including Hassan Id Balkassm, an attorney
lawyer accredited by the Higher Court in Rabat since 1982, who is currently the
president of the association.
1990s:
As the underground movement began to gain widespread support
from the Berbers of Morocco, the activists succeeded in founding a number of
Berber language and cultural associations, issued publications, and set up websites
and newspapers. With the events unfolding next door (in Algeria) the Moroccan
government effectively had no option but to concede to the peaceful demands.
1992:
Local Berbers from the Atlas reported that in 1992 a group
of "Arabic-speaking foreigners" arrived in the mountain, with
the aim of setting up plans to remove King Hassan II from the palace and
take control of Morocco. Whatever the origin of this was, it should not be excluded
that the idea of using the majority Berbers against the minority monarch stands
an attractive idea; which perhaps the reason the King reversed his ouragious
policies. Why make the majority of Morocco your enemy?
1993: the first meeting of the National
Coordination Council of Amazigh Associations: a grouping of the Berber
cultural and political associations in Morocco.
1994:
The foundation of the First Group of Indigenous Peoples of
Africa (IPACC). Hassan Id Balkassm, the president
of Tamayunt, and the former president of the World Amazigh Congress, was appointed
the president of IPACC. In July 1994, a Berber delegation attended the
annual meeting of the United Nations Working Group on Indigenous
Peoples, in Geneva, where they had identified the Berbers as an "indigenous" group.
This is not to say that the world and the UN did not know that the Berbers were
the indigenous peoples of North Africa, but it seemed that the Berbers had to
fight for their basic human rights even within the UN institution. Recognising
the Berbers as an indigenous group allows them a number of rights stipulated
by the UN convention, including the full rights to use their own language and
the right to self-govern.
1994:
The Berbers of Morocco have finally won the right to broadcast
news in Tamazight on national TV in 1994. The King Hassan II had announced in
a speech (20/08/1994) that Berber language deserves a place in schools. Those
two events went on to transform the Berber situation in Morocco, even though
practical results were then still a good few years away. Berber associations,
groups, radio & television programs, interviews, newspapers, magazines,
and websites were created by the end of the decade to express the new rights
of movement. There is no going back. But the direction forward had so far been
proved difficult to define.
2000:
In March 2000, hundreds of Berber activists signed the Berber
Manifesto. The document illustrates the persecution suffered by the Berber (majority)
minority of Morocco and the humiliation and alienation endured at the hands of
the king's government. They had also demanded:
Economic development of the neglected Berber rural areas.
State financial funding and support for Berber cultural institutions.
And update school textbooks to include the Berbers' important role in creating
Morocco.
2001: The IRCAM ?
King Mohamed VI had promised to preserve Tamazight language
by integrating it into the education system, and set up the Royal Institute for
Amazigh Culture (IRCAM) to monitor its progress. The IRCAM was created on Wednesday
17th of October 2001. However, according to Tamaynut (http://tamaynut.org/tamaynut/),
the Federal Council (CF) of the Amazigh World Congress had noted that anti-amazigh
panarabists were named with the direction of this organisation. These
reservations appear to have more weight than initially anticipated. For instance,
Berber language has always been known as Tamazight, and the Berber society
has always been a matriarchal one, but the institute (and other sites and organisations)
refer to Tamazight ('Berber Language') as “Amazigh Language” or "the language
of the Amazigh people" – clearly a patriarchal invention, instead of the
already in use: Tamazight; and hence the phrases ‘Amazigh Culture’,
‘Amazigh People’ and the absurd ‘Amazighity’ became the symbols
of intellectual corruption. Also a member (or a representative) of the IRCAM,
while he was in Yemen recently, apparently said the Berbers originally come from
Yemen (see 2010, below for more on this). The most valid analysis of the King's
IRCAM's hidden agenda was given by Professor Salem Chaker (see 2004, below: the
carriage before the horse).
2003: Teaching Berber in Moroccan schools:
The king's government has finally permitted the teaching
of Tamazight ('Berber language') in nearly 15 percent of the country's primary
schools. The decision came into effect on the 15th of September 2003, when Berber
language was officially introduced in 317 primary schools on an experimental
basis, which the Moroccan Ministry of Education aims to extend to all schools
by 2013. Tamazight names and traffic signs in Berber Tifinagh still
seem to cause some worry, but after this historic move more can be expected because
everything is linked to speech – the apparatus that makes us humans.
2004:
The IRCAM was successful in convincing the International
Organization of Standardization (ISO) to recognise Berber Tifinagh. In June 2004
Tifinagh was registered in the ISO's register of the languages of the world.
This means that the coding of Tifinagh will enable it, from 2005, to be integrated
into the software products of the major companies. The new Tifinagh system contains
55 letters, 22 of which were new additions.
In an interview with Salem Chaker, director of the Berber
research center (CRB) in Inalco, Paris, Aid Chemakh and Masin Ferkal asked the
Professor of Tamazight:
"In an official statement King Mohamed VI announced
the decision of IRCAM . . . to adopt the Neo-Tifinagh alphabet as the only writing
system for Tamazight in Morocco. As an Amazigh linguist, what is your reaction
to this decision?"
The following is a summary of Salem Chaker's answers to a
number of questions including the above one:
"I consider that it is at the same time a hasty and
badly founded decision, and certainly a dangerous one for the future and development
of Tamazight in Morocco . . . While no serious scientific debate on the question
of the alphabet to use ever took place in Morocco or Algeria, the political leaders
decided on an option that is totally disconnected from the current practice .
. . The goal can only be an attempt by the dominant spheres and their auxiliaries
to take over the Amazigh field by driving this transitional period of Amazigh
writing and teaching into a sure dead end . . . It is clear that . . . the
monarchy . . . lives in fear of an evolution "Algerian style" as far
as the Amazigh issue is concerned. In other words, they are afraid the Amazigh
would become socially autonomous . . . The creation of the IRCAM, as well
as the adoption of the Tifinagh script are part of a strategy which aims at reducing
the Amazigh social and political factor to nothing or close to nothing .
. ."
Also see July 2011 (below) for the response of
the IRCAM to the criticism relating to its Tifinagh policy.
2005 - 2006:
PDAM: The Moroccan Amazigh Democratic
Party (Parti démocrate amazigh marocain), Akabar Amagday Amazigh
Amrrukan, was created by Berber activists in Morocco 2005. The aim of the
political party is to campaign for "political secularism" and
greater cultural, economical, administrative and social rights for the Berber
tribes of Morocco. In 2006, however, the party changed its name to: Parti
écologiste marocain - Izigzawn (Moroccan Ecologist Party - Greens); indicating
the rise of green issues and the conservation of the Berber landscape.
2007 - 2008:
PDAM Banned: the PDAM was banned
by the Moroccan Interior Ministry in 2007, apparently because Moroccan law forbids
parties founded on ethnicity or religious principles - thereby defying the whole
point of 'parties'. Then the party was dissolved by a court decision in 2008.
Source of image: Libyan Tawalt: http://www.tawalt.com/?p=22955
The Arabic text in the image tells the news in Arabic.
2010:
The IRCAM's Objective: the
Amazigh Congress was angered by the statements made by a researcher belonging
to the Royal Institute for Amazigh Culture (IRCAM), in a lecture delivered
in the Yemeni capital. The lecturer declared that the Berbers originally come
from Yemen and that Tamazight culture is a branch of Yemeni culture. Of course,
such statements can only reflect the ignorance of the institution's representative of
basic histroy, genetics, archaeology and linguistics, where evidence is plentiful
to illustrate the CONTINOUS existence of humans in North Africa for at least
100,000 years (see
History of Libya for more on this.) The problem does not end here, as the
CMA itself had also received its share of valid criticism.
2010: UN's CRED:
In August the 27th, 2010, the United Nations Committee on
the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CRED) examined the reports submitted
by Morocco in accordance with Article 9th of the UN Convention, and consequently
issued a number of requirements, including the need for Morocco to step up its
efforts to promote Tamazight language and to consider the inclusion of Tamazight
in the Moroccan Constitution as an official language.
February Uprising 2011:
The uprising in Morocco started on the 20th of February 2011,
calling for a true democratic constitution and a parliamentary monarchy. Protesters
say the reforms proposed by the king do not meet their demands, but the proposal
to officially recognise Berber as an official language in Morocco was especially
welcomed.
June - July 2011:
Tamazight An Official Language:
on the 12th of June 2011, a constitutional reform was passed to the king of Morocco
recommending the recognition of Tamazight ('Berber Language') as one of the official
languages of Morocco, with a referendum to be held on the 1st of July 2011 to
vote for the new reforms. The results of the referendum were an overwhelming
approval, with 98.5 of the population voting in favour. However, some Berberists
say the results were manipulated to allow the king a new democratic image in
order to survive the current uprisings in North Africa.
July 2011:
The head of the IRCAM answers questions relating to the constitutionalisation
of Tamazight and the use of Tifinagh: http://www.ircam.ma/ar/index.php?soc=artip&pg=1&rd=44 :
بوكوس: دسترة الأمازيغية حدث تاريخي وكتابتها بحرف «تيفيناغ» حظي بتوافق وطن
15 January 2012:
Tawda: Moroccan Berbers call
for officialising the Berber New Year as a national holiday:
Berber protesters took to the streets of Rabat on Sunday the 15th of January
2012, to demand urgent follow-up of the Berbers' demands, to protest against
marginalisation, and to express solidarity with the Imazighen revolutionaries
of Libya. The Moroccan government has promised some reforms, but in practice
very little was implemented. They have also called for the government to release
all Berber prisoners and detainees. The protests coincided with the third day
of the (unofficial) Tamazight New Year (12 January 2962
AD), which the protesters demanded from the government to be made "official" and
a
"national holiday". Arab critics were quick, as usual, to denounce
the demands as imperial agendas.
Tuareg (Imuhagh): estimated at 4 million Berbers: Libya,
Faso, Niger & Mali
Struggle For Sahara
Sovereign Homeland
1899:
Kaocen: the Tuareg's struggle
for freedom and their wars against the foreign French troops saw a long history
of bloodshed; leading to organised resistance. Tuareg history states that after
the defeat of Egatregh in 1899, the resistance leader ag
Kaocen Keddi Igerzawen, from the powerful confederation of Ikazkzen
Air, began to unite the various movements into an organised military force.
1911: the rise of Firhoun of Ikazkazan in
1911.
1914: Kaocen
Revolt: the pre-independence rebellion of Ag Mohammed Wau Teguidda Kaocen
of the Aïr Mountains in 1914.
1915 - 1916: the rebellion
of the Tuareg and the Gourma Iwellemmeden: the fight against the oppressors
continued in 1915 in the Gourma Tuareg region, and by 1916 the leader of the
Tuareg Iwellemmeden Firhoun managed to escape from prison to lead the revolt;
which eventually led to the massacre of the Iwellemmeden, after they were tricked
into laying down their arms. The leader did manage to escape, again, but later
died after he was captured by the Kel Ahaggar auxiliaries working for the French
army. According to one Tuareg account the Songhay tribe were severely punished
and their villages razed to the ground, as they
were found to have had assisted the Tuareg rebels with guns, supplies and information.
1916: the Tuareg of Ajjer came
under heavy attack by the colonial army and were forced to flee their Djanet
military post in 1916. The scholar (Father) de Foucauld was assassinated
by the Tuareg of Ahaggar, after being found spying on Tuareg positions. In the
same year, Kaocen and his army joined the main camp in the valley of Ikazkazen
Amantaden, and called for the union of all the Tuareg groups. The united army
laid siege to Agadez for three months, but the French enforced their positions
and sent the Tuareg fighters back to the desert in 1917.
1919: Kaocen went into exile,
to begin regrouping another army. After the siege of Zawilah (also lasted for
three months), the Tuareg retreated to Gatroun, where they regrouped, but were
defeated again and forced to flee to Bilma before they arrived in Zinder. Under
the leadership of Air's Tagama the fight against the French continued. After
the capture of Tagama and his subsequent killing in Agadez, the movement came
to a halt, with disastrous effects, where people fled to exile, their homes were
looted, and their country was taken.
1960: Mali gained its independence
in the 1960s. The Tuareg's state descended into neglect, as they were severely
repressed by the post-colonial government. Many Tuareg people believe this wave
of persecution continued well after the so-called democratic coup in 1991. The
dignified Tuareg society before the colonial disaster began to disintegrate,
as the imposed conflict destroyed livestock and forced communities to flee
to neighbouring states; as if precisely that was the objective!
1962-63: The
First Tuareg Rebellion:
Independent Tuareg Nation: the repressive new regime
triggers a new wave of Tuareg armed resistance, when Tuareg groups from Northern
Mali took arms and rebelled against the government in 1962. The Tuareg called
for an independent sovereignty, but their demands were silenced by the heavily
armed post-colonial Malian government by 1963. This year marked the First Tuareg
Rebellion. Critics say the rebellion did not reflect a unified leadership
or clear evidence of a coherent strategic vision.
1970s/1980s:
As if the destruction caused by wars was not enough, the severe Sahelian
Drought of the 1970s and 1980s hit the Sahara with devastating effects.
Water became scarce, green disappeared, livestock died, and people starved. Many
Tuaregs fled back to the desert for humiliating life in relief camps, others
were urged or forced to integrate into larger cities alien to their needs, tens
of thousands fled as refugees to neighbouring countries (once more), while the
younger generations emigrated to Europe and America in search of "life".
The Tuareg societies were dispersed out of their homes; eventually leading to
the next Tuareg rebellion.
1990:
The Second Tuareg Rebellion (Revolution):
(1990–1995): the rebellion is also known as the Third Tuareg Rebellion, in reference
to the pre-independence rebellions of 1911 and 1914. An armed uprising by the
Tuareg of Niger and Mali re-ignites, with the aim of achieving autonomy and forming
their own nation-state. The "insurgency" occurred in a period following
the open political repression of the Tuareg people, the regional famine of the
1980s, and the subsequent refugee crisis. The conflict is one in a series of
Tuareg-based insurgencies in the colonial and post-colonial history of the Sahara.
The 1990s is therefore a decade fraught with complex events and the creation
of a large number of Tuareg organised armed resistance groups across Niger and
Mali. The rebellion caused a major upset to the economy of the region.
The tourist centre of Agadez, the Tuareg trade centre of In-Gall, and the uranium mining
town of Arlit (exploited by the French Areva), were evacuated of foreigners,
as the army moved in to suppress the revolution: the Tuareg Revolution. Tuareg
leaders however called of international assistance, as they said their scarce
resources did not allow them to form an independent central government. As a
response, the government of Niger agreed to include Tuareg representatives in
its government, but its hidden agenda is far from that. Soon it emerged that
some of these Tuareg figures were a source of controversy, as Tuareg leaders
felt that they were tricked into submission by false promises. However, the Tuareg
of Niger say they are still keeping an eye on the government's activity in the
Air Region, as well as on the Arlit's uranium business.
1990: Mali: the increase of
atrocities committed by the army against the people of Mali, particularly in
the northern regions of Gao, Kidal and Timbuktu, had one obvious conclusion:
the Tuareg of Mali joined the armed conflict and entered into direct confrontation
with the Malaian government. In a matter of few months nearly 600 civilians
died. The Algerian government intervened to effect a peace agreement at Tamanrasset,
but the outcome was hopeless and mounted to no more than a failed attempt, some
say was instigated to destroy the rebel movement; leading to fighting to resume.
1990: FPLN: Tchin-Tabaradene
Massacre: the Tuareg fighters formed a political opposition group in Libya
called the Popular Front for the Liberation of Niger (FPLN). After the attack
of Tchin-Tabaradene, the region descended into chaos and life became very hard,
forcing many Tuareg people to flee to other countries, and leading the government
to close the borders with both Libya and Algeria. As conditions worsened the
Tuareg were promised aid to ease their situation, but nothing arrived. Feeling
fed up with the whole thing, the FPLN attacked the police station at Tchin-Tabaradene
in May 1990, and fighting followed, in which at least 31 people died. According
to Tuareg accounts, the Nigerien army began arresting people in Tchin-Tabaradene,
Gharo and In-Gall, hundreds of whom died.
The military chief at Timbuktu sends his army to start a systematic
arrest of tribal chiefs and religious leaders, whom were publicly executed without
any form of juridical trial at Tillia, Tchin-Tabaraden and Tahoua.
Soldiers were garrisoned around all the water wells, systematically shooting
at whoever tries to get some water. It was reported that the victims' families
were held for a year after the killing. Soon afterwards, the already exhausted
Tuareg communities came under a new kind of attack where both the Algerian and
Libyan governments began their systematic destruction of the Tuareg traditional
social structure by forcing the Tuareg to abandon their ancient way of life and
home and instead hoarded into newly built villages and towns, in an attempt to
assimilate them into the modern world. The Tuareg felt they were blackmailed
into submission, and many of them refused to buy; and if they wanted anything
then they must visit the new centres, like Tamenrast, and practically, as one
Tuareg put it, beg the Arabs. Many dignified Tuaregs refused to submit and
remained in the desert without any financial support or help from the government.
After the massacre, the organised resistance was the only
hope, once again, and again, for the Tuareg people to defend themselves. A number
of political and resistance groups sprung up from the disaster: the Front
of Liberation of Aïr and Azawagh (FLAA);
the Front for the Liberation of Tamoust (FLT);
the Armed Resistance Against The Authorities of Mali and Niger, and
the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MPLA: Mouvement
Populaire de Libération de l'Azawad).
The MPLA is a Tuareg militant group formed in the northern
region of Mali, originally established in exile (in Algeria and Libya). Their
military campaign in June 1990 was said to have started the civil war in Mali;
eventually leading to the toppling of the Malian government, and the signing
of the Tamanrasset Accord with the government of Mali. In December 1991 the MPLA
joined forces with the MFUA.
MFUA: (the United Movements
and Fronts of Azawad): the union was founded in 1991, when most of the following
groups were united to form the United Movements and Fronts of Azawad:
Popular Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MPLA or MPA)
Revolutionary Liberation Army of Azawad (ARLA),
separated from MPA in 1991
Popular Liberation Front of Azawad (FPLA)
National Liberation Front of Azawad (FNLA)
The Autonomous Group of Timitrine
The Autonomous Liberation Front of Azawad (FULA)
The Patriotic Movement of Ganda Koye (MPGK)
1992: Truce:
the government sets up a security zone in the North. In August 1992 the army
arrests nearly 200 Tuareg, apparently for being 'Tuareg'. In 1993, the new government
makes a truce with the FLAA; but other groups continued the resistance and the
fight.
1992: The National Pact: the
Tuareg rebel movement in Mali signed a peace agreement with the Malian government
called "the National Pact"; which promised the various tribal groups in the
area (including Tuareg, Fulani and Songhay) a level of self-autonomy that would
allow them a limited power to run their own affairs. The National Pact also called
for the creation of a "Commission of Inquiry", but nothing materialised.
1992: peace short lived: the
peace talks had failed to effect a solid solution to the Tuareg's struggle for
dignity and freedom. Violence broke out again and as a result tens of thousands
of Tuareg and Maurs escaped to Mauritania and Algeria, leaving behind their deserted
homes and belongings in one of the most disastrous events in the region. Some
reports say the number of refugees was more than 100,000. It was reported
that on the 14th of May 1992 government officers were responsible for the death
of twelve Tuareg workers, working for the ONG (the Assistance of the Norwegian
Church); followed by 48 "breeders" (and their animals close to a water-well
near Foita) three days later.
1992: Tuareg sources say the
peace National Pact had achieved one thing: dividing the
rebel movement into various factions. The MFUA meets the new president
Alpha Oumar Konare. While other rebel groups turned to what was termed as "terrorist" activities,
as their organised rebellion then seemed in tatters and
fed up with starvation in the desert.
1993: Tuareg and Maur groups, known as "bandits" and
Tuareg rebels stepped up their campaign in the North of Mali against civilian
targets; leading to a near-state of civil war breaking out, when the military
and newly formed vigilante groups joined in. Nearly 300 rebel fighters, government
soldiers and civilians died. The reprisals spread across the region: vigilante
groups were responsible for the death of four people and the injury of 12 more
in Menaka; 50 more died around Timbuktu; and around 100 in Bamba.
1994: Peace Agreement:
the government of Niger started peace-talks with the various rebel groups, and
in June 1994 a second meeting took place in Paris. During the third meeting in
September 1994, an "agreement of peace" was signed
between Niger and the Tuareg resistance in Ouagadougou. This agreement is not
peace in itself but only a plan to discuss and reach a peaceful solution. October
1994: a military patrol vehicle was shot at by government-loyal forces, killing
the director of the Swiss Cooperation Mission and two Malian colleagues in Niafunke.
Government sources say they were assisting the Tuareg rebels. Then on the same
month the rebels attacked the town of Ansongo in Mali, killing around six people
including the head of the military unit stationed there. A few days later, a
group of Tuareg rebels, who were said to have been trained in Libya, attacked
Gao, killing around 14 people. This led to government reprisals and to the formation
of the Ghanda Koi Songhai militia - an armed group created to fight Tuareg rebels.
1995: Peace Accord:
rebels organised their forces and formed two political and armed groups: the ORA and
the CRA. The CRA is a large organisation made up
of six Tuareg rebel groups which joined forces to form the Coordination of the
Armed Resistance (CRA). The Niger Movement for Justice
(MNJ) and the Nigerien Patriotic Front (NPF) have agreed to establish the Coordination
of the Former Armed Resistance (CERA). Even though
the CRA continued a number of peace talks and negotiations with the government
of Niger, the freedom fighters say the peace accord produced no results, and
issued a warning to the government to resume fighting if no serious measures
were taken. With time the peace accord became a game, where a number of organisations
signed independent (and group) deals with the government, none of which produced
any results; leading many Tuareg analysts to say that the deals or the accords
were invented to divide the organised rebel movement and destroy the resistance
- which given the facts seems the only logical objective. For example:
the CRA signed a peace accord on October 1994
the ORA signed a peace accord on the 24th of April 1995. The ORA had later
suspended its participation in the talks, and was said to have carried an
armed assault on the Arab militiamen in the North of Niger.
the CRA rejects the ORA peace accord.
Ouagadougou Accords: various Tuareg groups sign a peace accord on the 15th
of April 1995, effectively ending the armed rebellion in 1998.
National Day of Concorde: a
national holiday in Niger, celebrated since the 24th of April 1995, when the
ORA signed its peace accord with the government of Niger, at the Congressional
Palace in Niamey (Palais des Congrès de à Niamey).
1995: Mano
Dayak, the CRA leader, died in a suspicious plane crash in the Adrar Chirouet
region (in Niger), on the 15th of December 1995, while he was in his way to meet
government officials for talks over the Peace Accords. Mano Dayak was the rebel
leader who led the Tamoust Liberation Front (FLT)
- also a member of the CRA alliance, and the one who opposed the ORA accord.
His forces continued to pound government positions from their base in the Tenere
Desert, east of Agadez.
1996: Timbuktu: weapons were
ceremonially burnt in 1996 in Timbuktu, in an attempt to end the long and bloody
conflict.
1996: the Niger military coup
d'etat of January 27, 1996: the coup removed the so-called Niger's first
democratically-elected President, Mahamane Ousmane, from power, and General Ibrahim
Bare Mainassara became the president. The new government lasted for about three
years, and then it was also removed in another coup in 1999.
1999: Niger's president Mainassara
was ousted from power in a military coup in January 1999.
2000: Flame
of Peace: the final peace agreement: the "Flame of Peace":
a celebration of an end to violence and armed conflict between the Tuareg and
the government, characterised by the burning of weapons on 25 September 2000
in Agadez.
2002: Air
Info: (http://www.airinfo-journal.com/index.php): the Tuareg newspaper Air
Info was launched in August 2002 by Ibrahim Manzo Diallo, a teacher and
a student of literature at the University of Niamey. Agadez was
his first newspaper. The first issue appeared on August 9, 2002. In April 2004,
the newspaper officially became a media group, which
currently has five-permanent employees in Agadez and seven correspondents around
the rest of the region. In 2006, another local newspaper was born in Zinder:
The Damagaram, which has its own headquarters in
Zinder and its own editorial staff.
2006: ADC:
the Malaian Tuareg group [May 23, 2006] Democratic Alliance for Change ([Mai
23, 2006] Alliance démocratique pour le changement) led a number of
attacks in the northern region of Mali during the summer months of May, June
and July of 2006. In 2007, the ADC, led by former combatant Ibrahim Ag Bahanga,
said the attacks were coordinated with the MNJ.
2006: Ecology:
Niger: in October 2006, the Tuareg leader Boutali Tchiwerin condemned the ecological
impact of the uranium industry and called for a greater share of the wealth and
the creation of jobs of the local people.
February 2007: after the various fake peace
talks, the region descended into a state of neglect, poverty and chaos, leading
to many Tuareg leaders to re-act. Apparently the uranium industry was blamed
for polluting the surrounding environment, while the Tuareg were deprived of
a fair share of the wealth they were promised before. As a result the Third (or
Fourth) Tuareg Rebellion started in early February 2007, when the MNJ attacked
a number of targets belonging to the Nigerien Armed Forces, and also business
and economic targets belonging to international companies and institutions, in
and around Iferouane, Arlit and Ingall. Between the 18th and the 22nd of June
2007, the MNJ attacked Niger's second largest airport in Agadez, in an attempt
to disrupt both: Niger's tourism and uranium industries.
April 2007: Uranium:
the MNJ calls for the respect of the local environment and a stop of the pollution
caused by the uranium industry. It also enforced its call by attacking the power
station of the uranium mining facility near Arlit. The Arlit mines, operated
by the French, were said to account for a fifth of the world's uranium deposits.
Two months later (June 2007), land mines were laid along the route from Arlit
to the ports of Benin - the route through which the uranium is shipped out of
the country. However, according to the MNJ, the Nigerien government laid Chinese-made
landmines across the region. The head of French Areva's Niger operations, Dominique
Pin, had admitted that the April attacks had forced them to cease uranium production
for one month. Tension erupted between the Nigerien government and the French
Areva, leading the government to offer new contracts to the Chinese Nuclear International
Uranium Corporation (SinoU).
August 2007: State of
Emergency: on August the 24, 2007, Niger's president Mamadou Tandja declared
a state of emergency in Agadez region, as his forces began to intensify their
attacks on the Tuareg of Niger, with reports of widespread arrests, imprisonment
of rebels, and suppression of both local and international media. However, the
MNJ said its fighting force increased to 2000 fighters as a result of large defections
from the Nigerien army, reportedly including the entire special forces unit Niger
Rapid Intervention Company (www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=15215).
By now the Tuareg rebel movements were dragged into and associated with terrorists
activities, and as such they became the target of various governments. It is
more difficult for the Nigerien government to suppress a revolution and an armed
rebellion by the natives; but if these movements can be brought together under
the umbrella of terrorism, then they can move in to eradicate the cause without
fear of attracting international reprisals. In April 2008 Niger passed a new
Anti-Terror law, granting the police and the army broader powers of arrest and
detention. The Tuareg Freedom Fighters have now become terrorists in their own
countries.
August 2007: Iferouane:
nearly 80 percent of the population of Iferouane were moved by the Nigerien government
to the southern and poor regions of the country.
September 2007: Mali: the armed resistance spreads
to Mali once more, but as usual the Malaian army reacted with an immediate military
campaign to end the revolt. Two more ceasefires followed (one initiated by Libya
and the other by Tuareg leaders from Mali), but these now became a name for a "lull
in violence".
September 2007: Niger: fighting broke out in
Niger, spreading deep south to areas which were previously unaffected by
the war. Yet again, the Nigerien government declared a state of emergency in
the north of the country and began its attacks on the various rebel groups. The
result was nothing more than turning the region into a "humanitarian crisis
zone". The persecution of the Tuareg returned with more arrests and more
human rights abuses, widely reported by international media. However, fighting
continued well into the following year (2008), as the MNJ refused to surrender.
2008: MNJ's Vice President Acharif
Ag Mohamed Moctar was assasinated the Nigerien Army at Tezirzait, in June 2008.
2008: December: the ATNMCA (Alliance
touareg nord mali pour le changement), a faction of the ADC group, resumed
a serious of attacks under the command of its leader Ibrahin Ag Bahanga. But
the revolt was swiftly suppressed by the Malaian government.
2008: Algerian and Libyan governments
mediated another peace deal in August 2008 between Malaian rebel fighters and
the Malaian government. Like any other peace deal before, fighting resumed. It
was reported that after the government's attack on the rebels, a large number
of Tuareg rebels defected to the government and joined the Nigerien army; ATNMCA's
chief Ibrahim Ag Bahanga moved to Libya; while many Malaian rebels came to accept
the reality. In fact many of the Tuareg rebels fled to Libya, as life became
very hard in their own stricken and neglected countries, where they joined the
Libyan army as professional soldiers.
2008: Ibrahim Ag Bahanga returned
home from Libya.
August 2008: Ibrahim Ag Bahanga assasinated: early
reports say he died in a car accident, but other reports say he was assasinated
by other rebels as they were moving weapons that were smuggled by Ag Bahanga
from Libya. Sources close to Ag Bahanga say he was collecting weapons to re-ignite
the Tuareg rebellion in the area.
2009: the Nigerien Tuareg fighters
continued to disrupt the uranium production in the north of the country. The
earlier peace accords began to achieve their (hidden) objective, as more splits
began to emerge among the various Tuareg rebel movements. Never trust anyone,
the ancient Berbers once said.
2009: Libyan government mediated
a ceasefire and hosted a meeting between various groups and the government. On
the 3rd of April, the Nigerien Minister of the Interior Albade Abouba arrived
in Tripoli, for talks with FFR's Mohamed Aoutchiki Kriska, FPN's Aklou Sidi Sidi,
and MNJ's Aghali Alamboat in Sert. The results, again, were no more than a lull
in violence (that is a temporary ceasefire) with promises of further talks to
reach a permanent peace deal, etc.
2009: MNJ
Split: in March 2009 splits emerged among the members of the MNJ, leading
to its leader (Ag Alambo) fleeing to Libya, and many of its fighting force joining
the FPN. After the split of the MNJ, the FPN began to call for peace talks. Under
Libyan supervision they met with government officials between March and June
2009.
Aghaly Ag Alambo: the leader
of the MNJ, who was also a member of FLAA, has recently returned to Niger from
Libya, after Libyan rebels came knocking on his door in Tripoli in September
2011 (read his escape story below).
2009: by now, various rebel
groups in Niger attempted to follow on the work of the pioneering leaders and
unite the various movements into a "national movement",
with the aim of overthrowing the Nigerien government. Attacks on the uranium
production sites continued, land-mines were used, and business and tourism were
disrupted; but the effects were no more than an increase of violence from the
government, an increase of the number of refugees, and the paralysing of all
economic activity outside the major towns; yet forcing more people to flee to
other regions and countries.
2010: CSRD:
the Supreme Council for the Restoration of Democracy (CSRD) is a military group
led by Major Salou Djibo. On the 18th of February 2010 the CSRD managed to oust
President Mamadou Tandja in a coup d’état, and subsequently set up a transitional
government, supposedly based on democratic principles.
The rebel leaders of the former Resistance Army met on the
22nd of September 2010 in Agadez, to examine the socio-political crisis prevailing
in the region, and noted the following:
The Tripoli peace talks, leading to laying down of arms by the various armed
fronts, had failed to see "the effective return of ex-combatants to their
families in return for a program of socio-economic reintegration".
The transitional government has ignored the peace agreement in practice,
as the various meetings with senior members of the Transitional government, including
the Chairman of the CSRD, the Minister of the Interior, and the Prime Minister)
came to no fruitful conclusion.
The total indifference of France and its non-involvement in the conflict.
The lack of response from national authorities regarding the acts of terrorism
suffered by the FDS (Defence Forces and Security), Tillia (Tahoua) and Tilo (Tillabery).
The upsurge in banditry and drug trafficking in the region of victimised
Agadez.
Condemn the unwarranted attacks against the indigenous Tuareg Berbers, who
were accused of complicity to highlight their exclusion.
MNJ: Le Mouvement des Nigériens
pour la Justice (Niger Movement For Justice)
The Niger Movement for Justice (MNJ) breaks the temporary
silence that followed the Libyan peace talks and declares its dissatisfaction
with the development in Niger, where thousands of combatants, who were promised
re-integration, were left to fend for themselves in the desert. The MNJ also
stated its position by reminding the CSRD and the government that the Movement
is not a commercial enterprise, and that the country and also the mediator Libya
need to pay attention to the crisis, to revive the peace talks and help bring
about a peaceful solution to the crisis. The MNJ calls for the support of the
efforts of the authorities and movements in the realisation of peace. Niger needs
Peace, they say. The MNJ also recommended that "the peace process" should
follow established operational structure consisting of respected dignitaries
and transparent leaders, to ensure a final solution to the crisis.
The Third Wave:
Disaster Strikes Again:
During the first wave, the 1990s, the warrior Tuareg of "Mother" ('Sahara')
suddenly found themselves "terrorists" in their own homes. Aftermath
the second wave, the 2000s, the dignified Tuareg were attacked for being "slave
masters", in a ploy to desecrate their matriarchal heritage and sacred matrilineal
naming system. Now, at the start of the third wave, they are "Gaddafi loyalists" and
anti revolution "Greens" to prevent them from having a Saharan Homeland
-- the Mother of Human Civilisation!
This third wave of persecution had then forced the Tuareg
to flee back home, if you can call it that. With no where to go but back to enemy
number "one", after "learning to live" with enemy number "two",
in an attempt to evade enemy number "three", the Tuareg Saga goes on
like a desert curse from the Jinn
Fortress of Tin Hinan.
The reality of course is far from any of that; but no doubt
the "attempt" to divide the Berbers is visibly there. Many international
media outlets fell for the scam, and openly began generalising specific rumours
as historical fact, even though some reporters already reported the Tuareg of
Libya being attacked by both: the rebels of the NTC and the loyalists of Gaddafi,
as well as by other governments nearby, and even nature herself took her usual
part: the droughts that hit the Tuaregs between the wars.
Elkhabar
('The News') reported that hundreds of Tuareg, who made Libya their new home,
after they fled their war-torn home, have fled Libya back home again, after they
refused to fight for Gaddafi's government against the rebels of emerging new
Libya, and not knowing which way home is anymore 160 of them fell dead.
After the rebels had entered Tripoli in August 2011, Ishak
Ag Hassini spoke of the Tuareg's disaster and how they were hunted by
the rebels like "rats". The Tuareg of Ubari begged the world to open
their eyes and recognise the martyrs who lost their lives defending their homes
against Gaddafi's dying army. But.
Doesn't the world know that it was a Tuareg guide who handed
over Saif Alislam to the rebels of Zintan, as reported by Reuters, when he could
have escorted him to safety for the one million Euro he was promised by the fugitive
leader's son; but he did not, and he is an Amaheq.
It goes without saying that dead Gaddafi did enlist a number
of Tuareg warriors in his poorly organised and infiltrated army, and as Libyans
they had all the right too to join the army of their government then, just as
Abdel Jalil himself was his Justice Minister and as many others who changed hats
once "bombs" fell.
Prime Minister el-Keib himself came out wearing a Berber
hat when Berber Protesters met outside his Tripoli office, on Sunday the
27th of November 2011, to demand
"recognition of identity", not language. To single out one particular
group from all others can only reflect the kind of belief that begs the mind
to reflect.
MNJ's Alambo told Reuters that
thousands of his rebel fighters joined the Libyan army to earn a better living
than back home in Niger. Many people then hopelessly accepted Gaddafi's military
apparatus sold to him by the West (and the East), despite countless coups to
topple his imposed regime, had it not been for his
"friends" who then were not ready to swap hats nor release the jinni from
the bottle. Read the statement made by the MNLA in relation to the allegations
spread by the media against them at: http://www.mnlamov.net/english/101-they-are-not-mercenaries.pdf .
Of course, there are those Tuareg who were not Libyans. Tens
of thousands of Tuareg refugees took shelter in Libya as a result of the disastrous
effects of the various rebellions and droughts that hit the Sahara in the past
decades. The Tuareg then were dying in their thousands, with hundreds of thousands
fleeing as refugees, but not many then wanted to know, as they do now, when the
trend is reversed, minus the extra disadvantage of taking home many weapons,
originally made in the West and the East.
Even then, Reuters wrote, "Tuaregs
. . . backed Gaddafi and view the NTC with suspicion". Does "Tuaregs" here
mean "All Tuaregs"? Cannot anyone tell us the scientific truth and
say how many of the 4 million Tuareg had supported
Gaddafi and how many did not? Confusingly in the same article Reuters replied: "Many Tuaregs
back Gaddafi because he supported their rebellion against the governments of
Mali and Niger in the 1970s." The Tuareg themselves, who can legitimately
answer better than anyone else, say hardly any -- far less than the number of
Arabs who supported Gaddafi from all walks of Libya -- the heroes of the so-called "Arab
Spring", in which Berber r-evolution-aries were
martyred only to be harshly labeled "agents of foreign agendas".
Besides if Gaddafi did really support the Tuareg's rebellions in Mali and Niger,
why then did not he grant them their autonomy in Libya?
More confusing than all, is the issue of the media, the twin "brother" of
war, without which war cannot do. The "staged meeting"
between Gaddafi, when he was still clutching to his sinking ship, and the supposed
Tuareg tribal leaders, who declared their support for his looming farewell, surely
shows people dressed in Tuareg attire, but the way they wore them, the way they
walked, and they way they carried themselves are in no way similar to those of
genuine nomads. This staged support did resonate across the world and many took
the bait. They took it very well. Similarly, those
little allies he gathered before Aljamahiria's studios during his last speeches,
waving the green flag in slow motion, with the picture cutting off now and then
to replay, over and over again, reflect just that:
the very little and staged support he had among his Arabs, let alone from the
Berbers.
After Gaddafi's predicted and grotesque death, the NTC "urged" its
rebel fighters not to take revenge and to respect the law. Ask any Libyan and
they will tell you exactly what the NTC itself says: powerless lions, urging
teenagers to lay down their (given) arms. The NTC begged its "thowwar",
as it begged the UN to release the frozen funds, but no one listened then. The
Libyans all agree: "let the pigeons loose and run beneath."
And so it follows that the unstoppable rebels run amok the
streets of Tripoli, and sadly elsewhere, as they began executing the earlier
commands of Gaddafi: "from house to house", in search of not "rats" but "green" Blue
Nomad Berbers or any "black" African, Libyans included -- except that
they are colour-blind. The media on the other hand was ready, as ever, to "document" and
archive the "records" with the fresh atrocities taking place in NTC's
new Libya; for later to use, my dear friends, and not for the love of facts.
The reported atrocities committed by both: the Gaddafi government
and the NTC government are well documented by Amnesty International and others
who also documented the atrocities of the UN and its military auxiliaries. Freedom
of speech compels us to read them, and there is no need to go on claiming ideals
that are hard to come by, even elsewhere! Read
Amnesty International Report (mde190252011en) here. One needs to learn from
past mistakes, blaming others is not the way forward but child's play.
According to Reuters, Aghaly
Ag Alambo, the leader of the MNJ, spoke of atrocities committed by the
rebels including one incident in which four "humans"
were gunned down near where he lived and their bodies were thrown in the courtyard
of a nearby ruined clinic. Aljazeera later on showed lots of
bodies left to rot on the pavements and on the grass of Tripoli for days on end,
with the rebels refusing to burry them, just as the body of the deposed "despot" was
left to trickle putrefied liquid in a meat locker in Mesratha with the stench
of freedom attracting onlookers queuing for 20 Libyan dinars.
Since when are we Libyans proud of humiliation and
revenge? No need twisting words out of contexts or "throwing a monkey
wrench in the works", since the need to remain humane humans ought
not be confused with the politics of hatred and sad reprisals. We must remain
the Libyans once we were, and Humans united at that, resisting all attempts to
divide, regardless of ethnicity, opinion, colour or even gender!
Alambo eventually fled over the roofs and found his way to
Bani Walid, from where he continued to Sabha, before he returned to his turbulent
home: Niger, to start the cycle all over again. While Ag
Hassini "called" for Algeria to re-open its border with Libya
to allow Tuareg refugees an escape route out of liberated Libya, as he urged
the National Transitional Council to address the issue and restrain its
frenzied "youth" to behave like mature
"adults".
It would make life like not-hell if people do recognise
the humble truth of the gifted life in which they live, and which we, all, will
depart, one way or another, equally for sure. Hear
the drums of once-rebel Tinariwen's Walla Illa and
you will learn what the masters of the Sahara want you to see. Meanwhile, people
are free to spend eternity fighting the "invisible
enemy" if it suits them very well.
Walla Illa: I go quietly to pay Mizgawa a small visit
It's better for a man to preserve his soulful nobility and keep his memories
safe
My anxieties drive me to cigarettes, full of illness
It's better for a man to possess nobility of soul and keep his memories safe
It has nestled in my lungs like a poison
My friends truth itself is always hard, unconquerable
He who hears it can turn into a rebel
August 2011:
In a Press Release by The Tuareg
Coordination of Libya, signed by Ishaq Ag Alhusseyni,
the Tuareg expressed their:
"Deep anxiety concerning the present situation of
the Tuareg community living in Libya. Since the fall of Tripoli, there has been
and continues to be many executions amongst Tuareg Libyan civilians. The organization
of a very serious massacre is being prepared under the eye of the international
media. We demand that the press coverage be responsible and ethical concerning
the spirit of vengeance that prevails amongst certain rebel groups. We are calling
the TNC, the International Community, NATO, the RED CROSS and all other international
organizations to apply the standards of international law, as established in
the Geneva International Convention, and to respect and protect innocent civilians
and victims in the Libyan conflict. The collected evidence is unanimous; many
civil Tuaregs have been executed and continue to be in Tripoli. Tuaregs in the
Libyan refugee camp of Debdeb in Algeria have reported of serious threats of
massacre against members of their community in the city of Ghadames situated
in the south of Libya. “The rebels are threatening the Tuareg to make them pay
the price by bloodshed of their pretended support to Kaddafi’s
regime."
"At the present time, several thousand Tuareg families,
mostly from the regions of Dereg and Ghadames, have fled to Algeria by fear of
reprisals. Most have found refuge in the town of Debdeb in Algeria located twenty
kilometers of Ghadames. The Tuareg community, who at the moment is trapped between
two forces, fears a bloodbath. Forced to Submit to Kaddafi’s followers in the
south, where “the Kadhafa’s” have reigned for decades and suspected by the northern
communities to be partisans of Kadhafi, the Libyan Tuaregs have become the target
of acts of vengeance committed by the Chebab, despite the laws of the Geneva
convention. Since the beginning of the conflict, civil Tuareg Libyans have seen
the fighting take a heavy toll within their communities. In the south, many were
enrolled to participate in pro Kaddafi demonstrations and found themselves parachuted
on the front lines of the conflict. Since March 2011 and before NATO’s interventions,
many military Tuaregs who refused to participate in repression operations were
executed by army officials. Over a thousand military Tuareg loyalists have died
since the bombing of NATO and during the battle of Misrata."
"At the same time, several isolated Tuareg groups
have tempted to join the rebellion, despite the communication difficulties. Collaboration
succeeded between the rebels and Libyan Tuareg groups during the battles of Zenten,
Nalut near the Tunisian border and Nefussa. Since April 2011, several
delegates of the Tuareg Coordination met with the TNC in order to organize coordination
with the rebels in southern territories. This is an urgent appeal addressed
to the TNC’s armed forces, to NATO and to the Red Cross to immediately stop all
acts of vengeance perpetuated by the rebel’s armed forces. Guaranties and elementary
rights must be respected and applied in accordance with the Geneva Convention
and the United Nations resolutions. Over 200 000 people are concerned by the
threat of massacre in prevision of the fall of Kadhafi’s regime."
The Tuareg Coordination of Libya
Ishaq Ag Alhusseyni Contact: ishaq@wanadoo.fr ; ghoumar@gmail.com
Media reports say that
many of the 80,000 African migrants who had been employed by Qaddafi's government
in the Libyan army have returned to Niger. Many of these returned with their
weapons. The Nigerien government feared the outbreak of yet another rebellion
which it calls "violence in the country". So far, there are
at least three confirmed reports of Libyan convoys arriving in Niger, accompanied
by military vehicles and high-ranking Libyan government officials, including
Gaddafi's son Saadi. The second convoy was said to consist of 250 military vehicles,
but no reports are available as to what kind of weapons this convoy was carrying.
When a few weeks later the NTC requested Saadi to be extradited to Libya to face
charges of murder (over the death of former Libyan midfielder and coach of the
national team Basheer Al-Rryani in the 1980s), the Niger government refused to
surrender Saadi to the NTC, saying it fears he will not face justice, and that
he is not wanted by the International Criminal Court. In December 2011 the Mexican
authorities foiled a plan to smuggle Saadi to Mexico using fake documents via
the Middle East. Earlier in the week a Tuareg news website reported a number
of Libyan officials crossing into Niger. On the following day Aljazeera confirmed
the news, after a larger convoy of military vehicles, soldiers and high-ranking
officials crossed into Niger. It has been estimated that there are at least 20
high-ranking Libyan officials in Niger as of September 2011.
Tuareg Battle Their Way: September
was also the month in which the Tuareg of Libya were dragged into a number of
battles with armed rebel groups affiliated to Libya's NTC in and around Ghadames,
the Berber Pearl of the Sahara. Some Western leaders did promise civil
war or chaos early on, and Libya's interim leaders did warn of civil war, but
the world can rest assured that there will be no civil war in Libya; just skirmishes
that express frustration more than anything else.
30 September 2011:
Libya's interim military chief Suleiman Mahmoud al-Obeidi
attended a meeting in Ghadames between Tuareg tribesmen and local Arabs, apparently "to
patch up" differences that started in July and which Reuters says " have
recently spilled over into violence".
Happy New Year.
January 2012:
The Fourth Tuareg Rebellion:
Autonomous Azawad:
The Official Website of the MNLA: http://www.mnlamov.net/english.html
MNLA: National Movement for
the Liberation of Azawad: according to the organisation, the aim of
the Tuareg group is to liberate Azawad from the illegal occupation of its territory
by the Malian government. After the collapse or failure of a number of peace
talks and accords with the government, during the previous rebellions, the group
is forced, they say, to take up arms as well as enlist the support of the various
Tuareg communities in the region in order to achieve the independence of the
Azawad region of northern Mali. The CMA urged all parties to resolve the issue
via peaceful means. It seems, like before, the Malian government said it
is prepared (but
never ready)
to open dialogue (only to close it) with the Tuareg,
but it will not tolerate a revolution (which it calls violence).
And just like Gaddafi and others had said about the people they suppressed,
the Malian government and its media accused the rebels of working with al-Qaida.
Read the statement made by the MNLA in relation to the allegations spread by
the "international
media" against them at: http://www.mnlamov.net/english/101-they-are-not-mercenaries.pdf .
The MNLA was formed during the autumn of 2011 by a number
of Tuareg groups and volunteers. The re-union included rebels from the MFUA;
the MTNM (previously led by the late Ibrahim Ag Bahanga); volunteers
from the various ethnic groups of northern Mali including Tuareg, Songhai,
Peul and Moor; and Tuareg fighters who have returned from
Libya recently, mostly those who took part in the fight against
Gaddafi, a small number of those who served in the Libyan army before the dictator's
fall, those who refused to fight against the Libyan rebels during the
February wars, and those who fought alongside rebel forces loyal to
the NTC. The media, as usual, does not make this distinction.
The
MNLA's military campaign is led by the head of its military wing Colonel Mohamed
Ag Najim.
The General Secretary of the MNLA is Bilal Ag Sharif. MNLA's
spokesman Moussa
Ag Acharatoumane said the
struggle will continue until the government of Mali accepts the Tuareg's right
to self-determination, and therefore a clear statement
that the Fourth Tuareg Rebellion (or the Fifth according to others) to liberate
Azawad had indeed began. Based in the south of the country, the Malian government
has little control over the Tuareg region in the north, but it has recently deployed
reinforcements to the areas round Timbuktu, Kidal and Gao, as well as at Tin-Zaouatene,
on the Algerian border, north of Adrar des Ifoghas. Also Ag Acharatoumane
told France24 that their units are on the move and not stationed in any one particular
place, and that most of their forces are still "not
engaged."
17 January 2012: the town of Menaka was taken
by Tuareg fighters. The bastion of the MNLA Menaka,
located approximately 400 km south of Kidal, was the place where the 1990 Second
Tuareg Rebellion began. The fighters started firing late on Monday and continued
until Tuesday morning. Using combat helicopters the fighters were eventually
pushed back by the Malian army. Six rebel vehicles were destroyed, several were
arrested, and at least one Malian soldier and several rebels fell dead. The Defence
Ministry said Tuareg fighters from the MNLA and
Libyan ex-soldiers were responsible for the attacks.
According to Reuters, "A
statement on a website purporting to be that of the separatist MNLA said the
group launched the attacks and blamed their action on what they said was the
Malian government's refusal to engage in dialogue . . . "To protect and
progressively re-occupy Azawad territory and also respond to Bamako's provocation,
the men of the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad have chosen to
act," the statement said. "It is in this context that military action
started in Menaka this morning," it said."
18 January 2012: following yesterday's
clashes, fighters attacked the town of Aguelhok,
approximately 140 km north of Kidal, in northern Mali. Both the rebel fighters
and government soldiers claim to be in control of Aguelho. The MNLA spokesman
said fighting was suspended in Tessalit to allow for the withdrawal of Algerian
soldiers who had been helping Mali. Reports speak of "heavy weapons" used,
probably smuggled from Libya's free-for-all munitions bunkers that were left unguarded
for months and months. The rebels were initially pushed back, but later returned
with heavy reinforcements, forcing government soldiers to retreat to Kidal.
19 January 2012:
The Malian government said its army had killed 45 Tuareg fighters, but the
Tuareg deny the claims, saying the figure is designed to boost the low morals
of the Malian army after their heavy defeat, in which 30 to 40 government soldiers
died. Both sides claim control of Menaka.
20 January 2012:
Bilal Ag Sharif, the general secretary of the
MNLA, tells Alakhbar, Mauritania's first independent media (see above link),
that indirect talks are taking place between the MNLA and the Malian government,
but they do not represent any "proper dialogue" because the Malian
government must first recognise the MNLA.
According to Ag Sharif, in his first media interview with Alakhbar:
Menaka Liberated: the liberation army of Azawad
had liberated the town of Menaka, before it withdrew to the outskirts to allow
the return of normal life. When the Malian army sent reinforcements, it was defeated
and suffered from defections. One Tuareg fighter was injured while four civilians
died.
Aguelhok: Ag Sharif informs Alakhbar that fighting
had ended there, and that the Tuareg are in complete control of the town. Dozens
of Malian military vehicles were destroyed in an ambush by Tuareg fighters.
Two Malian Aircrafts Lost: Ag Sharif also relates
that their forces had captured ten government soldiers including a colonel; and
destroyed two aircrafts, with one shot in Menaka before it crashed in the way
to Gao.
The Malian authorities are using extremism and trafficking as an excuse,
but to the contrary it is the Bamako government that has relations with trafficking
networks and even with the AQIM. He also stated that they have no connection
with AQIM nor with the "drug gangs" that are "prevalent
throughout the world".
Ag Sharif called for their brothers and the international community to assist
in the crisis, as he called for respecting international laws guaranteeing the
right of self-determination, independence and freedom.
World Amazigh Congress Manifesto in Support of the People
of Azawad:
بـيـان بشأن الأحداث في أقليم : أزواد
(1)
الكونغرس العالمي الأمازيغي، بصفته منظمة أمازيغية دولية، تهدف إلى الدفاع عن
الأمازيغ ووجودهم، ووجود ثقافتهم ولغتهم وحضارتهم، سواء في أوطانهم أو عبر العالم،
وحمايتهم من مختلف أشكال التمييز والإقصاء والعنف المعنوي والمادي، يتابع بكل اهتمام
بالغ وجدية، ومنذ فترة طويلة، الأحداث والوقائع الميدانية التي تجري على أرض إقليم
“أزواد”، بشمال مالي، وكذلك سياسات الحكومة المالية تجاه الشعب الأزوادي بمختلف
مكوناته العرقية والثقافية، ولهذا نسجل استنكارنا الشديد للانتهاكات الحقوقية الجسيمة،
والسياسيات الإقصائية المشينة، والأخطر من كل ذلك العنف المسلح الممارس تجاه المدنيين
العزل، والذي يعد جرائم حرب وضد الإنسانية، وأخرها ما حدث نهار أمس17 يناير 2012،
بمنطقة : مينيكا، بأقليم أزواد، حيث قامت القوات المالية بقصف السكان المدنيين العزل.
الكونغرس العالمي الأمازيغي، إذ يعلن عن مساندته ودعمه لكل المطالب الحقوقية والسياسية
الأزوادية المشروعة، التي يتطلع إليها شعب أزواد، ويعبر عنها بإرادته الحرة المستقلة،
يناشد هيئة الأمم المتحدة، والإتحاد الأوربي، والإتحاد الأفريقي، ودول الجوار، وكل
المنظمات الحقوقية الدولية، التحرك العاجل من أجل إنصاف الحقوق العادلة لإخوتنا
الأزواديين. الكونغرس العالمي الأمازيغي الرئيس فتحي نخليفه
Source: http://ossanlibya.org/?p=24120
The above statement deplores the marginalisation of the Tuareg
at all levels and the atrocities committed by the government against civilians,
and calls for the UN, African Union and the European Union to intervene to establish
justice.
26 January 2012:
Thursday: Tuareg rebels in Mali had taken the town of Lere,
about 600 km northeast of the capital Bamako, without a fight. Apparently the
Malian government withdrew its forces from the town a day earlier, just as it
did in Aguelhok earlier in the week after the Malian army sustained heavy casualities.
The rebels had also attacked Malian army positions in Anderamboukane,
near the Niger border. The Tuareg said they have captured the army base and raised
the flag of Azawad over the liberated town.
29 January 2012:
Refugee Crisis: according to Alakhbar (http://www.alakhbar.info/22134-0-0FAFCA0-CF0C-C-.html)
nearly 2,058 Azawadians had escaped to Mauritania in the past three days, and
that Mauritania did allow the refugees to stay at Fasala, by the border
with Mali, but no services were provided for those who escaped
the
"fighting hell" in Azawad. It also said that its sources
had denied the existence of any refugee camps in the area, but that the Mauritanian
authorities are watching closely. Baskno also received a number of refugees including government
defectors.
30 January 2011:
According to a press release seen by Alakhbar,
Tuareg liberation fighters said five MNLA members including Yousef Qasem Migha
were arrested by Malian forces and were taken to an "unknown destination".
They also said government forces had stormed the house of Shikh Mini Weld Bab
Alkounti in the village of Anfeef, and while searching the property they "stole
12 million African francs" before leaving the house.
04 February 2012:
Timbuktu: 20 Tuareg rebels were killed and 12
injured during two days of fighting in the region of Timbuktu, the Malian Defence
Minister said on Saturday. Air force
helicopters were used to attack Tuareg rebel positions near Niafunke.
Fighting also broke out near Kidal, where reporters
heard "heavy weapons fire" overnight and through Saturday morning, in an attempt
by the rebels to take control of the two military camps in the area and liberate
the strategic town of Kidal. Civilians have been seen fleeing Kidal and
Bamako in the past few days. So far, nearly 3,500 people
had fled to Mauritania, while the International Committee for the Red Cross said
nearly 10,000 people had crossed into Niger as a result of the clashes that took
place around Menaka and Anderamboucane.
Unified Berber movements refers to the Berber organisations that were formed
by the unity of Berberists from the various Berber groups and associations found
in North Africa and abroad. During the 1990s the Berbers' campaign for freedom
took an international form, where activists began to attend a number of international
conferences to help bring the issue to the attention of the UN and the "outside
world". Their pleas for freedom and recognition were ignored locally by
the dictators of North Africa, as they failed so far to attract justice so often
is the focus of all claims!
(1)
Amazigh World Congress : AWC (Congrès mondial amazigh: CMA):
1995: Amazigh World Congress:
The Amazigh World Congress (Congrès mondial amazigh:
CMA): was founded in France in 1995, when the historic Amazigh Pre-congress gathering
took place in Saint-Rome de Dolan, France, between the 1st and the 3rd of September
1995. But the idea was born a year earlier, when in October 1994 the CFPCMA (Committee
in France for the Preparation of the Amazigh World Congress) was set up, after
preparational talks held in the summer of 1994, in Douarnenez (Brittany, France).
This then was officially created on the 22nd of March 1995. The structure of
the organisation has 32 members, a World Bureau of 11 members, and five Commissions.
It was attended by 75 delegates representing various associations, groups and
individuals from Libya, Niger, Mali, Canary Islands, and other European countries,
particularly Spain, France, United Kingdom, Belgium and Germany. Surprisingly,
Algeria was absent, apparently because the Algerian delegates were unable to
obtain visas to enter France. For the first time in modern history Berberists
from various Berber countries including human rights campaigners, academicians,
musicians & artists, students & researchers, and militants and rebel
groups, set together to discuss the current status of the Berbers. This is not
to say that collective efforts were not taking place before then, as many Berberists
and Berber scholars and musicians from Libya, Algeria and Morocco were in regular
contact with each other, exchanging information and material including printed
publications and music albums and tapes.
Criticism: some Berberists
did voice their concerns over the allegations that the congress or some members
of the congress are agents of Arab governments (of both Libya and Algeria) and
of foreign powers, but no evidence presented. However, tension and disagreement
within the organisation were widely reported. Like many other "freedom movements",
there is no doubt the CMA has its share of enemies, and only time and transparency
will reveal the ultimate objectives.
The topics explored by the congress were defined as follows:
To define the legal status of the Berbers in each of the countries of North
Africa.
To identify and document the status of the Berber movements in each of the
countries of North Africa.
To coordinate independent research efforts to set a framework for the development
of Tamazight Language.
To explore the venues available to secure funding and expertise to administer
the projects of the organisation.
To develop a permanent institution of resources for the development and preservation
of Berber heritage.
To represent the Indigenous peoples of North Africa and the Amazigh immigrant
communities of the world.
To study the socio-economic functions of Tamazight.
To explore the issue of officialisation, such as making Tamazight an official
language.
To research the introduction of Tamazight in education.
To internationalise the Berber cause and campaign for international recognition.
2008:
Division Within The CMA: the
news of the CMA's internal fracture began to appear in the media shortly after
the congress' fifth session in 2008. The meeting was scheduled to take place
in Tizi-Ouzou, the Berber capital of Algeria, but after the Algerian government's
refusal to allow the organisation to hold its 5th session in Kabylia, the main
faction of the CMA (the majority) decided instead to hold the event in Meknes,
Morocco. But a minority group, led by former CMA President Rachid Raha and Ahmed
Dgherni, decided to come against the majority decision by insisting on the congress
to be held in Tizi-Ouzou. Feeling euphoric to challenge the Algerian government,
they flew to Algiers, but expectedly were denied entry into the country after
they arrived at Algiers Airport, and consequently were sent to Casablanca. However,
the CMA continued with its three-day session in Meknes between the 31st of October
and the 2nd of November. The president Lounes Belkacem was reported to have said
that there were no two congresses because any legitimate congress requires the
approval of the Federal Bureau. He also said that Ahmed Dgherni (the Secretary-General
of the PDAM: Amazigh Democratic Party in Morocco) has no link with the CMA, and
that Rachid Raha appears to have "personal ambition to be president",
something which he can pursue only through the assembly and not via a coup*.
The split has resurfaced this year (2011), when
www.amazighnews.com wrote: "Rachid Raha: «Le congrès de Djerba n'a rien
de légal !»" (the Djerba congress is not legal). The article**
speaks of lawyer Hassan Id Belkassem repeating the same song of October 2008,
like a broken record. (See next for the Djerba session.)
Djerba, Tunisia
(29 September 2011 - 2 October 2011) Delegations attended the session: Algeria, Morocco, Libya, Canary
Islands, Tuareg, Tunisia, and International delegations (including from Catalonia,
Corsica, the European Union and international media).
Final Communiqué & Amendments (02/10/2011):
Appointment of new President: Libya's representative Mr. Fathi Benkhalifa has
been elected the new president by the council, replacing Mr. Belkacem Lounes.
Union of North African Peoples (UNAP):
a meeting of North African Berbers was held in Tangier, Morocco, as part of the
7th edition of the TWIZA Festival of Tangier, on the 23rd and the 24th of July
2011. The participants agreed to form the Union of North African Peoples
(UNAP), with Ferhat Mehenni as president
(for three years). Representatives of the Berber countries are as follows:
Ferhat Mehenni of the Interim Government of Kabylia (Algeria); President.
Fethi Benkhelifa of the Transitional National Council (Libya).
Thomas Quintana of the Canary Islands.
Khadija Bensaidane of Tunisia.
Ahmed Arehmouch of Morocco.
Other countries that were not represented in this meeting
are advised to submit a membership application. Filing of articles of association
will be decided in its next meeting, scheduled for the end of August.
According to Sylvia Smith, writing for the BBC (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-14650257)
:
"This would transform the greater Arab Maghreb from
an Arab-dominated region into a confederation of states that would take the Berber
voice into account. But without a single unifying dialect and caught between
very different situations in each country, their bid for unity and greater rights
could easily be once more lost, especially if radical Islamist groups take the
place of the deposed despots they helped to oust."
(3)
AMA: l’Assemblée Mondiale Amazighe:
"For The Consolidation of The Rights of
Imazighen."
After the recent sixth assembly in Tunisia, the CMA reconvened in Brussels
between the 9th and the 11th of December 2011. The participants have agreed to
create a new, non-profit, non-governmental organisation in accordance with Belgian
law. The move to restructure the CMA under Belgian law allows the Berber organisation
the protection of international institutions and of the European Union. The new
organisation will replace the existing World Amazigh Congress and its constitution
and structure. The name of the new organisation in Tamazight is Agraw
Amadlan Amazigh
(Amazigh World Assembly: AWA).
Previously the CMA and its regional branches came under criticism over a number
of issues, resulting in conflict arising within the organisation. The new restructure
aims to unite the differences under the umbrella of the Amazigh World Assembly
(AMA). Its draft "Manifesto" calls for a Democratic
Confederation Tamazgha, social and cross-border, based on the right
to "regional autonomy". This
project will be sent to local associations and other regional and national parties
for review and possible amendments, before the final validation at the next general
meeting (scheduled for October 2012, in Nador, Morocco).
Defending the right to "cultural identity" and "regional autonomy" and
establishing
"democratic institutions" in North Africa.
Promotion, protection and development of freedom, democracy, equality, tolerance,
and indigenous rights including the rights of the Imazighen women, men and children
of North Africa.
Campaign against all forms of marginalisation, exclusion and discrimination.
Campaign for "official recognition" of Tamazight identity, culture and language in
the various countries of North Africa.
Promotion and development of Tamazight language and culture.
Coordination and consolidation between the various Tamazight associations
at all levels.
Creation of communication means to implement the coordination, including
newspapers, periodicals, books, magazines, cassettes, CDs, radios, films, TV,
video, and IT.
Preserving acculturation (: 'cultural modification by adapting to or borrowing
traits from another culture').
Rehabilitation and rewriting Tamazight history and civilisations for educational
and research purposes.
Protection of Tamazight heritage, such as historical monuments, museums and
archaeological and prehistoric sites.
Legal fundraising to finance the activities of the AMA.
Development of trade between the Imazighen and other peoples on the basis
of universal values of diversity, tolerance, modernity, solidarity, cooperation,
mutual respect, reciprocal recognition, and the struggle against racism.
Defence and promotion of the values of peace and conflict-resolution via
diligent dialogue.
Defence and promotion of civil, political, economic, social, cultural and
linguistic rights of the Imazighen people.
The Structure of The Amazigh World Assembly:
The General Assembly
The Confederal Council
The Confederal Bureau
Local, Regional And National Structures
Ad hoc Committees
The Committee of The Wise
Confederal Council
M. El Battiui Mohamed, President
M. Mimoun Sharqi, Chairman of honour and legal affairs
Louisa Hadad, Deputy Chairman and Secretary-General for France
GDF M. Aissa, Secretary-General
Moussa Backa, General Treasurer
Jamal Alatiaoui, Treasurer-General
Rachid Raha, Deputy Chairman of International Relations
Thomas Fortune, Deputy Chairman for the Tuareg
Ibrahim Ag Wanasnati, Executive Vice President for the Tuareg
Badr Aiyachi, Spokesperson and Head of Communications
Mohamed Elmajjoudi, Deputy Chairman for Belgium
Naima Nahnah, President Delegate for Spain
Amina Ibn Sheikh, President Delegate for Morocco
Faisal Aoussar, Deputy Chairman for the general Rif
Ghazal Abdellah, Deputy Chairman for the general Atlas
Mohamed and NouredinHathout Elhamouti, Members Officers missions.
The International Tuareg (internationale touareg) is an active organisation
campaigning for greater rights for the Tuareg of the Sahara. One of their objectives
is the conservation and advocacy of Touareg groups in accordance with the Declaration
on The Rights of Indigenous Peoples of September 13, 2007. The group has
participated in the 7th session of the UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues
(held in New York from 21/04 to 02/05/2008); attended the fifth assembly of the
World Amazigh Congress (held in Meknes, Morocco, from 31/10 to 02/11/2008); and
took part in the Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (held in
Geneva).
The Board:
President
Consultant / VP
6 Advisors
The Bureau:
A secretary
A Treasurer
A representative of Niger
A representative of Burkina Faso
1 representative from Belgium
A representative of the United Nations
A project manager
Projects:
Organisation of a popular forum on the rights of indigenous peoples.
Food aid to displaced Tuareg.
Reconstruction of Tuareg heritage.
Participation in United Nations Permanent Forum.
Participation in the mechanisms of UN experts in Geneva and New York.
Global Recognition of Tamazight:
International support for the Berbers' modern cause began
to take some visible form from 1990s; but although some countries did express
sympathy long before then, there was nothing serious, just some basic human rights
scribbled to appease the appalling state of mind many minorities came to endure.
The United Nations, USA, France, Canada and Spain have all expressed their sincere
reservations regarding the persecution and negligence the Berbers currently still
suffer in North Africa, with some passing on minor recommendations, declarations & advice
to encourage leaders to introduce democratic reforms and respect human rights.
But, the Berbers are stuck with the masquerading cycle of dictators:
installed; encouraged to reform; before they were dragged out of "dug" holes.
Thence the Berbers came to disregard all aborted efforts
as broken promises and ignore all peace accords as mere recommendations and dry
words lacking "action", if not instigated to divide resistance and
cries of reform. It is indeed a dubious irony allowing powerless people the right
to "free speech"
while at the same time granting totalitarian authorities the power "to
do"
wrong deeds. However, no one as yet had the courage to come out "of
the hole" voluntarily and speak the outlawed "truth" many
Arab dictators and kings see "too sensitive to discuss",
such as full citizenship, full recognition of "identity", and "self
governing". These they say pose a serious challenge to their illegitimate
political tyranny, which will ultimately shatter their surrogate authority and
theoretical unity, even though they do not in reality.
Still there is hope, since while the 2011 uprisings in North
Africa were underway, Hillary Clinton hinted at the prospect of better human
rights for the Berber communities of North Africa, when she referenced (in Youtube, at
minute 2:28) the limited freedom the "Amazigh Community" and the Arabs
of Morocco have under the rule of the king, and rightly expected greater reforms
from the king -- whose country's population apparently did not seek a "regime
change"
but only "greater reforms"! A few months later down the line the king
agreed to hold a referendum, and again few months later Berber language was at
last voted one of the official languages of Morocco. The first ever theoretical
victory the Berbers had achieved in modern history. It seems certain that indigenous
peoples are recognised as human beings only when powers take notice of them,
otherwise they will remain persecuted for as long as it takes for the powers
to fully recognise them as human beings.
It can be argued that what is happening now to the Berbers
of Libya is very similar to how the Berbers of Algeria and Morocco had ended
up after the (semi) independence wars. During the Arabisation movement in Algeria
the Arab government urged the Berbers to put their Berber demands behind and
instead concentrate on the national unity of Algeria. The NTC of today's Libya
urged the "Berber revolutionaries" to "disappear" or "integrate" and
instead concentrate on uniting Libya; except that most Libyans agree that no
one knows how to go on about uniting Libya, or even what uniting means. The definitions
of "liberation", "freedom"
and "justice" are never spoken about, while the definition of the word "people" (in
the popular phrase "let the people decide their own destiny") is unclear
and in practice always refers to "Arab people".
The Arab thinkers of North Africa have always maintained that the Berber issue
is a recent colonial strategy to "divide and rule". But history, of
course, shows that the Berbers were always in the front during their wars against
the colonial intruders. This was demonstrated in Libya, Algeria, Morocco and
by the Berber Tuareg of the Mother Sahara. In fact the colonial masters seemed united
in their inclination to ignore the Berbers' right for independence and freedom
across the whole of North Africa, while at the same time appeared eager to elevate
a particular flavour of "Arabism"; probably to serve other regional
strategies in which "native identities" most often appear as "pawns".
Most North African leaders of the past century fell victims to these "war
games", and consequently brought destruction after destruction upon their
countries. Revolts, coups, wars, revolutions, uprisings, springs and falls, all
come and go as a matter of routine -- and always without full consultation with
the "people"! But many Arabs and Berbers of today strongly feel that
the time has come for both the Arabs and Berbers to unite, embrace "freedom" and
"democracy" (without any limitations), and wake up to the limitless
opportunities their countries can achieve. They have all the means to create
a regional superpower on a global scale, and yet they are no where to be seen,
dead-locked in wars, pain and poverty.
Before, people were isolated by both geographical and political
borders. But now, with the Internet technologies becoming widely available, they
are closer to one another than ever before, and hence the opportunity to share
the facts. The availability of Berber material from diverse tribes and sources
in the World Wide Web has to be considered as the most important factor in the
recent Berber developments. For the first time in history anyone with a computer
and an Internet connection can explore the whole world right from within their
home, and for once read the simple truth. The most important issue the Berbers
need to address at the current stage is to start writing their own history, document
their culture, and break away from this long period of darkness in which supremacists
wrote like tyrants. Upsidedown-minded despots were quick to spot the indisputable
danger of the new revolution. The Chinese Government became so anxious as
Internet usage quadrupled in year 2000, but by 2010 it was itself heavily implicated
in hacking scandals. The British Metropolitan Police admitted net
use has swelled the number of contributors to the carnival against Capitalism
in the “CITY” of London on the 18th of June 1999. Dr Rodney Barker
argues that if net usage and voting become global, political parties might cease
to exist. The natives of America & Canada, the Basques of Europe, the
Berbers of Africa, the Aboriginal natives of Australia, the Kurds and many
other indigenous peoples of Asia, and most of the world's demoralised and poor
minorities now use the Internet to research and publish information about their
respected cultures and make themselves heard in a deaf environment, free nations
know as the just world of reverberating morality and order, and dignified nation-less
hamlets see as "chaos" and
"injustice", thriving with marcescent policies, economic inequality
and governments brutality.
In contrast to the dictators' grip and censorship, smart government
agencies instead can extensively utilise the technology to launch cyber attacks
and obfuscated media wars. With the advent of social networking, such as beloved-not
Facebook and Twitter, various institutions now have access to new kind of weaponry.
For instance, during the recent wave of uprisings that hit North Africa and the
Middle East, as it is currently building momentum in the western world, the western
media including Aljazeera.net had reported that government-backed western hackers
were found to have created thousands of fake Facebook and Twitter accounts calling
for military intervention from the West in their respected countries. The irony
of it all is that where repressive despots suppressed the press to report freely,
super powerful Youtube amateur streams claimed the upper hand and began publishing
all kinds of home-made videos, showing atrocities and allegations from both
sides of the story that are impossible to verify, and yet media giants use
them to popularise their points of view, but not of the enemy's. To
get around this tricky paradox news readers always say they "cannot
independently verify the video" -- after they show it, over and over,
of course! Why bother showing home footage implicating both sides of horrendous
crimes and putting their lives in danger when one cannot independently
verify the material at hand? Where are the high standards previously claimed
to be the foundation of proper journalism?
United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples:
The United Nations General Assembly Declaration calls for member states, the
states already enjoying the benefits of the declaration, to respect the full
human rights of persecuted indigenous minorities (and majorities as in the case
of Morocco) including the rights to "self-determination", "self-government",
and "nationality".
The Declaration affirms that "all doctrines, policies and practices
based on or advocating superiority of peoples or individuals on the basis of
national origin or racial, religious, ethnic or cultural differences are racist,
scientifically false, legally invalid, morally condemnable and socially unjust".
Why then is it right the principles of justice apply only to certain peoples
who are often the colonisers, my dear "declared friends", while at
the same time the persecuted ones are always the helpless and law-abiding *uncitizens?
The Declaration of course is not a legally binding document under
international law; but it does however "represent the dynamic development
of international legal norms [and all that] and it reflects the [recommended]
commitment of the UN's member states to move [on] in certain [future] directions". Needless
to say, the UN "hopes" the declaration will set an "international
standard", a kind of precedent, for the treatment of indigenous peoples,
the ancient humans who brought all of us onto this earth, and for "thank
you" the offspring kill them, in so many ways.
The first "resolution 1/2 " was passed on the 29th of June 2006;
but it was not until the 13th of September 2007 that the resolution was voted
on during the General Assembly's 61st regular session. Some countries were not
happy with the implications -- the complications of "foreign agendas".
143 countries voted in favour, four against, 11 abstained, and 34 were absent.
The four countries that voted against the Declaration are: United States,
Australia, Canada and New Zealand, all of which were originally recent European
colonies, and all of which have a large number of indigenous minorities! Thousands
of native American languages were still in existence when the colonisers arrived,
but now the number is reduced to a mere few hundreds -- still very large in comparison
to one ruling foreign language, and a good sign of the kind of protection they
were afforded. However, all four countries have moved [on] to endorse the declaration
-- that is the recommended declaration. Mother's eternity will pass by before
they implement the just laws they daily apply to themselves.
The declaration affirms that "indigenous peoples are equal to all
other peoples, while recognizing the right of all peoples to be different, to
consider themselves different, and to be respected as such".
The Declaration is hoped to "enhance harmonious and cooperative relations
between the State and indigenous peoples, based on principles
of justice, democracy, respect for human rights, non-discrimination and
good faith."
Article 1:
"Indigenous peoples have the right to the full enjoyment, as a collective
or as individuals, of all human rights and fundamental freedoms as recognized
in the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
and international human rights law."
Article 2:
"Indigenous peoples and individuals are free and equal to all other peoples
and individuals and have the right to be free from any kind of discrimination,
in the exercise of their rights, in particular that based on their indigenous
origin or identity."
Article 3:
"Indigenous peoples have the right to self-determination.
By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely
pursue their economic, social and cultural development."
Article 4:
"Indigenous peoples, in exercising their right to self-determination, have
the right to autonomy or self-government in
matters relating to their internal and local affairs, as well as ways and means
for financing their autonomous functions."
Article 5:
"Indigenous peoples have the right to maintain and strengthen their distinct
political, legal, economic, social and cultural institutions, while retaining
their right to participate fully, if they so choose,
in the political, economic, social and cultural life of the State."
Article 6:
"Every indigenous individual has the right to a nationality".
Article 7:
"1. Indigenous individuals have the rights to life,
physical and mental integrity, liberty and security of person."
"2. Indigenous peoples have the collective right to live in freedom, peace
and security as distinct peoples and shall not be subjected to any act
of genocide or any other act of violence, including forcibly removing children
of the group to another group."
Article 8:
"1. Indigenous peoples and individuals have the right not
to be subjected to forced assimilation or destruction of their culture."
Article 9:
"Indigenous peoples and individuals have the right
to belong to an indigenous community or nation, in accordance with the
traditions and customs of the community or nation concerned. No discrimination
of any kind may arise from the exercise of such a right."
History tells us the Berbers have created one of the first "banking
systems" in the world, namely the fortified granary
castles of Nafousa Mountain and other areas, and yet they still do not have
a single bank of their own. Numbered at around 30 million, with a substantial
share of North Africa's businesses, land and wealth, there is no reason why they
cannot get together and help build their neglected, marginalised and poor regions
-- after all, fighting poverty starts at home!
The aspiring story of Elouise
Pepion Cobell, a member and a legendary leader of the Blackfeet Native
American Tribe of Montana, is very inspiring. The Blackfeet National Bank is
the first national bank located on Native American reservation and owned by a
Native American tribe. She Co-Chaired the bank, and directed the NACDC -- a non-profit
affiliate of Native American Bank. Being an activist, lawyer, and treasurer for
the Blackfeet, she challenged the "United States' mismanagement of trust
funds belonging to more than 500,000 individual Native Americans",
to eventually win in 2010 when the US government approved a $3.4 billion settlement.
Some of the funds will be used to "buy back lands and restore them
to the Native American tribes".
Download
the full United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: